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INTRODUCTION
From the crossbow to the rifle, the biplane to the jet fighter, the
mortar to the atomic bomb, advances in technology have often
been adapted for military ends.1  Because of their novel applica-
tions, however, new weapons sometimes have escaped the bounds
of international law.  For example, the military adaption of the air-
plane shortly following its invention at the beginning of the twenti-
eth century dramatically changed the dimensions of warfare,
making attacks far behind enemy lines much easier to carry out.
Especially during World War II, all sides routinely violated the 1938
League of Nations Resolution on aerial bombardment, its pur-
ported customary law analog,2 and the spirit, if not the exact letter,
of Article 25 of the 1907 Hague Regulations.  That article prohibits
attacking an undefended city3; the 1938 Resolution requires air
forces to take precautions to protect civilians, permits targeting
1. See William C. Martel, Technology and Military Power, 25 SUMMER FLETCHER FOREIGN
WORLD AFF. 177, 178 (2001).
2. See Thomas M. McDonnell, Cluster Bombs over Kosovo: A Violation of International
Law?, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 31, 74–75 nn.168–71 (2002) [hereinafter McDonnell, Cluster Bombs
over Kosovo] (quoting Resolution and discussing its status as custom).  Some of the foot-
notes and citations are drawn from my previous work, especially the above-cited piece.
3. Usually, the cities were defended in that they possessed anti-aircraft batteries, but
the principle underlying Article 25 is to protect civilians from direct attack.  This principle
was later more precisely expressed in the 1977 Additional Protocol I, which provides: “The
civilian population, as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack.”
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 51(2), June 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter A.P. I].
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military objectives only, and prohibits bombing civilians and civil-
ian objects, such as homes and hospitals.4
In World War II, Germany engaged in terror bombing of
London.5  Britain and the United States engaged in target area
bombing (“carpet bombing”) of German cities, including the
firebombing of Hamburg and Dresden.6  The Japanese bombed
Shanghai and Chungking.7  The United States dropped nuclear
weapons on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.8  Indis-
criminate bombing by all sides caused at least 1.5 million civilian
casualties in that conflict.9
It took over thirty years after World War II (and the global reac-
tion to the Vietnam War10) for the international community to
reaffirm the principle that all combatants—including air forces—
must discriminate between legitimate military targets and civilians.
Not until the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions
of 1949 (AP I and AP II) were adopted did the world community
again commit to the rule of the 1907 Hague Regulations and the
1938 League of Nations Resolution that, absent the presence of a
military objective, civilians and civilian objects were immune from
4. Third Committee to the Assembly, Reduction and Limitation of Armaments and Protec-
tion of Civilian Population Against Bombing from the Air in Case of War, League of Nations Doc.
A.69 1938 IX (1938).
5. See McDonnell, Cluster Bombs over Kosovo, supra note 2, at 62 nn.123–24. R
6. ALAN J. LEVINE, THE STRATEGIC BOMBING OF GERMANY, 1940–1945, at 59–63, 17–80
(1992) (noting that the British Royal Air Force played a more significant role than the
United States in the Hamburg attacks and carried out the incendiary bomb attack on Dres-
den, which was nevertheless part of an Anglo-American bombing program).
7. TAKASHI YOSHIDA, THE MAKING OF THE “RAPE OF NANKING,” HISTORY AND MEMORY
IN JAPAN, CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 27, 40 (2006); GAVAN MCCORMACK, THE EMPTINESS
OF JAPANESE INFLUENCE 265 (2001).
8. JOHN HERSEY, HIROSHIMA 25, 75 (1946).
9. Kenneth Hewitt, Place Annihilation: Area Bombing and the Fate of Urban Places, 73
ANNALS ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 257, 257, 263 (1983) (citing numbers as large as 1.6 mil-
lion); see Philip S. Meilinger, Winged Defense: Airwar, the Law, and Morality, ARMED FORCES &
SOC’Y 103, 104 (1993) (noting that of the thirty million people who died during World War
II, 5% were victims of aerial bombings); see also Hugo Slim, Why Protect Civilians? Innocence,
Immunity and Enmity in War, 79 INT’L AFF. 481, 490 (2003) (detailing that, in single rounds
of attacks taking place between 1943 and 1945, 45,000 civilians were killed in aerial bomb-
ings of Hamburg, between 70,000 and 150,000 civilians were killed in aerial bombings of
Dresden, and 100,000 civilians were killed in aerial bombings of Tokyo).
10. The United States dropped significantly more bombs on North and South Viet-
nam than all Allied Forces did in all theatres in World War II, causing a large part of the
estimated 195,000 to 430,000 civilian deaths.  Charles Hirschman, Samuel Preston & Vu
Manh Loi, Vietnamese Casualties During the American War: A New Estimate, 21 POPULATION &
DEVEL. REV. 783, 790 (1995) (citing GUENTER LEWY, AMERICA IN VIETNAM app. I (1978);
T.C. THAYER, WAR WITHOUT FRONTS: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN VIETNAM (1985))
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attack.11  Because of the previous state practice, the international
community has had to work hard to re-establish the fundamental
principle of discrimination, of protecting civilians in armed
conflict.12
Like the advent of the airplane nearly a century earlier, the
advent of the weaponized, remotely controlled drone has changed
the dimensions of warfare.  Now, an attacker can strike from the
comfort of a control room, thousands of miles away from any
action.13  Governments possessing drones may, therefore, be
tempted to carry out an increased number of attacks, perhaps
legally questionable (if not absolutely illegal), because no member
of their armed forces suffers any risk whatsoever.  Remotely con-
trolled drones were initially used for surveillance; then they were
weaponized and used for attack.14  In that capacity, they can
directly support troops on the ground and attack enemy troops
and enemy military installations.
Drones can also be used to carry out a targeted killing or assassi-
nation.  Both the Bush-Cheney and Obama administrations have
used drones, particularly for the purpose of carrying out targeted
11. A.P. I, supra note 3, art. 35(2); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of R
12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed
Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter A.P. II].
12. Most weapons that have been banned by international conventions fail to discrim-
inate between civilians and military objectives. See McDonnell, Cluster Bombs over Kosovo,
supra note 2, at 66 n.137 (discussing landmines, cluster bombs, and other indiscriminate R
weapons); Roger S. Clark, Methods of Warfare that Cause Unnecessary Suffering or Are Indiscrimi-
nate: A Memorial Tribute to Howard Berman, 28 CAL. W. RES. INT’L L.J. 379, 384 (1998); see also
Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or
Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94
L.N.T.S. 65 [hereinafter Poison Gas Protocol]; Hague Declaration Concerning Asphyxiat-
ing Gases, July 29, 1899, 187 Consol. T.S 453.  Many argue that nuclear weapons, because
they similarly lack the ability to discriminate between civilians and combatants, should like-
wise be banned, but neither the international community nor the International Court of
Justice has expressly so decided. See, e.g., Legality of the Threat of Nuclear Weapons, Advi-
sory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8) [hereinafter The Nuclear Weapons Case].  The Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) posits  that other weapons not specifically
covered by treaty fall within this ban, including, among others, incendiary weapons and
nuclear weapons. JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 70 (2005).
13. If the locations of these control rooms continue to be publicized, one can imagine
the targets of drone attacks targeting the building housing such control rooms, or the
people entering or leaving the buildings or military bases housing such rooms.  Presuma-
bly, these would be heavily fortified and virtually immune from attack.  Nevertheless, one
could imagine such an attack being attempted.  Far more likely is that terrorist organiza-
tions would opt to retaliate by going after soft targets, such as the May 2010 attempt in
Times Square in New York City.
14. James M. Keagle & Baily Ann Cahill, Attack of the Drones, INT’L CONF. SCI. PAPERS
AFASES 1220, 1226 (2011).
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killing of suspected Islamic terrorists.15  Just as the rule of discrimi-
nation suffered with the beginning of air warfare, the weaponized
drone, particularly when employed for this purpose, challenges:
(1) the international human rights law peremptory norm against
extrajudicial killing, (2) the limits that military necessity places on
combatants, (3) the prohibition on attacking civilians unless and
until “they take a direct part in hostilities,” (4) the international
humanitarian and human rights law norms16 protecting non-com-
batants from attack, and (5) the principle of chivalry.17  To avoid
some of the mistakes of the last century brought about by then-
novel weapons technology, the international community must
demand, at a minimum, that those using robotic weapons strictly
follow international law.18
In the last decade, the weaponized drone, essentially a robotic
aircraft with both reconnaissance and missile and bomb delivery
capability, has helped fight the so-called “war on terrorism.”19  On
November 5, 2002, a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) official
apparently sitting in an office in Langley, Virginia, with the push of
a button, commanded a Predator Drone over Yemen to launch a
missile attacking a jeep carrying six persons, including al Qaed
Senyan, allegedly linked to the attack on the USS Cole.20  This was
15. 100 Drone Strikes in Pak in 18 Months Under Obama Compared to 45 in Entire Bush
Term, HINDUSTAN TIMES, July 28, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 14983494; Ms. Rice’s Testi-
mony, GLOBE & MAIL, Apr. 9, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 18401580; Pak Says Recent Raids
from Across Afghan Border Led to Hotel Bombing, HINDUSTAN TIMES, Sept. 23, 2008, available at
2008 WLNR 18075424.
16. International human rights law applies during armed conflict as well as during
peacetime.  In armed conflict, however, the law of war generally prevails over conflicting
human rights norms.  In peacetime, human rights law prohibits the police from using
deadly force to kill a suspect unless the suspect poses an imminent threat of death or
serious bodily harm to another.  In armed conflict, however, a soldier may kill opposing
combatants unless the latter have clearly thrown down their arms.  For more about jus in
bello, see infra 112–142 and accompanying text. R
17. “Chivalry and principles of humanity are a competing inspiration for the law of
armed conflict, creating a counterbalance to military necessity.” THEODOR MERON, THE
HUMANIZATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (2006).
18. Some commentators argue that Predator and Reaper drones have caused exces-
sive and unnecessary civilian casualties; others, notably Professor Kenneth Anderson, argue
that given the outstanding cameras and missile guidance systems that drones possess and
their ability to observe a single location for hours, drones are far more accurate and limit
civilian casualties better than other military attacks.  Kenneth Anderson, Predators over Paki-
stan, WKLY. STANDARD (Mar. 8, 2010), http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/predators-
over-pakistan?nopager=1.
19. For a critique of this characterization, see THOMAS M. MCDONNELL, UNITED
STATES, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE STRUGGLE AGAINST TERRORISM 36–37 (2010).
20. CIA ‘Killed Al Qaeda Suspects’ in Yemen, BBC (Nov. 5, 2005), http://news.bbc.co.
uk/2/hi/2402479.stm; Craig Hoyle, Yemen Drone Strike: Just the Start?, JANE’S DEF. WKLY.,
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the first known use of drones (also known as unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs)) to carry out a targeted killing outside a theatre of
war.21  The Obama administration, in particular, has significantly
expanded the use of drones in Afghanistan and Pakistan.  Drones
fired 74 missiles in 2007, 183 in 2008, and 219 in 2009, almost a
three-fold expansion.22  From June to September 2010, 2,100 mis-
siles attacked Taliban forces in Afghanistan.23  The Obama admin-
istration has similarly increased the number of drone attacks in the
Pakistani tribal areas.24  Since 2004, the CIA has carried out at least
310 such attacks, over 300 of them since January 2008—five times
more than in the Bush-Cheney administration.25
A 2011 study shows that U.S. drones had logged a total of 2.7
million hours of flight time.26  Predator drones alone flew 1.2 mil-
lion hours since the beginning of the drone program up until the
end of last year in more than 80,000 missions, 85% of which took
place in combat situations.27  Last year, Predator drones increased
the figure by another 70,000 hours,28 the rest accounted for by
smaller weapons systems operated by the U.S. military.29  The
Nov. 13, 2002 (noting that “the CIA-operated RQ-1 Predator UAV, developed by General
Atomics Aeronautical Systems destroy[ed] a civilian vehicle with an AGM-114 Hellfire air-
to-surface missile at the target around 160km east of the Yemini capital, Sana’a”).
21. See RQ-1 Predator MAE UAV, FED’N AM. SCIENTISTS (Nov. 6, 2002), http://www.fas.
org/irp/program/collect/predator.htm.
22. Christopher Drew, Drones Are Playing a Growing Role in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 19, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/20/world/asia/20drones.html.
23. Dexter Filkins, U.S. Uses Attacks to Nudge Taliban Toward a Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
14, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/15/world/asia/15afghan.html.
24. Bill Roggio & Alexander Mayer, Charting the Data for U.S. Airstrikes in Pakistan,
2004–2011, LONG WAR J., http://www.longwarjournal.org/pakistan-strikes.php (last
updated Aug. 24, 2012).
25. Id.  This increase was apparently part of the Bush-Cheney Administration strategy.
See Helene Cooper & David E. Sanger, U.S. Will Widen War on Militants Inside Pakistan, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 1, 2010, at A1, A15.  Because Vice-President Richard Cheney played such a
critical role in fashioning his administration’s counter-terrorism policies, this Article refer-
ences that administration as the “Bush-Cheney administration.”
26. Nick Turse, Investigation Finds U.S. Military Drones Have Flown Close to 3 Million
Hours, ALTERNET (Nov. 1, 2011), http://www.alternet.org/world/152925; see also Executive
Overview: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, JANE’S UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES & TARGETS, Oct. 8,
2010.  Note that the amount of drone flying hours is increasing exponentially, having
reached 250,000 hours after twelve years of flight in 2007, 500,000 in February 2009, and a
million hours last year. See JANE’S SENTINEL SECURITY ASSESSMENT – NORTH AMERICA, PRO-
CUREMENT (2011) (noting that “MQ-1s are currently recording some 19,000 hours per
month, of which more than 95% is rated as ‘combat time’ over Afghanistan and Iraq”)
[hereinafter PROCUREMENT].
27. Blair Watson, Unmanned Aerial Systems, FRONTLINE DEF., Sept. 2010, at 15, available
at http://www.frontline-canada.com/downloads/10-5_UAV_training.pdf.
28. Turse, supra note 26. R
29. Id.
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United States, however, is not the only country using unmanned
vehicles (UMVs).  Over fifty countries and at least one non-state
actor use them.30  Reportedly, drone manufacturers are having a
hard time keeping up with the demand.31
Drones have unquestionably achieved tactical successes.  One
report suggests that drones have killed well over three-dozen top al
Qaeda and Taliban leaders in the mountainous, inaccessible
30. Willam Wan & Peter Finn, Global Race on to Match U.S. Drone Capabilities, WASH.
POST. (July 4, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/global-
race-on-to-match-us-drone-capabilities/2011/06/30/gHQACWdmxH_story.html. The
United Kingdom, Israel, Russia, Turkey, India, Iran, and Hezbollah, among other others,
are using unmanned aerial vehicles.  Addendum on Targeted Killing to Report of the Spe-
cial Rapporteur on Extrajudicial and Summary Killings, U.N. Human Rights Council, ¶ 27,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) (by Philip Alston) [hereinafter Report on
Extrajudicial and Summary Killings]; Turkey Unveils a Spy Drone of Its Own, FOX NEWS (July
16, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/scitech/2010/07/16/turkey-unveils-spy-drone.
31. See Noah Schactman, Drone War Continues; UAV Production Sky High, WIRED (Dec.
16, 2008), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2008/12/drone-war-conti; Michael Sirak,
U.S. Air Force Using MQ-9A Predator Operationally, JANE’S DEF. WKLY., Mar. 16, 2005 (noting
that the manufacturer of the Predator Drone doubled production and that, among other
things, the Air Force wants a sixty-eight unit fleet of MQ-1 Predator Drones).  The U.S.
Congress approved President Obama’s budget request for significantly more drone
programs:
The legislation also meets the president’s request for USD554 million for North-
rop Grumman RQ-4 Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicles, along with USD489
million for 24 General Atomics Aeronautical Systems (GA-ASI) MQ-9 Reapers
and USD481 million for 24 GA-ASI MQ-1C Sky Warrior drones. In addition, the
legislation provides USD68 million - USD18.5 million more than the president’s
request - for targeting pods that allow aircraft to conduct precision strikes.
PROCUREMENT, supra note 26. R
Aside from attack drones, the United States now employs an unprecedented number of
other kinds of unmanned military vehicle systems (U.M.V.s) in warfare.  Ajey Lele,
Unmanned Vehicles and Modern Day Combat, INDIAN DEF. REV. (Feb. 11, 2011), http://www.
indiandefencereview.com/interviews/unmanned-vehicles-and-modern-day-combat.  Aside
from unmanned aerial vehicles, the military operates unmanned ground vehicles,
unmanned underwater vehicles, as well as unmanned surface vessels. See id.  From less
than 50 U.M.V.s a decade ago, the United States now operates an estimated 7,000 U.M.V.s.
Elisabeth Bumiller & Thom Shanker, War Evolves with Drones, Some Tiny as Bugs, N.Y. TIMES,
June 20, 2011, at A1.  U.S. U.M.V.s range in size from the Hummingbird, which is 4.5
inches long with a 6.5 inch wingspan and capable of flight and audio and video surveil-
lance, to the Global Hawk high-altitude spy plane, with a wingspan almost as long as a
Stratofortress B52. Id.  Still a prototype, the Hummingbird also has the capacity to hover.
Id. at A10.  The dimensions range from 122.2 to 130.9 feet (37.25 to 39.9 meters) depend-
ing on the model. RQ-4A/B Global Hawk High-Altitude, Long-Endurance, Unmanned Recon-
naissance Aircraft, AIRFORCE TECH., http://www.airforce-technology.com/Projects/rq4-
global-hawk-uav (last visited June 9, 2012).  Israel has the largest drone in the world, the
Eitan, which has a wingspan of eighty-six feet and is almost as large as a Boeing 737, with an
endurance of twenty hours and the ability to launch missiles.  Joe Pappalardo, How Israeli’s
Biggest Drone Could Take Out Iranian Nukes, POPULAR MECHANICS (Feb. 23, 2010), http://
www.popularmechanics.com/technology/military/planes-uavs/4346921.
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regions in Afghanistan and in Pakistani tribal areas.32  Drones have
also killed many lower-level Taliban and al Qaeda members as the
Obama administration expanded the targets beyond al Qaeda and
Taliban leadership.33  This Article explores whether targeted kill-
ing of suspected Islamist terrorists comports with international law
generally, whether any special rules apply in so-called “failed
states,”34 and whether deploying attack drones poses special risks
32. The New American Foundation number for militant leaders killed in Pakistan is
about 43. The Year of the Drone, NEW AM. FOUND. http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/
drones (last updated Aug. 24, 2012).  Roggio puts the Pakistan number at 49.  Bill Roggio
& Alexander Mayer, Charting the Data for U.S. Airstrikes in Pakistan, 2004–2012, LONG WAR J.,
http://www.longwarjournal.org/pakistan-strikes.php (last updated Sept. 1, 2012); see also
Mark Landler & Helene Cooper, Qaeda Woes Fuel Talk of Speeding Afghan Pullback, N.Y.
TIMES, June 19, 2011, at A1 (“Of 30 prominent members of the terrorist organization [al
Qaeda] identified by intelligence agencies as targets, 20 have been killed in the last year
and a half.”).
33. Greg Miller, Increase U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan Killing Few High-value Militants,
WASH. POST (Feb. 21, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2011/02/20/AR2011022002975.html; see also Fawaz Gergez, The Truth About Drones, NEWS-
WEEK (Mar. 30, 2010), http://www.newsweek.com/2010/05/30/the-truth-about-drones.
html.  The Obama administration has “reaffirmed support for the program.”  Martin
Entous et al., CIA Tightens Drone Rules, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 4, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB10001424052970204621904577013982672973836.html.
34. “Failed State” refers to a country whose armed forces, police, and judiciary are so
powerless that neither law nor order is enforced or followed: “A feature of such conflict is
the collapse of state institutions, especially the police and judiciary, with resulting paralysis
of governance, a breakdown of law and order, and general banditry and chaos.  Not only
are the functions of government suspended, but its assets are destroyed or looted and
experienced officials are killed or flee the country.” NEYIRE AKPINARLI, THE FRAGILITY OF
THE ”FAILED STATE” PARADIGM 11 (2010) (quoting Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Introduction to the
United Nations and Somalia 1992–1996, in THE UNITED NATIONS BOOK SERIES 45–49 (1996)).
Somalia has been a particularly troubled state, with one of its Islamic militant organizations
recently pledging allegiance to al Qaeda, probably as a result of military defeats. Compare
Somalia’s Al-Shabab Join Al-Qaeda, BBC NEWS (Feb. 10, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
world-africa-16979440 (reporting that al-Shabab’s recent pledge of support to al Qaeda
comes at a time when al Qaeda needs to project its operational power and al-Shabab is
facing “pressure on several fronts,” including a retreat from Mogadishu in the face of U.N.-
and A.U.-backed government forces as well as lost national popularity due to the group’s
ban on foreign aid during a wide-ranging drought), and Bronwyn Burton, Divisive Alliance,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/22/opinion/divisive-alli-
ance.html?pagewanted=all (stating that the alliance between al Qaeda and al-Shabab will
not strengthen terrorist efforts due to the retreat of al-Shabab from the capital, the infight-
ing between al-Shabab’s extremist and nationalist factions, whose loyalties are divided
between jihad and building a moderate caliphate, and the looming threat of U.S. drone
attacks), with Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabab: Double the Trouble?, AL JAZEERA (Feb. 11, 2012), http:/
/www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2012/02/2012210174512105718.html (not-
ing that despite al-Shabab’s retreat from the capital, the group still poses a threat to inter-
national security because of recent use of terrorist tactics, such as bombing a Mogadishu
cafe´ and killing fifteen people, and “sympathisers will continue to provide assistance not
only to al-Qaeda but also to al-Shabab because of th[e] formal merger”); see also Somali Al-
Shabab Base Captured Outside Mogadishu, BBC NEWS (Mar. 2, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/world-africa-17231884 (describing how African Union and government forces cap-
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for the civilian population, for humanitarian and human rights
law, and for the struggle against terrorism.
Part I of this Article discusses the Predator Drone and its
upgraded version Predator B, the Reaper, and analyzes their tech-
nological capabilities and innovations.  Part II discusses interna-
tional humanitarian law and international human rights law as
applied to a state’s targeting and killing an individual inside or
outside armed conflict or in the territory of a failed state.  Part III
analyzes the wisdom of carrying out targeted killing drone attacks,
even if otherwise legal, against the Taliban, al Qaeda and other
Islamic terrorist organizations that have embraced suicide
bombing.
I. THE PREDATOR AND REAPER DRONE
A. The Predator
Science fiction writers long ago thought of the creation of huge
robots of war that would fight each other, reducing human casual-
ties and making victory and defeat depend on the machines’
strength rather than on human beings’ grit, wit, and willingness to
shed blood.35  Although not intended for targeting an opposing
UAV,36 the Predator Drone is, nonetheless, a robot of war.  The
Predator MQ-1, the most common weaponized drone used by the
United States, is about the size of a general aviation aircraft.37
Depending upon wind, altitude, and ordnance weight, the
Predator can remain flying from about nineteen hours to forty
hours without refueling.38  It can fly up to an altitude of 25,000 feet
tured an al-Shabab base in the wake of the U.N. Security Council agreeing “to bolster the
number of AU forces by more than 5,500 to 17,731 [and] to include the Kenyan troops
that entered the country last October in pursuit of al-Shabab militants . . . [in order to
implement] a stronger mandate to attack,” as the group is construed as a regional threat).
35. Cf., e.g., ISAAC ASIMOV, I, ROBOT (1950) (anticipating the widespread use of robots
but generally depicting robots in a positive light as a force that prevents, rather than
causes, violence).
36. There is a report that in March 2003, a Predator Drone shot an air-to-air missile at
an Iraqi MIG fighter jet before the MIG shot the Predator down. See ELIZABETH BONE &
CHRISTOPHER BOLKCOM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31872, UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES:
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 16 (2003).
37. See Joel Baglole, MQ-1 Predator – Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, ABOUT.COM, http://
usmilitary.about.com/od/uavs/a/mq1.htm (last visited June 10, 2012); Factsheets: MQ-1B
Predator, U.S. AIR FORCE (Jan. 5, 2012), http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/
factsheet.asp?id=122.
38. The Predator is twenty-seven feet long (8.2 meters) with a wingspan of 48.7 feet
(14.8 meters). Id.  There are some reports suggesting that the actual endurance of the
Predator is less than the maximum rated forty-hour endurance, namely, around twenty-
four hours. See, e.g., BONE & BOLKCOM, supra note 36, at 6; see also RQ-1 Predator MAE UAV, R
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(7,620 m.), with a cruising speed of eighty miles per hour (129
km/h.).39  The Predator is equipped with highly advanced radar
and infrared cameras.40  Imaging radar is able to produce a high-
resolution picture at night; the synthetic aperture radar provides
images in all kinds of weather conditions.41  As one pilot explained,
with the infrared cameras, “you can actually see somebody smoking
from about 25,000 feet.”42  The swivel camera enables the drone to
focus on a single point for extended periods despite its flying
around that point.43
The Predator Drone MQ-1 is equipped with two Hellfire missiles,
each capable of destroying a tank.44  After takeoff, the drones can
supra note 21 (stating in a chart that the endurance is “24 hours on station at 500 NM R
[presumably up to] 40 hours”).  Another report lists the endurance of the Predator at 29
hours.  John Pike & Steven Aftergood, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), FED’N AM. SCIENTISTS
(July 19, 2010), http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/uav.htm.  Yet an official U.S.
Army report indicates that the endurance of the Predator is twenty hours and that of the
Predator B or Reaper is sixteen hours. See Jaysen A. Yochim, The Vulnerabilities of
Unmanned Aircraft System Common Data Links to Electronic Attack 23 (Nov. 6, 2010)
(unpublished Master’s thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College), available at
www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/uas-vuln.pdf (reproducing table of UAS Capabilities
from HEADQUARTERS, DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-04.15, MULTI-SERVICE TACTICS,
TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR THE TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYS-
TEMS 21 (2006)).  These discrepancies may in part be explained by whether the Predator is
carrying a full load of ordinance, whether it is flying in already high altitude mountainous
regions like parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and by the speed at which it is being flown.
39. The normal operating altitude of the Predator is, however, 18,000 feet above
mean sea level. See JOINT ARMED FORCES, JP 3-30, COMMAND AND CONTROL FOR JOINT AIR
OPERATIONS III-33, fig.III-15 (2010).
40. The Predator is equipped with synthetic aperture radar and high resolution for-
ward-looking infrared cameras with six fields of view, described as follows:
An imaging radar works very like a flash camera in that it provides its own light to
illuminate an area on the ground and take a snapshot picture, but at radio
wavelengths.  A flash camera sends out a pulse of light (the flash) and records on
film the light that is reflected back at it through the camera lens.  Instead of a
camera lens and film, radar uses an antenna and digital computer tapes to record
its images.  In a radar image, one can see only the light that was reflected back
towards the radar antenna.
Tony Freeman, What Is Imaging Radar?, NASA, http://southport.jpl.nasa.gov/desc/imagin-
gradarv3.html (last updated Jan. 26, 1996).
41. See RQ-1 Predator MAE UAV, supra note 21 (describing the Predator Drone’s sen- R
sors as follows: “The sensors include an electro-optic/infrared (EO/IR) Versatron Skyball
Model 18 with a zoom lens and a spotter lens, and a Westinghouse 783R234 synthetic
aperture radar (SAR)”).
42. David Piper, Trim Reaper: Streamlined Killer Drone Begins Combat Operations in Iraq,
FOX NEWS (July 24, 2008), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,389962,00.html.
43. See BONE & BOLKCOM, supra note 36, at 21 (“These cameras are housed in a ball- R
shaped gimbal turret that can be easily seen underneath the vehicle’s nose.”).
44. Adam Lange, Hellfire: Getting the Most from a Lethal Missile System, ARMOR, Jan.–Feb.
1998, at 25, 27 (noting that the Hellfire missile has “the explosive and penetrating force
necessary to defeat the armor of a tank or destroy ‘softer’ targets”).  A new payload has
recently passed testing and will likely be used on Predator and Reaper Drones: Archer is a
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be operated via satellite link by ground stations anywhere in the
world, but the CIA reportedly runs them out of its office in Lang-
ley, Virginia.45  The Air Force had operated its drones mainly from
Creech Airbase near Las Vegas, Nevada, but now employs other
light weight precision guided missile developed by Raytheon Corporation with a new 4.5 kg
(10 lb) blast/fragmentation multi-purpose warhead is fitted, with the missile weighing
about 16 kg (35 lb).” PROCUREMENT, supra note 26. R
The Predator typically carries a laser target designator and rangefinder, permitting the
drone to paint the target for the Hellfire missile to hit.  A capable drone “pilot” is said to
have the ability to put the Hellfire Missile through the window of a house. See, e.g., Sue
Baker, Predator Missile Launch Test Totally Successful, AM. FED’N SCIENTISTS (Feb. 27, 2001),
http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/docs/man-ipc-predator-010228.htm (noting in
test that AGM 114 missile “struck the tank-turret about 6 inches to the right of dead-
center”).  The Predator “pilots” can transmit the images that the Predator’s cameras and
sensors are returning directly to commanders in the base, troops on the ground, or jet
fighters and attack helicopters in the air. Mix and Match: Integrating UAVs into the Battle-
space, JANE’S DEF. WKLY. (July 31, 2009).  Those in the field can view the images in real time,
employing laptops or smaller, hand-held devices with computer screens. Id.  The Predator
Drone can also provide precise targeting coordinates or “paint the target” for commanders
in the base or other actors in the field.  In the war in Afghanistan, Predators worked with
AC-130s to paint targets. See Sig Christenson, AF Secretary Talks of ‘Revolution’ in Warfare
Ideas: Roche Sketches Picture of New Technologies, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Apr. 4, 2002, at
19A, available at 2002 WLNR 13896770.
Operating the Predator requires a runway with a length of 5,000 feet (1,524 meters), a
ground station within sight of the place of landing and takeoff, and a satellite communica-
tion system for remote operation, from, for example, the United States.  Jane’s Electronic
Mission Aircraft, Radar Surveillance/Multisensory Systems, United States, IHS JANE’S: DEF. &
SECURITY INTELLIGENCE & ANALYSIS, (Oct. 5, 2010) (“Most recently, identified upgrades [of
the Predator] have included the introduction of glycol-weeping wet wings (for ice mitiga-
tion), fuel injection dual alternators, longer wings, ‘enhanced’ maintainability, dual nose
cameras, a split engine cowling, steel braided hoses and improved engine blocks.  In this
context the Block 15 configuration is known to incorporate an infra-red (IR) nose camera
and a lower engine cowling that can be detached without removing the AV’s (Aerial Vehi-
cle’s) propeller.”)  The manufacturer of the Predator provides four drones for each relay
station, all of which can be fit into a single container, a “coffin” that fits within a C-4 cargo
plane. RQ-1 Predator MAE UAV, supra note 21.  As of late 2005, Jane’s sources report that R
USAF NQ-1 Predators were no longer equipped with the AN/ZPQ-1 radar and were oper-
ating as primarily strike assets with an EO/IR surveillance and laser designation capability.
Other planned upgrades include: “A USD71 million contract for systems to equip the MQ-
1 Predator [with Airborne Signals Intelligence Payload (ASIP)] was awarded to Northrop
Grumman in mid-2009; . . . ASIP delivers enhanced [Signals Intelligence] capabilities by
detecting, identifying and locating radar and other types of electronic emitters.” PROCURE-
MENT, supra note 26. R
45. Jane Mayer, The Predator War, NEW YORKER (Oct. 6, 2009), http://www.newyorker.
com/reporting/2009/10/26/091026fa_ fact_mayer.  The CIA has long operated a drone
base from Djibouti. Craig Whitlock & George Miller, U.S. Building Secret Drone Bases in
Africa, Arabian Peninsula, Officials Say, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2011, at A1, A12. One report
indicates that the United States currently operates 57 drone bases, including those in the
United States and abroad.  Nick Turse, Mapping America’s Shadowy Drone Wars, TOM DIS-
PATCH (Oct. 16, 2011), http://www.tomdispatch.com/archive/175454.
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bases as well.46  Recently, the Obama administration has estab-
lished new drone bases in the Arabian Peninsula and in Africa,
including Ethiopia and the Seychelles.47  The drones are often
kept in operation twenty-four hours per day.48
B. The Reaper
The Predator B, now generally called the Reaper,49 is about 50%
bigger than the Predator.50  The Reaper can carry, among other
ordnance, four Hellfire missiles (twice that of the Predator) plus
two laser-guided 500-pound (227.3 kg.) bombs.51  The Reaper is
46. See PROCUREMENT, supra note 26 (stating that “[b]oth the Reaper and the Predator R
are flown remotely by pilots at Creech AFB, Nevada,” but also observing that “21 MQ-1
Predator UAVs, associated support equipment and personnel were transferred to Air Force
Special Operations Command at the end of May 2007 [and that number was increased to
28 later that year]”).  Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri has also recently become a
home base for Predators.  Elisabeth Bumiller & Thom Shanker, G.O.P. Is Split as It Weighs
Military Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2011, at A1.  Other ground control stations in the United
States for Reaper or Predator Drones include: Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in Arizona,
Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri, March Air Reserve Base in California, Springfield
Air National Guard Base in Ohio, Cannon Air Force Base and Holloman Air Force Base in
New Mexico, Ellington Airport in Houston, Texas, the Air National Guard base in Fargo,
North Dakota, Ellsworth Air Force Base in South Dakota, and Hancock Field Air National
Guard Base in Syracuse, New York.  Turse, supra note 45. R
47. Whitlock & Miller, supra note 45.  The Seychelles base had apparently been used R
for drone reconnaissance flights previously but now is being used for weaponized drones.
See Sara Sorcher, U.S. Expanding Drone Bases in East Africa, Arabian Peninsula, NAT’L J. (Sept.
21, 2011), http://www.nationaljournal.com/nationalsecurity/report-u-s-expanding-drone-
bases-in-east-africa-arabian-peninsula-20110921.
48. Publicly available information indicates that the “crew” for the drone consists of
two individuals: the pilot (a rated officer) and the sensor (an enlisted Air Force member
who handles communications, the cameras, and the weapons), each putting in an eight-
hour shift before another crew takes over.  Scott Lindlaw, Lack of Experience Causes Most
Predator Crashes, AIR FORCE TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 26671086 (“On
rare occasions, pilots bank the aircraft so steeply that the drone loses contact with the
satellite.”); see also Dan Kois, How Do You Fly a Drone?, SLATE (Aug. 9, 2006), http://www.
slate.com/id/2147400.
49. William Cole, Hawaii Guard Gets Flock of Shadow UAVs, HONOLULU STAR-ADVISER
(Mar 25, 2011), http://www.staradvertiser.com/news/hawaiinews/20110525_hawaii_
guard_gets_flock_of_shadow_UAVs.html (discussing how smaller drones, including the
Shadow, about the size of a biggish model airplane are being used for reconnaissance and
are designed to fly just ahead of the troops to observe enemy forces and weapon systems, if
any).
50. It has a wingspan of 66 feet (20.12 meters) and a length of nearly 36 feet (11
meters). See General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Altair/Guardian/Ikhana/Mariner/MQ-9
Reaper/Predator B, IHS JANE’S: DEF. & SECURITY INTELLIGENCE & ANALYSIS, Jan. 8, 2010, at 4
[hereinafter General Atomics Aeronautical Systems].
51. See PROCUREMENT, supra note 26 (noting that the Reaper is “four times heavier R
than Predator, [and that] it has nine times the range, flies somewhat faster and twice as
high and is far more heavily armed, being able to carry eight weapons, including AGM-114
Hellfire missiles, GBU-12 laser-guided bombs and GBU-38 Joint Direct Attack Munitions”).
32358-jle_44-2 Sheet No. 46 Side A      10/29/2012   11:23:52
32358-jle_44-2 Sheet No. 46 Side A      10/29/2012   11:23:52
\\jciprod01\productn\J\JLE\44-2\JLE202.txt unknown Seq: 13 17-OCT-12 12:37
2012] Sow What You Reap? 255
equipped with similar sensors, radars, and cameras.  The Reaper’s
mission is “[to] search for surface objects[,] . . . track them [and]
. . .  then pass on targeting data to other platforms or strike the
targets itself with its onboard complement of precision-guided
weapons.”52  Reapers have been operational in Afghanistan since
September 2007 and in Iraq since July 2008.53  Although there are
reportedly far more Predator Drones in the United States’ invento-
ries than Reapers, the CIA is said to fly the more powerful Reaper.
Furthermore, its fleet is poised to more than double in the next
year, if it has not already done so.54
C. Shortcomings of Drones
Weaponized drones have drawbacks, the most significant of
which is replacing a human on-board pilot with remotely con-
trolled robotics: “For instance, without direct human control or
intervention, a weapon could potentially be delivered to a target
that is no longer hostile, whereas a human could recognize the
change in target profile and not [have] delivered the weapon.”55
The Reaper can fly at altitudes up to 50,000 feet, but generally flies between 30,000 and
45,000 feet, double that of the Predator.  Sirak, supra note 31. R
52. Id.
53. The Reaper’s endurance is ten hours less than the Predator’s and even less if the
Reaper is carrying a full payload.  However, with its higher speed, the Reapers have signifi-
cantly longer range. See PROCUREMENT, supra note 26.  Note that an official U.S. Army R
report indicates that the endurance of the Reaper is sixteen hours, with a cruising speed of
90 knots and a maximum speed of 200 knots. See Yochim, supra note 38, at 23. But see R
General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, supra note 50 (putting the Reaper’s endurance with a R
“clean airframe” at 32 hours); E-mail from Douglas Marshall, Professor, N.D. Univ., Sch. of
Aviation, to author (June 13, 2011) (on file with author) (putting the average endurance
of the Predator and Reaper, again depending upon conditions, at 19 to 22 hours).
Furthermore, the Reaper’s endurance is considerably longer than the endurance of a jet
fighter.  The endurance of the F15 and F16 is about the same, but varies depending on
whether either is flying with an external tank:
F-15 and F-16 un-refueled are about the same.  Even though the Eagle has two
engines it carries much more fuel.  Now depending on configuration 1, 2, 3 tanks
vs. clean (no external tanks) will determine the endurance; drag, weapons config-
uration, altitude, etc. [For] [e]xample: F-16 cruise[s] at about FL330; 1 tank, 1.5
hours; 2 tank 2.5 hours; 3 tank 3.0 hours (because of drag did not increase time
much)[.]  Center line tank has 300 gallons, two external has 370 gallons.
See E-mail from Marshall to author, supra.  Thus, the Reaper can project considerable force
for a longer period of time over hostile territory.
54. Scott Shane & Eric Schmitt, CIA Deaths Prompt Surge in Drone Strikes, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/23/world/asia/23drone.html (“By
next year, the C.I.A. is expected to more than double its fleet of the latest Reaper aircraft—
bigger, faster and more heavily armed than the older Predators—to 14 from 6, an Obama
administration official said.”).
55. Thomas P. English et al., Naval Surface Warfare Ctr., The Safety of Unmanned Sys-
tems: The Development of Safety Precepts for Unmanned Systems (UMS) 3–4 (June 1, 2009) (paper
presented at 13th International Command and Control Research and Technology Sympo-
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This observation applies especially to drones remotely controlled
from the other side of the earth via satellite uplink since there may
be more than a one second delay between the relayed images and
the received command to attack.56  On the other hand, drones can
observe a potential target for hours, a capacity most other aircraft
lack.57  An enemy may, however, be able to jam transmissions to
and from the drone,58 and perhaps break through encryption pro-
tection and take over the drone.59
sia, Seattle, Wash.), available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA486748&
Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf; see also Yochim, supra note 38.  Major Yochim notes that R
despite the advantages that unmanned aerial vehicles bring, UAV have distinct weaknesses:
“[U]nmanned systems also have some disadvantages when compared to manned aircraft.
They are still prone to human error due to their being flown by ground-based operators.
Their development and procurement cost has grown exponentially as capabilities increase.
Current systems are not autonomous and their control is contingent on uninterrupted
communications.  Their dependence on a constant control signal has contributed to a
UAS accident rate 100 times greater than manned aircraft. A threat could exploit this need
for an uninterrupted data feed by using Electronic Warfare to disrupt this signal, poten-
tially crippling unmanned systems.”  Yochim, supra note 38, at iv. R
On the other hand, some argue that the high quality cameras and drone’s ability to
hover over a target indefinitely make the drone a more discriminate weapon system than
manned jet fighters, which pass over targets at such a high rate of speed that the pilot and
crew are unable to make comparably good observations and whose pilots may suffer from
combat stress. Cf., e.g., Ian Ramage, Fully Autonomous Weapons Systems and Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law (Apr. 4, 2011) (unpublished student paper, Pace University
School of Law) (on file with author) (“The advanced daylight and IR [infrared] cameras
[of a robotic autonomous sentry SGR-A1] also provide for better assessment of potential
targets than a tired soldier.”).
56. Stuart Fox, New System to Allow for Automated Drone Landings, POPULAR SCI. (Aug. 4,
2009), http://www.popsci.com/military-aviation-amp-space/article/2009-08/new-system-
allow-automated-predator-drone-landings (noting that there is a 1.2 second delay for the
communication signal to travel from the United States to the satellite and then to the
Predator Drone in Afghanistan or Pakistan).  Another author notes as follows: “Satellite
links have one big drawback: they are far out in space (22,000 miles for some) and the
speed with which they can transfer data is considerably slower than land-based and under-
ocean fibre optic cables.  Data takes 500 milliseconds to travel by satellite.  But with Hiber-
nian Atlantic’s Dublin connection [through fiber-optic cables under the ocean] it takes 60
milliseconds to cross the ocean.  The effect is called latency: the Coolock connection has
low latency, a Nevada-Afghan satellite link has high latency.” x7o, Ireland and Predator
Drones, WIKILEAKS CENT. (Jan. 20, 2011), http://wlcentral.org/node/999.
57. See Anderson, supra note 18. R
58. For a detailed discussion on the ease to which unmanned systems may be subject
to an electronic attack by jamming, see Yochim, supra note 38, at 70–73. R
59. A study commissioned by the Pentagon identified twelve potential problems that
the drones (“unmanned systems” or “UMS”) may present:
[1] Loss of control over the UMS; [2] Loss of communications with the UMS[;]
[3] Loss of UMS ownership (lost out of range or to the enemy); [4] Loss of UMS
weapons; [5] Unsafe UMS returns to base; [6] UMS in indeterminate or errone-
ous state; [7] Knowing when an UMS potentially is in an unsafe state; [8] Unex-
pected human interaction with the UMS; [9] Inadvertent firing of UMS weapons;
[10] Erroneous firing of UMS weapons; [11] Erroneous target discrimination;
[12] UMS injures operators, own troops, etc.
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There has been at least one report of the United States having
lost control of a drone, a Predator B (Reaper), over Afghanistan.60
The Air Force had to shoot it down.61  It is not clear whether the
United States simply lost control of the drone or whether there was
some other malfunction.  One government report indicates that
11% of unmanned aerial systems fail because of communications
problems—which may have caused the loss of control here.62  (The
English et al., supra note 55, at 3–4. R
60. C.J. Chivers et al., View Is Bleaker Than Official Portrayal of War in Afghanistan, N.Y.
TIMES (July 25, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/26/world/asia/26warlogs.html
(citing a September 13, 2009 incident report concerning a “rogue” drone); see also The War
Logs, GUARDIAN, July 26, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 14821840 (releasing the actual logs).
The log summary states as follows:
An F15 was ordered to shoot down a REAPER UAV that had lost its control link in
the south of Afghanistan.  All efforts were made to re-establish the link before a
decision was made to shoot the UAV down prior to crossing into TAJIKISTAN.
The CAOC selected an unpopulated area over which to down the aircraft.  An
F15 fired on the REAPER and it destroyed its engine, however the link was re-
established and the controller was able to guide it into a mountain in RAGH
District . . . There were no sensitive items on board the REAPER but it did go
down with its ordnance (Hellfire and GBU-12).
The War Logs, supra. The Hindustan Times made a similar report, apparently about a Pakis-
tani Drone that was out of control and crashed in March of 2008.  Gurinder Gill, Spy Plane
Crashes in Punjab, HINDUSTAN TIMES, Mar. 21, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 5535824. A
Global Hawk drone crashed in Maryland after the pilots apparently lost control.  Brian
Bennett, Military Global Hawk Drone Crashes in Maryland, L.A. TIMES (June 11, 2012), http://
articles.latimes.com/2012/jun/11/nation/la-na-nn-maryland-drone-crash-20120611.
61. See The War Logs, supra note 60. R
62. See Yochim, supra note 38, at 40 (citing the Office of the Secretary of Defense R
2003).  U.S. unmanned systems require two communication links to operate properly: a
Video Communication Link, which transmits images to a Ground Control Station, and a
Common Data Link, by which the ground controllers remotely control the Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle. See id. at 5.  Maj. Yochim explains what happens when the Ground Control
Station loses contact with the CDL: “If a CDL experiences frequency interference, the UA
executes a self-recovery program known as a “lost link procedure” and attempts to reac-
quire the CDL from the GCS.  If smaller UA, such as the RQ-11 Raven, fails to reacquire
the CDL, it continues its self-recovery program and returns to a preprogrammed recovery
point.” Id.
Furthermore, the Predator Drone program has been plagued by a large number of
crashes, particularly upon landing. See id. at 39–40 (citing the Office of the Secretary of
Defense’s proposition in 2003 that communications problems are one of the major causes
of drone crashes).  The number of crashes has gone down, but some reports indicate that
Predator Drones were rushed into use after 9/11 before they had been adequately tested.
Drones in Afghanistan Suffer Frequent System Failures: Pentagon Report, ASIAN NEWS INT’L, July 7,
2010, available at 2010 WLNR 13587475 (noting that there have been seventy-nine drone
accidents overall costing at least one million dollars apiece and stating that “[t]hirty-eight
Predator and Reaper drones have crashed during combat missions in Afghanistan and
Iraq, and nine more during training on bases in the U.S. – with each crash costing between
3.7 million and 5 million dollars”); see Sirak, supra note 31 (noting that “Predators were R
rushed to the field and were maintained by specialists outside the service’s normal support
chain”).  Regarding the crashes, see David Zucchino, War Zone Drone Crashed Add Up, L.A.
TIMES (July 6, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/06/world/la-fg-drone-crashes-
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CIA has not publicly acknowledged that it carries out drone attacks
in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, or Somalia and has not provided
publicly available information about the drone’s failure.63)
Some critics have noted that often the drones show the control-
lers only a segment of the battlefield, allowing remote commanders
to micro-manage decisions of officers and troops in the field with-
out the (literally) broader perspective of those officers and
troops.64  The resolution of the drone’s cameras, including its
infrared cameras, is remarkable, as is its night vision.  Nevertheless,
when used for a targeted killing operation, the drones may not pre-
sent a sufficiently definite image to assure remote controllers that
20100706; see also Chivers et al., supra note 60 (noting that the Wikileaks classified docu- R
ments suggest the number of drone crashes has been greater than previously reported).
Some government reports indicate that unmanned aerial systems experience a failure rate
100 times greater than that of manned aircraft. See Yochim, supra note 38, at 67 R
(“[R]eports indicate that UAS are 100 times more likely to succumb to failure than their
manned counterparts.”) (citing CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 2005).  Yochim notes that “[t]he
most common causes for these failures are malfunctioning power plant or props, flight
control malfunctions, human error, and communications failures.” Id. (citing Office of
the Secretary of Defense 2003); see also Gareth Jennings, USAF Loses Second MQ-1 Predator in
One Week, JANE’S DEF. WKLY. (Apr. 11, 2008) (noting not only that two Predators had
crashed within a week, but also that six had crashed within the previous fifteen months).
In 2011, U.S. Predator and Reaper drones had been infected with a virus.  Noel Shachman,
Computer Virus Hits U.S. Predator and Reaper Drone Fleet, WIRED (Oct. 11, 2011), http://
arstechnica.com/business/2011/10/exclusive-computer-virus-hits-drone-fleet.
63. Although not the focus of this Article, assigning the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) a major combat role in piloting attack drones raises troubling issues.  First, since CIA
officers are not uniformed combatants, they lack combat immunities in much the same way
that al Qaeda fighters lack them.  Second, as a secret service, the CIA in its actions and its
procedures is far less transparent than the regular armed forces.  The CIA does not issue
public “after action” reports or openly investigate targeted killing attacks.  Holding open
investigations is critical to ensuring United States’ compliance with both international
humanitarian law and human rights law.  Third, given the CIA’s intelligence failures in the
run-up to the war in Iraq, the CIA’s troubling history of assassinations in the 1960s and
1970s, and that its officers, unlike the military, are not subject to court martial under the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, the United States should place the full responsibility for
the drone attacks elsewhere, namely, on its military services alone. See Report on Extrajudi-
cial and Summary Killings, supra note 30, ¶¶ 18–21; see also Gary Solis, CIA Drone Attacks R
Produce America’s Own Unlawful Combatants, WASH. POST (Mar. 12, 2010), http://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/wp-yn/content/article/2010/03/11/AR2010031103653.html; Marc A.
Thiessen, Op-Ed., In CIA Drone Mission, Who Will Protect the CIA?, WASH. POST (June 8,
2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/07/AR201006
0701986.html.
64. See Mix and Match: Integrating UAVs into the Battlespace, supra note 44 (“[D]ubbed R
‘Rummy TV’ after the then U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, who purportedly
had the video feed [from Predator Drones] in his office and would immediately reach for
his telephone to demand action from senior U.S. commanders when he saw targets he
thought should be investigated or attacked.”).
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they are targeting the correct person.65  Publicly available video
links support the proposition that despite the rather high quality
image that the drone cameras return from two continents away, it
may still not be clear enough to enable remote operators to recog-
nize a particular face with reasonable certainty.66
For attacks carried out by the U.S. Air Force and the CIA, recent
claims of civilian casualties range from fifty to almost 2,000.67  A
65. Consequently, remote controllers have to depend heavily on intelligence on the
ground and from other sources to be assured of attacking the right individual.
66. Aside from the quality of the image, the vertical perspective viewing the individual
from above, as opposed to a direct horizontal view, may make positive identification diffi-
cult. See Editorial, How a Drone Killed Innocents, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Apr. 17, 2011), http://
www.tampabay.com/news/perspective/how-a-drone-killed-innocents/1163822.  Upgrades
in the cameras and sensors may solve this problem. But see Eric Lichtblau & James Risen,
Hiding Details of Dubious Deal, U.S. Invokes National Security, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2011, at A1
(reporting on contractor who allegedly sold Pentagon fraudulent software purporting to
be able to positively identify alleged terrorists from drone videos).
67. Compare David Pegg, Drone Statistics Visualized, BUREAU INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM
(Aug. 10, 2011), http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2011/08/10/resources-and-
graphs (reporting that 2,412 people have been killed in the drone strikes since 2004, 467
of whom were civilians), with Chris Woods & Christina Lamb, Obama Terror Drones: CIA
Tactics in Pakistan Include Targeting Rescuers and Funerals, BUREAU INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM
(Feb. 4, 2012), http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2012/02/04/obama-terror-drones-
cia-tactics-in-pakistan-include-targeting-rescuers-and-funerals (noting that  based on eyewit-
ness reports, “since Obama took office three years ago, between 282 and 535 civilians have
been credibly reported as killed[,] including more than 60 children.”), and Roggio &
Mayer, supra note 24 (reporting that 2,390 operatives from Taliban, Al Qaeda, and allied R
forces have been killed in drone strikes since 2006, while 138 civilians have been killed).
Roggio implicitly claims that there has not been a single civilian casulaty since the website
was last visited on February 28, 2012.  The New America Foundation estimates that
between June 2004 and April 7, 2011, “drone strikes killed somewhere between 1,435 and
2,283 people of whom 1,145 and 1,822 were described as militants in reliable press
accounts.”  Peter Berger & Katherine Tiedemann, Washington’s Phantom War, The Effects of
the U.S. Drone Program in Pakistan, 90 FOREIGN AFF. 12, 13 (2011).  They further note that
“[t]his suggests that over the life of the program, the percentage of fatalities who were
militants has been around 80 percent; in 2010, that figure rose to 95 percent.” Id. at 16; see
also Scott Shane, C.I.A. Is Disputed on Civilian Toll in Drone Strikes, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2011,
at A11 (noting that the CIA has made the claim that since May 2010, drone strikes have
killed 600 militants and not a single non-combatant). But see Civilian Deaths from U.S.-NATO
Drone Attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan Provoke Hatred and Violence, VOICES FOR CREATIVE
NONVIOLENCE (May 18, 2011), http://vcnv.org/civilian-deaths-from-u-s-nato-drone-attacks-
in-afghanistan-and-pakistan-provoke-hatred-and-viole (noting that the Human Rights Com-
mission of Pakistan estimates that drone strikes killed 957 civilians in 2010); see also Adnan
Adil, The State of Human Rights in Pakistan by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, TIMES
(Pakistan), Apr. 11, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 7453573 (noting that the Pakistan
Human Rights Commission criticized the coalition’s use of drones because of the number
of civilian deaths drones inflict compared with the number of terrorist leaders, adopting a
figure of 700 civilians killed in 2009); Scott Shane, U.S. Drone Strikes Are Said to Target Rescu-
ers at the Sites, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2012, at A4, available at 2012 WLNR 2551970 (reporting
that British journalists concluded that 50 civilians were killed by CIA drone strikes in
attempting to rescue those who had just been subject to a drone attack).
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New America Foundation study reported that in 2009, drone
strikes killed at least 725 people, around 502 described as militants,
suggesting that the civilian death rate is about 30%, three to ten
ratio, three civilians for every ten militants.68  A comparable 2011
study revealed that drone strikes killed at least 353 people; 337
were categorized as militants, suggesting that the civilian death rate
is about 5% (one civilian to twenty militants).69  Some studies of
the CIA’s use of drones in Pakistan conclude that, in 2011, for
every twenty-five militants killed, drones killed roughly two to three
civilians.70
In contrast, another study of the CIA’s use of drones in Pakistan
concludes that for every militant killed, the drones killed fifty civil-
ians, a fifty-to-one ratio.71
68. 2009: The Year of the Drone, NEW AM. FOUND., http://counterterrorism.new
america.net/drones/2009 (last visited June 11, 2012).  Other reports yield a higher civilian
to combatant ratio. See Gregg Carlstrom, How Accurate Are U.S. Drones?, AL JAZEERA, http://
english.aljazeera.net/focus/2010/05/2010530134138783448.html (last modified June 3,
2010) (citing one Pakistani study indicating that there were 687 civilians killed and only
fourteen al Qaeda members killed (a fifty to one ratio), but also citing a study from Univer-
sity of Massachusetts Professor Brian Glyn Williams, who found only 44 confirmed civilians
killed and 240 others whose affiliation, civilian, or militant, was unknown (only 3.5% civil-
ians killed)). But see Gareth Porter, Cover-up of Civilian Drone Deaths Revealed by New Evidence,
REALNEWS.COM (Aug. 19, 2012, 8:20 AM), http://therealnews.com/t2/component/con-
tent/article/92-more-blog-posts-from-gareth-porter/1215-cover-up-of-civilian-drone-deaths-
revealed-by-new-evidence (estimating that the majority of drone deaths are of non-combat-
ants and criticizing the New American Foundation for using a flawed methodology).
Updated figures for drone strikes in northwest Pakistan show that approximately 1,717 to
2,680 individuals have been killed since 2004 and that approximately 17% were non-mili-
tants (with only 5% in 2010). The Year of the Drone, supra note 32. R
69. The Year of the Drone: Estimated Total Deaths from U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan,
2004–2012, NEW AM. FOUND., http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones#2011chart
(last updated Aug. 24, 2012).
70. Compare Roggio & Mayo, supra note 24 (showing that, as of October 31, 2011, R
there have been 397 militants and thirty civilians killed in drone strikes, a near 8% civilian
casualty rate), with Pegg, supra note 67 (showing that, as of October 31, 2011, there have R
been 435 people killed in drone strikes, 51 of which were civilians, a near 12% civilian
casualty rate). But see Porter, supra note 68 (concluding that mostly non-combatants have R
died in drone strikes).
71. Mary Ellen O’Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of Pakistan,
2004–2009, at 1 (Notre Dame Law Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-43), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1501144; see also Daniel L. Byman,
Do Targeted Killings Work?, BROOKINGS INST. (July 14, 2009), http://www.brookings.edu/
research/opinions/2009/07/14-targeted-killings-byman (estimating ten civilians are killed
for every one militant killed).  Part of the controversy involves the criteria for determining
who is a militant or a “civilian taking active part in hostilities.” See infra note 133.  Part R
stems from the CIA’s practice of targeting suspected lower level unidentified militants:
“The [contentious] March 17[, 2011] attack [in the Pakistan Tribal Areas] was a ‘signa-
ture’ strike, one of two types used by the CIA, and the most controversial within the admin-
istration.  Signature strikes target groups of men believed to be militants associated with
terrorist groups, but whose identities aren’t always known.”  Entous et al., supra note 33. R
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Despite some flaws, the remote controlled drone’s ability to
hover over remote areas for hours, its outstanding cameras that
capture relatively clear images both day and night, its precision
guided weaponry, and the ability to control the drone from
thousands of miles away have earned the drone a place on the bat-
tlefield.  Furthermore, drones will certainly occupy a larger battle-
field role in the future.
II. LEGALITY OF TARGETED KILLING AND USING DRONES TO
CARRY OUT SUCH KILLINGS
After 9/11, human rights advocates and the media gave much
attention to the United States’ disregarding the Geneva Conven-
tions and international human rights in its treatment of detainees
in Abu Ghraib, Bagram Air Base, and Guanta´namo Bay,72 but they
largely ignored targeted killings (or “assassinations”73).  Both the
Bush-Cheney and the Obama administrations’ increased reliance
on drones has focused debate on whether state agents may legally
target and kill a suspected terrorist, rather than attempting to cap-
ture or arrest.74
Whether denominated an “assassination” or “targeted killing,”
the government identifies an individual by name and instructs its
agents to kill that person. The question is whether such premedi-
tated and deliberate killing violates international law.  The legal
The Obama administration had banned this type of strike, id., but has since permitted such
strikes to continue, Adam Entous, Siobhan Gorman & Juliane E. Barnes, U.S. Relaxes Drone
Rules, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 26, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230472
3304577366251852418174.html.
72. Much of Part II.A, C, and D is drawn from the author’s book, MCDONNELL, supra
note 19, at 156–59. R
73. Some scholars make no distinction between “targeted killing” and “assassination.”
See, e.g., Nehal Bhuta, States of Exception: Regulating Targeted Killing in a ‘Global Civil War’, in
HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERVENTION AND THE USE OF FORCE 242, 246 n.20 (Philip Alston & Euan
MacDonald eds., 2008).  Others use the term “targeted killing” to refer to the killing of a
“specific” combatant or a civilian “taking a direct part in hostilities,” and “assassinations” to
refer to intentional killings of previously identified individuals outside armed conflict. See
GARY SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 538–39 (2010).
74. President Bush signed executive orders authorizing Secretary of State Donald
Rumsfeld to use “secret commando groups and other Special Forces units to conduct cov-
ert operations against suspected terrorist targets in as many as ten nations in the Middle
East and South Asia.”  Seymour M. Hersh, The Coming Wars; What the Pentagon Can Now Do
in Secret, NEW YORKER, Jan. 25, 2005, at 40 (noting that these authorizations completely
escape normal congressional oversight of CIA covert operations).  For an alternative inter-
pretation of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, see Jordan Paust, Use of Armed Force Against
Terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond, 35 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 533, 536–37 (2002) [here-
inafter Paust, Use of Armed Force].
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question is complex, and, as noted international humanitarian law
scholar Michael Bothe put it, the short answer is “it depends.”75
A. Peace Versus Hostilities
Absent armed conflict, a state-sponsored transnational assassina-
tion violates international law.76  Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter
prohibits the use of force in the territory of another state.77  Such
assassinations also violate international human rights law.  Custom-
75. See MCDONNELL, supra note 19, at 156. R
76. But see Jordan Paust, Permissible Self-Defense Targeting and the Death of bin Laden, 39
DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 569, 580–81 (2011) [hereinafter Paust, Death of bin Laden]; E-mail
from Jordan Paust to author (Dec. 29, 2011) (on file with author) (arguing that “the real
issue is whether something is [an] ‘assassination’ (because it is treacherous) or a selective
killing. . . . [P]eople are rightly killed during permissible uses of force in self-defense.”).
He argues that outside of armed conflict, armed force may be used to carry out what he
terms “Self-Defense Targeting.”  E-mail from Paust to author, supra. Paust’s position is
discussed infra notes 184–187 and accompanying text. R
Some have argued that assassinating/targeted killing of a country’s leader or high mili-
tary command may be justified in anticipatory self-defense. See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt,
State-Sponsored Assassination in International and Domestic Law, 17 YALE J. INT’L L. 609, 646
(1992). Such a position must meet the standards of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, which,
on its face, requires an “armed attack” to invoke the use of armed force. See U.N. Charter
art. 51.  Arguing that the customary law of self-defense permitted preemptive attack in
narrowly defined circumstances, many scholars assert that Article 51 must be read broadly
to include this pre-existing custom. See MCDONNELL, supra note 19, at 245–58.  Others R
argue that there is an inherent natural law right of the oppressed to assassinate a tyrant.
See, e.g., Luis Kutner, A Philosophical Perspective on Rebellion, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
AND POLITICAL CRIMES 51, 52–63 (M.C. Bassiouni ed., 1975).
Lastly the Convention on Preventing Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons,
had it been in force at the time of the Castro assassination attempts, might have been
violated. See generally Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T.
1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167.  This Convention prohibits the murder or attempted murder of,
among others, the “Head of State.” Id. arts. 1(a), 2(a), 2(d).  The Convention is generally
interpreted as applying only when the protected person travels abroad.  Schmitt, supra at
619.
77. Of course, a state (the “receiving state”) could give another state (the “sending
state”) permission to carry out a targeted killing on the receiving state’s soil, thus absolving
the sending state from any Article 2(4) violation.  Unless another exception applies, such a
killing would still violate human rights law.  Reportedly, the United States had the permis-
sion of Yemen, Pakistan, and now Somalia to carry out the drone attacks.  Kimberly Dozier,
Survey Finds Growing US Drone Attacks on Terror Suspects Unpopular Around the World, ASSOCI-
ATED PRESS (June 13, 2012), http://news.yahoo.com/survey-finds-growing-us-drone-attacks-
terror-suspects-133013523.html; see also Jane Mayer, The Predator War: What Are the Risks of
the C.I.A.’s Covert Drone Program?, NEW YORKER (Oct. 26, 2009), http://www.newyorker.
com/reporting/2009/10/26/091026fa_fact_mayer; Indira A.R. Lakshmanan, Pakistan
Ends Drone Strikes in Blow to U.S. War on Terror, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-13/pakistan-tells-white-house-to-stop-drone-missions-after-
disputes-fray-ties.html.
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ary international law78 and human rights treaties such as the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights79 bar extrajudicial
killing.80  For example, Chile’s sending an assassin to Washington,
D.C. to kill Orlando Letelier, Chile’s former ambassador, violated
both the U.N. Charter (as an impermissible use of armed force in
the territory of another state (the United States)) and interna-
tional human rights law (as an arbitrary, extrajudicial killing).81
Other examples include the United States’ bungled attempts to
assassinate Fidel Castro and Syria’s alleged complicity in the assassi-
nation of former Lebanon Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri.82
78. Unless permitted by international humanitarian law, an extrajudicial killing vio-
lates a peremptory norm of international law. See Derek Jinks, The Federal Common Law of
Universal, Obligatory, and Definable Human Rights, 4 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 465, 470 n.34
(1998); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 702 (1987); see also Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/Res/217(III), at 71 (Dec. 10,
1948) [hereinafter UDHR] (“Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of per-
son.”); Alejandre v. Cuba, 906 F. Supp. 1239, 1252 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (“[S]o widespread is the
consensus against extrajudicial killing that ‘every instrument or agreement that has
attempted to define the scope of international human rights has ‘recognized a right to life
coupled with a right to due process to protect that right.’”) (citations omitted).
79. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. EXEC. DOC.
E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
80. Applying the ICCPR and other human rights treaties requires interpreting the
treaties to impose obligations on states when they are acting outside their own territory.
Although some travaux preparatoires suggest that the drafters did not intend the ICCPR to
apply extraterritorially, the trend in decision in international tribunals and bodies is
toward imposing obligations under human treaties wherever a state’s military or law
enforcement agents are operating: “[Article 2.1] does not imply that the State party con-
cerned cannot be held accountable for violations of rights under the Covenant which its
agents commit upon the territory of another State.” ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 385 (2d ed. 2005) (quoting Sergio Euben Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, U.N. Human
Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 40, A/36/40 (July 29, 1981)); see also
MCDONNELL, supra note 19, at 55–57; Jordan Paust, Above the Law: Unlawful Executive Autho- R
rizations Regarding Detainee Treatment, Secret Renditions, Domestic Spying, and Claims to
Unchecked Executive Power, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 345, 361–62 n.40 (2007); Al-Skeini v. United
Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2011), available at http://www.echr.coe.int
(holding that the European Convention applies extraterritorially to United Kingdom’s
alleged human rights abuses committed in Basra, Iraq over which U.K. forces had effective
control). But see Michael J. Dennis, Agora: ICJ Advisory Opinion on Construction of a Wall in
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Application of Human Rights Treaties in Times of Armed Conflict
and Military Occupation, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 119 (2005) (arguing that the original intent of
the drafters limited human right treaties to the territory of the party).
81. Although the United States had not ratified the ICCPR at the time of Letelier’s
assassination, Chile had done so in 1972. See ICCPR Status: Ratifications and Reservations,
UNTC, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
4&chapter=4&lang=en (last updated June 11, 2012); see also supra note 80 (discussing R
extra-territorial application of human rights treaties).  In any event, such an extrajudicial
execution at that time can be said to have violated customary international law as well as
human rights treaties.
82. See S.C. Res. 1636, ¶¶ 10–15, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1636 (Oct. 31, 2005) (requiring
Syria to cooperate with U.N. investigators concerning Prime Minister’s al Hariri’s murder).
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B. Jus Ad Bellum: The Right to Use Force against a Transnational
Terrorist Organization
In a state subject to armed conflict, different, more complicated
rules may apply to targeting and killing a suspected terrorist than
in a state or territory at peace.  The first question deals with jus ad
bellum,83 namely, whether a state attacked by a transnational terror-
ist organization may use force against a state that is hosting the
terrorist organization, and, if so, the amount of force permitted.
The second question concerns jus in bello,84 namely, the permissi-
ble methods and means of delivering such armed force, including
the legality of targeting a particular individual in particular circum-
stances.  The starting point of jus ad bellum concerning transna-
tional counterterrorism operations is Article 3(g) of the U.N.
General Assembly Resolution on Aggression (Resolution) and the
International Court of Justice’s (ICJ’s) controversial interpretation
of the same in Nicaragua v. United States.85  In pertinent part, that
rule defines an act of aggression as including a state’s “sending . . .
armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts
of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount
to . . . [‘an armed attack’ or the State’s] substantial involvement
The Security Council has since established the Special Tribunal for Lebanon to investigate
the assassination. See About the STL, SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEB., http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/
about-the-stl (last visited June 11, 2012).  Such an assassination would also violate Syria’s
obligations as an occupying power.  Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Per-
sons in Time of War arts. 27, 47, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
83. The ICRC defines jus ad bellum as follows
The ius ad bellum (law on the use of force) . . . seeks to limit resort to force
between States.  Under the UN Charter, States must refrain from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state
(Art. 2, para. 4).  Exceptions to this principle are provided in case of self-defence
or following a decision adopted by the UN Security Council under chapter VII of
the UN Charter.
IHL and Other Regimes—Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS (Oct. 29,
2010), http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/ihl-other-legal-regmies/jus-in-bello-jus-ad-
bellum/overview-jus-ad-bellum-jus-in-bello.htm.
84. The ICRC defines jus in bello as follows:
[Jus in bello (law in war)] addresses the reality of a conflict without considering the
reasons for or legality of resorting to force.  It regulates only those aspects of the
conflict which are of humanitarian concern.  Its provisions apply to the warring
parties irrespective of the reasons for the conflict and whether or not the cause
upheld by either party is just.
Id.
85. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
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therein.”86  The ICJ has concluded that the Resolution on Aggres-
sion has crystallized into customary international law.87
The Resolution seeks to explicate Article 51 of the U.N. Charter,
which grants states the right to use armed force in self-defense if
they suffer an “armed attack.”88  Assume, for example, that a host
state “sends” transnational terrorists (“armed bands, groups,
irregulars”) to launch a “large scale attack”89 (an “armed attack”)
on a neighboring state.  In such circumstances, the neighbor has
the right to use proportionate armed force in self-defense under
Article 51.90  This right would presumably include the right to
invade the host state or to launch aerial attacks, including
weaponized drone attacks, on the host state.
If, however, the host state did not “send” the transnational ter-
rorists to carry out a large scale attack or attacks in the neighboring
state and was simply unable to stop any such attack, then under the
Resolution and Nicaragua v. United States, the host state is not
responsible for the attack under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter or
under Article 3(g) of the Resolution.91  Article 3(g) requires that
the transnational terrorist be sent “by or on behalf of a State.”92  If,
however, the transnational terrorists engaged in a large scale
attack, even without the consent of the host state, the attacked
neighboring state would have a right of self-defense under Article
51.  That article does not require that the attack be carried out by a
“state.”93  In that case, however, the neighboring state would have
86. Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 29/3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No.
19, U.N. Doc. A/9619 (Dec. 14, 1974) (emphasis added).
87. Nicar. v. U.S., .1986 I.C.J. ¶ 195.
88. U.N. Charter art. 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right
of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security.”) (emphasis added).
89. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (D.R.C. v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J.
168, ¶ 147 (Dec. 19).
90. See Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. ¶¶ 176, 195.
91. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) went even further, requiring that the host
state have “effective control” of the terrorist organization, observing that “the Court does
not believe that the concept of ‘armed attack’ includes not only acts by armed bands where
such acts occur on a significant scale but also assistance to rebels in the form of the provi-
sion of weapons or other support.” Id. ¶¶ 115, 195.
92. Id. ¶ 195.
93. See U.N. Charter art. 51; Jordan J. Paust, Self-Defense Targetings of Non-State Actors
and Permissibility of U.S. Use of Drones in Pakistan, 19 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 237, 238–41 &
nn.3, 5 [hereinafter Paust, Self-Defense Targetings]. But see Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. ¶ 35
(Kooijman, J., concurring) (“Resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001) [those responding
to 9/11] recognize the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence without mak-
ing any reference to an armed attack by a State.  The Security Council called acts of inter-
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to limit its use of force to target the transnational terrorists and
havens they have enjoyed in the host state, rather than launching
attacks on the host state as a whole.94
If, however, the terrorists (“armed bands, groups, irregulars”)
are not engaging, either in activities that reach the level of an
armed attack within the meaning of the U.N. Charter or an immi-
nent armed attack of that magnitude, then neither the Charter nor
customary international law permits the victimized state to use
armed force against the host state.  “Article 51 of the Charter may
justify a use of force in self-defence only within the strict confines
there laid down.  It does not allow the use of force by a State to
protect perceived security interests beyond these parameters.”95  Such
lower level violence could be characterized as a border incident or
ordinary criminality, not giving rise to the right to respond milita-
rily under the international law of self-defense.96
national terrorism, without any further qualification, a threat to international peace and
security which authorizes it to act under Chapter VII of the Charter.  And it actually did so
in resolution 1373 (2001) without ascribing these acts of terrorism to a particular State.  This is
the completely new element in these resolutions.  This new element is not excluded by the
terms of Article 51 since this conditions the exercise of the inherent right of self-defence
on a previous armed attack without saying that this armed attack must come from another State
even if this has been the generally accepted interpretation for more than 50 years.”)
(emphasis added).
94. See D.R.C. v. Uganda, 2005 I.C.J. ¶ 148; see also Theresa Reinhold, State Weakness,
Irregular Warfare, and the Right to Self-Defense Post-9/11, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 244, 267–68 (2011)
(reaching the same conclusion regarding Israel’s attack on Lebanon for the acts of Hizbol-
lah).  If the terrorists are about to engage in an imminent “armed attack” and all peaceful
measures have been exhausted, then under the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense, the
neighboring state would likewise have the right to use proportionate force to stop the
imminent attack. Cf. British-American Diplomacy: The Caroline Case, AVALON PROJECT, http://
avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/br-1842d.asp (“[The] ‘necessity of that self-defence
[must be] instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for
deliberation.’”) (citing letter from Daniel Webster to Lord Ashburton, Apr. 24, 1841).
95. D.R.C. v. Uganda, 2005 I.C.J. ¶ 148 (emphasis added).  The ICJ added that
“[o]ther means are available to a concerned state, including, in particular, recourse to the
Security Council.” Id.  But see Reinhold, supra note 94, at 262 (noting that state practice in R
Africa suggests a broader right to self-defense than that which the ICJ is willing to
recognize).
96. A border incident does not satisfy Article 51.  Int’l Law Assoc., Hague Conference
(2010): Use of Force, Final Report on the Meaning of Armed Conflict in International Law, at 3
[hereinafter Report on the Meaning of Armed Conflict].  Self-help in the form of counter-mea-
sures might be justified during a border incident, but not resort to armed conflict. See
John L. Hargrove, The Nicaragua Judgment and the Future of the Law of Force and Self-Defense, 81
AM. J. INT’L L. 135, 138 (1987). But see Christian Tams, The Use of Force Against Terrorists, 20
EUR. J. INT’L L. 359, 388 (2009) (stating that the “accumulation of events” doctrine appears
to be gaining more acceptance); Reinhold, supra note 94, at 246 (criticizing the so-called R
“accumulation of events” approach to constitute an “armed attack” though “attractive at
first glance,” for ultimately “undermin[ing] the imminency requirement” essential for jus-
tifying resort to force in self-defense).
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In such situations, the victimized state would typically appeal
through diplomatic channels to the host state to exert law enforce-
ment efforts (a) to  arrest and extradite or (b) to arrest and prose-
cute the irregulars (terrorists) in question.  If the host state is
unable to do so, but willing to cooperate with the victimized state,
together both nations could engage in law enforcement efforts
against the terrorist organization and possibly employ the military
as well, but with a mandate to arrest rather than kill, except in an
emergency.  In other words, international human rights law
requires states to resort to a law enforcement regime rather than a
law of war regime here.
Under the law enforcement regime, deadly force may be used
only upon a showing of absolute necessity, to protect oneself or
another “against the imminent threat of death or serious injury.”97
Generally, law enforcement may be carried out only by the host
state (or by a foreign state with the permission of the host state).  A
narrow exception, however, may permit a foreign state to use force
in a host state without the host state’s consent.  Customary interna-
tional law recognized before the U.N. Charter permitted a state to
use proportionate force to protect its own nationals.98  This preex-
isting custom probably survives in Article 51 within the ambit of
97. Mary Ellen O’Connell, The International Law of Drones, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L., Nov. 12,
2010, at n.10 (citing U.N. Basic Principles for the Use of Force and Firearms by Law
Enforcement Officials, 8th U.N. Cong. on the Prevention of Crime & Treatment of
Offenders, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.144/28/Rev.1 (Aug. 27–Sept. 7, 1990)) (emphasis added).
The complete article is as follows:
Law enforcement officials shall not use firearms against persons except in self-
defense or defense of others against the imminent threat of death or serious injury, to
prevent the perpetration of a particularly serious crime involving grave threat to
life, to arrest a person presenting such a danger and resisting their authority, or
to prevent his or her escape, and only when less extreme means are insufficient to
achieve these objectives.  In any event, intentional lethal use of firearms may only
be made when strictly unavoidable in order to protect life.
Id. (emphasis added).
98. Tom Ruys, The ‘Protection of Nationals’ Doctrine Revisited, 13 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY
L. 233, 233, 236 (2008).  Ruys explains:
[T]he so-called ‘protection of nationals’ doctrine . . . suggests that states are
allowed to forcibly intervene in other countries for the protection of their nation-
als abroad, subject to the following (cumulative) conditions: (i) there is an immi-
nent threat of injury to nationals; (ii) a failure or inability on the part of the
territorial sovereign to protect them and; (iii) the action of the intervening state
is strictly confined to the objective of protecting its nationals . . . .  [Some argue]
that nationals abroad form part of a state’s population and are therefore one of
its essential attributes, implying that an attack against nationals abroad can be
equated to an attack against the state itself, thus triggering Article 51 UN Charter
. . .
Id. (citations omited).
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“the inherent right of self defense.”99  Consequently, upon a show-
ing that a terrorist organization is subjecting a U.S. national to a
threat of imminent death or serious bodily harm and the host state
is doing nothing to prevent the threat from being carried out, the
United States may use proportionate force against the terrorist or
terrorists in question in the unwilling host state.100
September 11, 2001 transformed not only the United States’
world-view, but that of the international community.101  Within
days of 9/11, the U.N. Security Council unanimously condemned
the attacks and within the month, the Security Council prohibited
any state from harboring or otherwise assisting terrorist organiza-
tions.102  Acting under its Chapter VII powers,103 the Security
Council adopted measures to stop states from financing terrorist
organizations, to ensure that states prosecute terrorists, and to
require states to “afford one another the greatest measure of assis-
tance in connection with criminal investigations.”104  Through its
binding Resolution, the Security Council specifically prohibits
states from “providing any form of support, active or passive” to ter-
rorists or their organizations.105  The Resolution adds that “all
States shall . . . .deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support,
or commit terrorist acts, or provide safe havens . . . .”106
The Security Council, however, said little about the conse-
quences of a host state’s violating that Resolution.  In the pream-
ble, the Resolution does “reaffirm the need to combat by all means, in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the threat to interna-
99. See U.N. Charter art. 51; see also Kristen E. Eichensehr, Defending Nationals Abroad:
Assessing the Lawfulness of Forcible Hostage Rescues, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 451, 478 (2008) (charac-
terizing the Israeli Entebbe hostage rescue as “the gold standard,” exemplifying the right
to use force to protect one’s nationals); Paust, Self-Defense Targetings, supra note 93, at R
238–41 & n.3.
100. Paust, Self-Defense Targetings, supra note 93, at 238–41. R
101. Part of this and the next paragraph are drawn from MCDONNELL, supra note 19, at R
265.  For a deeper discussion of the Security Council Resolution, see id.
102. S.C. Res. 1368, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001).
103. U.N. Charter arts. 25, 39–51.
104. See MCDONNELL, supra note 19, at 265. R
105. S.C. Res. 1373, ¶ 2(a), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
106. Id. ¶ 2(a), (c) (emphasis added).  The preamble of this resolution also under-
scores the duty of states not to serve as safe havens for terrorists or their organizations:
Reaffirming the principle established by the General Assembly in its declaration
of October 1970 (resolution 2625 (XXV)) and reiterated by the Security Council
in its resolution 1189 (1998) of 13 August 1998, namely[,] that every State has the
duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist
acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory
directed towards the commission of such acts, . . .
Id. pmbl.
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tional peace and security caused by terrorist acts.”107  Some have
argued that this language authorizes states to act unilaterally with
armed force against perpetrators of terrorist attacks in states that
violate the Resolution.108  The “combat by all means” preamble
paragraph, however, begs the question, for it says states may
engage in combat only “in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations.”109  The question is whether the Security Council
authorized the use of force (which presumably would include
weaponized drone targeting killing attacks) against violating host
states.  The Resolution does not answer this question.110  Absent a
terrorist organization’s launching the equivalent of an armed
attack from a host state’s soil, the victim state’s only armed force
option, apparently, is to seek the Security Council’s authorization
to use force under Chapter VII.111
C. Jus in Bello: The Rules of the Game
Once hostilities begin, a different legal regime is triggered.
Granted, jus ad bellum (principally now founded on the U.N. Char-
ter and related custom) determines whether a state has the right to
use armed force. On the other hand, jus in bello is utterly indiffer-
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., Paust, Use of Armed Force, supra note 74, at 544–45. R
109. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 105, pmbl.  Preambles to a treaty have no direct legal R
effect but are considered part of the “context of the treaty,” which may be referred to in
treaty interpretation. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31.1, 31.2, May
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (“1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the
light of its object and purpose. 2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a
treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes . . . ”)
(emphasis added).
110. This Resolution plus subsequent state practice has probably undermined the vital-
ity of Nicaragua v. United States, which established the strict “effective control” test.  Under
that test, a state that has been victimized or imminently threatened by a terrorist organiza-
tion may not use armed force against a haven state unless that state “effectively controls”
the terrorist organization. See Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 115 (June 27).  Even the
Tadic court’s lower standard, requiring that the haven state “have a role in organizing . . .
the military operations” of the terrorist group still requires more than simply occupying a
passive role vis-a`-vis the terrorist group. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judge-
ment, ¶ 137, at 59 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999), http://www.
icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad-aj990715e.pdf.
111. September 11 did constitute an armed attack within the meaning of Article 51,
but it could be argued that it was launched from Germany as much as it could be said to be
launched from Afghanistan.  There is little evidence to suggest that al Qaeda was an
“organ” of the Taliban regime, such that the acts of al Qaeda could be directly attributed
to the Taliban within the meaning of Nicaragua v. United States.  But see MCDONNELL, supra
note 19, at 259–69 (arguing that the post-9/11 legal regime plus humanitarian interven- R
tion justified a proportionate use of force).
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ent as to which side possesses this right.112  The jus in bello regime
sets forth the rules of the game; the rules under which hostilities
can be carried out.  These rules are primarily found in the Hague
Convention of 1907,113 the four Geneva Conventions of 1949,114
and their two Additional Protocols of 1977.115  These multilateral
treaties (and relevant international custom) constitute the major
part of the regime of international humanitarian law (the law of
war).116 That regime immunizes individual soldiers and com-
manders from criminal liability for what otherwise would be mur-
der (intentionally killing a combatant).117
The law of war and its accompanying combat immunities enter
into effect, however, only upon a finding that there is a “state of
armed conflict.”118  That term is not clearly defined, but available
definitions, particularly of “non-international armed conflict,”
112. In modern history, both sides typically claim that the other was the aggressor;
determining which side was right in starting the armed conflict is so contentious that it fails
to advance the parties’ bearing the responsibility of carrying out the conflict within the
bounds of humanitarian law:  “To this day, the idea that animates the jus in bello, embodied
in the ICRC’s ethos, is that ‘human suffering is human suffering, whether incurred in the
course of a “just war” or not. . . . Humanity, not Justice, is its prime concern.’”  Robert D.
Sloane, The Cost of Conflation: Preserving the Dualism of Jus Ad Bellum and Jus In Bello in the
Contemporary Law of War, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 47, 64 (2009) (quoting GEOFFREY BEST, HUMAN-
ITY IN WARFARE 4–5 (1980)).
113. See Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Convention
with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague Convention (IV)), Annex,
art. 1, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539  [hereinafter Hague Regulations], available
at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO/195?OpenDocument.
114. See, e.g., Third Geneva Convention of 1949, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
115. A.P. I, supra note 3; A.P. II, supra note 11.  War crimes and crimes against human- R
ity are now principally codified in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 7, 8, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (1998) [here-
inafter Rome Statute].
116. It is also called “the law of armed conflict.” See ICRC, WHAT IS INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW? 1 (2004), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other /
what_is_ihl.pdf.  Aside from these conventions, there are conventions banning certain
weapons. See, e.g., Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S.
211; Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weap-
ons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,
Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137; Poison Gas Protocol, supra note 12; Hague Declaration R
Concerning Asphyxiating Gases, supra note 12. R
117. Intentional murder is defined by the Model Penal Code as follows: “A person is
guilty of [intentional murder] if he [or she] purposely [or] knowingly . . . causes the death
of another human being.” MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.2(2), 210.3 (1985).  Combat immu-
nities also extend under the same principles to the destruction of property in armed con-
flict.  A.P. I, supra note 3, art. 43(2). R
118. See Report on the Meaning of Armed Conflict, supra note 96, at 2, 24, 32–33 (identify- R
ing organization of the parties and intensity of the fighting as the two principal characteris-
tics of an armed conflict).
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impose geographic limits.  The International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) concluded that an armed conflict
“exists whenever there is a resort to armed forces between States or
protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and
organized armed groups or between such groups within the State.”119
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court adopted the
ICTY’s definition.120  Virtually any level of hostilities between states
triggers international humanitarian law.121  Hostilities between a
state and a non-state actor, such as al Qaeda, however, must reach a
certain threshold for the humanitarian law of a non-international
armed conflict to apply.122 Protracted armed conflict contemplates
119. HELEN DUFFY, THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’ AND THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
218 (2005) (quoting Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defense
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995)) (emphasis added).  For a detailed discussion of the meaning of
“non-international armed conflict,” including the requirement that the non-state actor
have a sufficient level of organization and that the hostilities reach a sufficient intensity,
see ANTHONY CULLEN, THE CONCEPT OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT IN INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 14 (2010); Report on the Meaning of Armed Conflict, supra note 96, R
at 2, 24, 32–33.
120. The relevant article of the Rome Statute provides as follows:
Paragraph 2 (e) [enumerating prohibited conduct] applies to armed conflicts
not of an international character and thus does not apply to situations of internal
disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or
other acts of a similar nature. It applies to armed conflicts that take place in the
territory of a State when there is protracted armed conflict between governmental
authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups.
Rome Statute, supra note 115, art. 8(2)(e) (emphasis added).  Criticizing the United States R
broad definition of armed conflict, Nils Melzer states as follows:
The U.S. Government has identified its adversary in this war [the war on terror-
ism] as interchangeably as ‘Al Qaida and its affiliates’, as ‘every terrorist group of
global reach’ or simply as ‘terrorism’ per se, and has emphasized that no distinc-
tion would be made between ‘the terrorists’ and ‘those who knowingly harbor or
provide aid to them.’  These sweeping descriptions hardly meet the minimum
requirements for a ‘party to the conflict.’  For the practical reasons pointed out
above, the notion of armed conflict must remain restricted to armed contentions
between groups of individuals that are sufficiently identifiable based on objective
criteria.  In order to prevent total arbitrariness in the use of force, this minimum
requirement must be upheld in spite of the practical difficulties that doubtlessly
arise in identifying the members and structures of loosely organized and
clandestinely operating armed groups.  No social phenomenon whether terror-
ism, capitalism, Nazism, communism, drug abuse or poverty can be a ‘party’ to a
conflict.
NILS MELZER, TARGETED KILLINGS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 262 (2008).
121. Report on the Meaning of Armed Conflict, supra note 96, at 2 (disagreeing with the R
ICRC Commentary on the point, noting that, even between states parties, international
armed conflict requires “fighting of some intensity”).
122. Traditionally that strand of humanitarian law applied only to actions of such
groups “within the State.”  A.P. II expressly covers non-international armed conflict.  A.P. II
first notes that it applies “in the territory of a high contracting party between its armed
forces and dissident armed forces or other organized groups which, under responsible com-
mand, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and
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battles, fighting between the parties, and not merely a sporadic hit-
and-run characteristic of many terrorist operations.123  Protracted
armed conflict also occurs within a specific territory: “While the
area of war is extensive[,] it is not unlimited and does not in general
extend for example to the territory of other states not party to the
conflict, unless those states allow their territory to be used by one
of the belligerents.”124
In addition, A.P. II notes that it does not apply to “situations of
internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and spo-
radic acts of violence . . . .”125  In deciding whether the violence has
risen to the level of an “armed conflict,” government authorities
and international tribunals should consider the “nature, intensity,
and duration of the violence and the nature and organization of
the parties.”126  “Critically, the non-state or insurgent groups that
may constitute parties must be capable of identification as a party
to the conflict and have attained a certain degree of internal organ-
concerted military operations.” A.P. II, supra note 11, art. 1(1) (emphasis added).  Although R
the United States has not ratified A.P. II, this article can be said to reflect customary inter-
national law.
123. Jordan Paust, Mike & Teresa Baker Law Center Professor, Univ. of Houston Law
Ctr., Panel Discussion at the American Branch of the International Law Association, Inter-
national Law Weekend: Civilian Casualties in Modern Warfare: The Death of the Collateral
Damage Rule (Oct. 22, 2011) [hereinafter Paust, Civilian Casualties].
124. DUFFY, supra note 119, at 223 (emphasis added).  Professor Mary Ellen O’Connell R
also has stressed the geographic limitations on non-international armed conflict.  Mary
Ellen O’Connell, Professor, Notre Dame Law School, Panel at the American Branch of the
International Law Association, International Law Weekend: What is War? (Oct. 21, 2005);
see also CULLEN, supra note 119, at 140. R
125. A.P. II, supra note 11, art. 1(2). R
126. DUFFY, supra note 119, at 221 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also KRIAN- R
GAK KITTCHAISAREE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 137 (2001) (noting that “situations of
internal disturbances and tensions, unorganized and short lived insurrections, banditry, or
terrorist activities are not subject to international humanitarian law”) (emphasis added.).
However, the line between non-international armed conflict and law enforcement jurisdic-
tion has been difficult to identify.  Charles Garraway, Professor, Royal Inst. of Int’l Affairs
(Chatham House), Conference Brief at the U.S. Naval War College: Non-International
Armed Conflict (NIAC) in the 21st Century (June 21–23, 2011) (“The challenge is if
LOAC [Law of Armed Conflict] and human rights law are not to collide there has to be
some compromise, where they differ, such as targeting.  We need to know what law applies
in which circumstances.  The answer might lie in the intensity of the violence.  Where the
intensity is similar to IAC, LOAC has priority.  Where the intensity is less, human right law
has priority.”).
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ization.”127  Otherwise, the state may target an individual at its
whim, without affording any legal process whatsoever.128
In an armed conflict, international humanitarian law permits the
combatants on one side to attack without warning the combatants
and other military targets of the other.  Usually, there is no obliga-
tion to request surrender before attack or to capture, rather than
kill, unless the enemy has clearly thrown down their arms.129  Dur-
ing World War II, the United States learned that Admiral Isoroku
Yamamoto, the Japanese naval commander, was on a military
plane; to kill him, the U.S. Command deliberately targeted that
plane.130  Some would suggest that targeting Yamamoto was not
chivalrous,131 but he was a combatant and therefore, presumably, a
lawful subject of attack.132 Combatants may not, however, target
127. DUFFY, supra note 119, at 221–22 (citing ICRC Report on International Humanita- R
rian Law and Contemporary Armed Conflicts and noting control of territory is not neces-
sary for armed conflict despite the language of A.P. II quoted above); see also Gabor Rona,
Interesting Times for International Humanitarian Law: Challenges from the “War on Terror”,
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 55, 60 (2003) (noting that “there can be no humanitarian law
conflict without identifiable parties” and criticizing the formulation “war on terror,”
because “terror” cannot be a party).  Meeting the threshold of being able to be identified
as a party corresponds to the requirement that the group attain a sufficient level of organi-
zation. CULLEN, supra note 119, at 123–24 (“The general consensus is that armed groups R
opposing a government must have a minimum degree of organization and discipline—
enough to enable them to respect international humanitarian law—in order to be recog-
nized as a party to the conflict.”) (quoting Armed Conflicts Linked to the Disintegration of State
Structures, ICRC (Jan. 23, 1998), http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/
57jplq.htm).  Given the decentralized nature of al Qaeda, with some adherents receiving
little more than inspiration from Osama bin Laden (dead or alive), identification of parties
to the alleged non-international armed conflict is problematic.  Thomas M. McDonnell,
The Death Penalty—An Obstacle to the “War Against Terrorism”?, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 353,
397 n.205 (2004) [hereinafter McDonnell, The Death Penalty] (discussing so-called
“leaderless resistance”).
128. See CULLEN, supra note 119, at 125; MELZER, supra note 120, at 246–61. R
129. DUFFY, supra note 119, at 311 n.177 (acknowledging this proposition, but noting R
that a preference for arrest rather than killing is “implicit . . . at least as far as [it] causes no
military disadvantage”); cf. Schmitt, supra note 76, at 644 (noting that “targeting someone R
meeting the criteria of a combatant in armed conflict, but whose death is not ‘necessary’
would be illegal”). But see Vincent-Joel Proulx, If the Hat Fits, Wear It, If the Turban Fits, Run
for Your Life: Reflections on the Indefinite Detention and Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists, 56
HASTINGS L.J. 801, 884–85 (2005) (arguing that the right to quarter bars targeted killing).
See infra notes 134–136 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of military R
necessity, and infra note 136 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of the R
right to quarter.
130. BRIAN MICHAEL JENKINS, UNCONQUERABLE NATION: KNOWING OUR ENEMY,
STRENGTHENING OURSELVES 172 (2006).
131. See MERON, supra note 17, at 2. R
132. The targeted killing of Yamamoto does not appear to have violated the Hague
Convention, which prohibits treacherous killing of the enemy. See Hague Regulations,
supra note 113, art. 23 (noting that it is “especially forbidden . . . to kill or wound treacher- R
ously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army”) (emphasis added).  Compare
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civilians unless the civilian “takes a direct part” in the hostilities.133
Even with respect to combatants in armed conflict, targeted killing
must pass the test of military necessity.134  For example, if enemy
troops are obviously unarmed, the opposing military force should
the assassination of S.S. General Reinhardt Heydrick, military governor of German-occu-
pied Bohemia and Moravia in 1942. See Patricia Zengel, Assassination and the Law of Armed
Conflict, 43 MERCER L. REV. 615, 628 (1992).  The Royal Air Force flew in two Free Czecho-
slovak soldiers who were not wearing uniforms. Id.  After parachuting down, they threw a
bomb into Heydrick’s car, killing him. Id.  In retaliation, the Germans killed 120 people in
a church, executed 1,331 Czechs, and transported 3,000 Jews, who had been detained in
Theresiestadt, to death camps. Id. Since the two who carried out the assassination were
out of uniform, arguably they committed an act of perfidy, falsely trading on their appar-
ent civilian status, thereby endangering the civilian population, and violating Article 23 of
the Hague Regulations. Id. at 629–30; see also Schmitt, supra note 76, at 639 (killing an R
enemy during armed conflict constitutes an illegal killing if the actor feigns civilian status
or wears a uniform of the enemy and notes that “irregular combatants commit treachery if
they use their apparent noncombatant status to get closer to the target than they otherwise
would.”). But see Zengel, supra, at 629 (noting Heydrick’s assailant made “no affirmative
misrepresentation” nor betrayed any “personal trust or confidence”).  On the other hand,
the war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity perpetrated by the Nazi regime
mitigate the violations of the laws of war by those opposing them.
133. A.P. I, supra note 3, art. 51(3).  The ICRC Commentary on Article 51(3) of A.P. I R
notes that “‘hostile acts’ should be understood to be acts which by their nature and pur-
pose are intended to cause actual harm to the personnel and equipment of armed forces.”
ICRC, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CON-
VENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 618 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter COMMEN-
TARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS].  “Thus a civilian who takes part in armed combat,
either individually or as part of a group, thereby becomes a legitimate target, though only
for as long as he takes part in hostilities.” Id. The ICRC Commentary notes that “the word
‘hostilities’ covers not only the time that the civilian actually makes use of a weapon, but
also, for example, the time that he is carrying it, as well as situations in which he under-
takes hostile acts without using a weapon.” Id. at 618–19, ¶ 1943.  Although the United
States has not ratified A.P. I, it considers Article 51 as reflecting customary international
law. See U.S. ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK (2002), at 11 (Jeanne M. Meyer & Brian
J. Bill eds., 2002) (United States considers as custom “[art.] 51 (protection of the civilian
population, except para. 6 reprisals).”  The A.P. I rule reaffirms Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions of 1949, which prohibits combatants from attacking “[p]ersons taking
no active part in the hostilities.”  Geneva Convention III, supra note 114, art. 3(1).  All R
states of the world are parties to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions.
The ICRC has published an interpretative guide on direct participation, with the chal-
lenge of international terrorism foremost in view. See generally NILS MELZER, ICRC, INTER-
PRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2009). But see Eric T. Jensen, Targeting Persons and
Property, in THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE LAWS OF WAR 37, 56–57 (2009) (defending the
2006 Military Commissions Act definition of “enemy combatant” as including not only indi-
viduals who have “engaged in hostilities,” but also persons “who ha[ve] purposely and
materially supported hostilities against the United States,” a broader definition than that
contained either in Common Article 3 or A.P. I).
134. MELZER, supra note 120, at 286–89; see also A.P. I, supra note 3, arts. 51, 57; Paust, R
Self-Defense Targetings, supra note 93, at 271–72; HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note R
12, at 3, 25, 37, 61. R
32358-jle_44-2 Sheet No. 56 Side A      10/29/2012   11:23:52
32358-jle_44-2 Sheet No. 56 Side A      10/29/2012   11:23:52
\\jciprod01\productn\J\JLE\44-2\JLE202.txt unknown Seq: 33 17-OCT-12 12:37
2012] Sow What You Reap? 275
capture rather than kill them.  Jean Pictet of the International
Committee of the Red Cross, states as follows:
If we can put a soldier out of action by capturing him, we should
not wound him.  If we can obtain the same result by wounding
him, we must not kill him.  If there are two means to achieve the
same military advantage, we must choose the one which causes
the lesser evil.135
The law of war permits armed forces to defeat the enemy but
does not provide an unlimited license to kill.136
Humanitarian law also limits attacking a combatant when civil-
ians and civilian objects lie nearby.  Under the proportionality rule,
a combatant may not carry out “an attack which may be expected
to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians . . . which
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated.”137  This formulation, however, puts a thumb
135. MELZER, supra note 120, at 289 (quoting JEAN PICTET, DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCI- R
PLES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 751 (1985)). Melzer underlines that combat-
ants need not take unreasonable risks to capture, rather than kill, an enemy:
[W]hile the operating forces can hardly be required to take additional risks in
order to capture rather than kill an armed adversary, it would defy basic notions
of humanity to shoot to kill an adversary or to refrain from giving him or her an
opportunity to surrender where the circumstances are such that there manifestly
is no necessity for the immediate application of lethal force.
Id.
136. Furthermore, the ban on weapons that cause “superfluous injury or unnecessary
suffering” stems again from limits military necessity imposes. See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-
BECK, supra note 12, at 240–41.  One aspect of this ban is described as follows: “The pream- R
ble to the St. Petersburg Declaration states that the use of . . . weapons [that render death
inevitable] ‘would be contrary to the laws of humanity’, and it was this consideration that
led to the prohibition of exploding bullets by the Declaration.” Id. at 241.  The notion is
that an armed force does not necessarily have to kill an enemy to achieve the military
objective; wounding may be enough.  A targeted killing operation, as its name suggests,
demands the death of an enemy.  Disregarding such a general obligation may not render
the weaponized drone illegal, but so using drones does contradict the spirit of this ban.
Likewise, humanitarian law requires that armed forces give enemy troops quarter.  The
Hague Regulations, supra note 113, art. 23(d).  Thus, enemy forces who surrender should R
be captured or arrested, but may not be killed.  Putting it another way, a “take no prison-
ers” order is per se illegal.  Targeted killing by drones challenges both principles.  A drone
(like a jet fighter) cannot capture or arrest a combatant.  So while troops may capture
unarmed combatants (rather than kill them), drones lack that ability.  Likewise, a combat-
ant cannot surrender to a drone (or a jet fighter).  Even if an unarmed surrendering com-
batant might be easily captured by a patrol, the drone pilot often will be unable to
ascertain that information and, in any event, lacks the ability to capture or arrest.
Given the parallel between drones and jet fighters, for example, one cannot assert that
the limits on military necessity and on the ability to give quarter make weaponized drones
an illegal weapon.  Certainly, jet fighters are not.  On the other hand, the inability of com-
batants (or non-combatants) to surrender in the face of or during such a drone attack adds
to the terror drones inspire.
137. A.P. I, supra note 3, art 51.  Although A.P. I applies only to international armed R
conflict and there is no express proportionality rule in A.P. II applying to non-interna-
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on the scale in favor of military advantage to the detriment of
potential civilian loss.138  The official commentary of the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross implies that an armed force
could destroy a village to kill a single active duty enemy solider.139
Defenders of attack drones have argued that, far from dispropor-
tionately endangering civilians, the drones’ precision guided mis-
siles and capacity to hover over the target limit civilian casualties
far more than other types of attack.140  Others also point out that
the precision nature of the attacks produces far fewer refugees
than “ground combat” or “traditional air strikes.”141  On the other
hand, international human rights law applying outside of armed
conflict more sharply limits a state’s use of armed force: “[L]ethal
use of firearms may only be made when strictly unavoidable in order
to protect life.”142  Consequently, a Hellfire missile, capable of
destroying a tank (or killing everyone in a house) could never be
employed in law enforcement operations even against an actor
who poses an immediate threat to others.
tional armed conflict, “there is a general consensus that the principles of targeting apply to
armed conflict generally, whether Article 2 [international armed conflict] or Article 3
[non-international armed conflict].”  Jensen, supra note 133, at 44. R
138. See MCDONNELL, supra note 19, at 139. R
139. The ICRC Commentary interprets the proportionality rule broadly: “The pres-
ence of a soldier on leave obviously cannot justify the destruction of a village.” COMMEN-
TARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 133, at 684.  Had there been two soldiers R
on leave, could the village then have been destroyed? See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note
115, art. 8(b)(iv); Jensen, supra note 133, at 51–54. But see Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT- R
98-29-T, ¶ 58 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 3, 2003) (adopting a more
civilian-protective interpretation in determining that the defendant carried out a dispro-
portionate attack).
140. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 18.  Professor Radsan argues, however, that because R
drone pilots are so far removed from actual combat conditions that they should be subject
to a stricter proportionality rule than those facing actual combat.  Afsheen John Radsan,
Panel Discussion at the American Branch of the International Law Association, Interna-
tional Law Weekend: “Is Targeted Killing Legal?” (Oct. 23, 2010); Afsheen John Radsan &
Richard Murphy, Measure Twice, Shoot Once: Higher Care for CIA-Targeted Killing, 2011 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1201 (2011).
141. See Scott Shane & Thom Shanker, Strike Reflects US Shift to Drones in Terror Fight,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/02/world/awlaki-strike-
shows-us-shift-to-drones-in-terror-fight.html?pagewanted=all (“While experts argue over the
extent of the deaths of innocents when missiles fall on suspected terrorist compounds,
there is broad agreement that the drones cause far fewer unintended deaths and produce
far fewer refugees than either ground combat or traditional airstrikes.”).
142. Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment
of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, Aug. 27–Sept. 7, 1990, Basic Principles for the Use of Force and
Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.144/28/Rev.1, Annex.
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In that regard, international humanitarian law can no longer be
considered in isolation from international human rights law.143
Since the end of World War II, international human rights law has
undergone revolutionary development.  The world community has
embraced the International Bill of Rights, including the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights,144 and several other multilateral trea-
ties.145  Three regional human rights regimes with their own inter-
national courts constituted under the following multilateral
treaties have come into existence: the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the
American Convention on Human Rights, and the African Charter
on Human Rights and People’s Rights.146  The International Crimi-
nal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the Special
Court for Sierra Leone, the Special Tribunal of Lebanon, the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, and the Inter-
national Criminal Court, all established within the last two decades,
have jurisdiction not only over war crimes, but also over genocide
and crimes against humanity.147  Lastly, the United Nations has
established the Human Rights Council, and the Security Council
143. David Kretzmer, Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions or
Legitimate Means of Defence?, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 171, 201 (2005). Professor Kretzmer also
argues that neither international humanitarian law nor human rights law precisely fits the
challenge posed by highly organized, persistent non-state terrorist organizations and move-
ments: “An armed conflict between a state and a transnational terrorist group is not an
international armed conflict.  However, as it transcends the borders of the state involved, it
does not fully fit the mode of a non-international conflict either.” Id.
144. See, e.g., UDHR, supra note 78; ICCPR, supra note 79; International Covenant on R
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 4 U.N.T.S. 1976; Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78
U.N.T.S. 277.
145. See, e.g., Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-
20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3.  Many of the human rights conventions through the assemblies of state parties
have established monitoring committees that perform a quasi-judicial function. See, e.g.,
Human Rights Committee, OFFICE U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUM. RTS., http://
www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc (last visited June 13, 2012).
146. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; American Convention on Human Rights, Nov.
21, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143; African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27,
1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217.
147. In addition, the Review Conference of the International Criminal Court (ICC)
Assembly of State Parties recently adopted a definition of the crime of aggression. See
Claus Kress & Leonie von Holtzendorff, The Kampala Compromise on the Crime of Aggression, 8
J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1179 (2010).
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itself, in issuing binding resolutions concerning armed conflict,
routinely calls upon states to respect human rights law.148
Applying international human rights law, the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR), for example, has construed the propor-
tionality rule in counterterrorism operations in non-international
armed conflict in Chechnya as essentially requiring that the com-
batant “ensure that any risk to life is minimized.”149  Unless a drone
pilot is almost certain that no innocent civilians are present in the
attack zone, firing a Hellfire missile with the power to destroy a
house and its inhabitants would violate the ECtHR’s rule.
Although probably constituting a progressive development of the
law in the context of traditional humanitarian law, the ECtHR’s
approach is consistent with the Tactical Directive that U.S. com-
manders have adopted in Afghanistan to lessen civilian casualties
and damage to homes and other civilian objects.150
Using drones to carry out targeted killing is, nonetheless, legal in
certain circumstances in armed conflict.  Targeted killing, how-
ever, enjoys a less favored place than other kinds of military attacks.
Dr. Francis Lieber drafted the Lieber Code, one of the foundations
of humanitarian law, at the request of Secretary of War Stanton of
Abraham Lincoln’s cabinet.  It expressly forbids assassination:
Section IX.—Assassination.
148. The law of war does not allow proclaiming either an individ-
ual belonging to the hostile army, or a citizen, or a subject of the
hostile government an outlaw, who may be slain without trial by any
captor, any more than the modern law of peace allows such
international outlawry; on the contrary, it abhors such outrage.
The sternest retaliation should follow the murder committed in
consequence of such proclamation, made by whatever authority.
Civilized nations look with horror upon offers of rewards for the
assassination of enemies as relapses into barbarism.151
While one could argue that the Lieber Code is referring only to
individuals who are “slain” after capture, the spirit of the provision
casts doubt on singling out for death a particular individual by
148. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1456, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1456 (Jan. 20, 2003) (declaring that
“[s]tates must insure that any measure taken to combat terrorism comply with all their
obligations under international law, and should adopt such measures in accordance with
international law, in particular international human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law”)
(emphasis added).
149. See, e.g., Isaveya, Yusupova & Bazayeva v. Russia, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. 39, ¶ 171 (2005);
see also Ergi v. Turkey, 1998-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1751, ¶¶ 6–23, 77 (1998).
150. See infra notes 300–302 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Tactical R
Directive.
151. THE LIEBER CODE OF 1863, art. 148 (Apr. 24, 1863) (emphasis added).
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name.152  The ambivalence about targeted killings is likewise indi-
cated by the long-standing practice of enemy forces refusing to
assassinate the political leaders of the other side.153  Even the run-
up to the targeted killing of Admiral Yamamoto, who was clearly a
combatant and certainly not a political leader, provoked intense
debate in the upper echelons of the military and possibly in the
Roosevelt White House.154  This ambivalence almost certainly
stems from the undeniable fact that picking out a named person to
kill feels much more like murder than justifiable, honorable com-
bat.  As Justice John Paul Stevens, who as a Navy officer helped
break the code that enabled the United States to bring down Yama-
moto, stated, “The targeting of a particular individual with the
intent to kill him [is] a lot different than killing a soldier in
battle. . . .”155
Despite the questions surrounding targeted killing, the Bush-
Cheney administration decided that the United States could
engage in targeted killing of suspected terrorists.  President Bush
declared that the United States had entered into a state of world-
wide armed conflict with terror, covering al Qaeda and all “associ-
152. Forty-four years after the promulgation of the Lieber Code, the 1907 Hague Con-
ventions outlawed “treacherous” killings, killings that today we would classify as perfidious.
See A.P. I, supra note 3, art. 37.  (“It is prohibited to kill, injure or capture an adversary by R
resort to perfidy. Acts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he
is entitled to, or is obliged to accord protection under the rules of international law appli-
cable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that confidence shall constitute perfidy.”).
In 1998, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court reverted to the old fash-
ioned “treacherous” language, but likewise reinforced the prohibitions on such killings.
See Rome Statute, supra note 115, art. 8.  The Rome Statute expressly forbids “[k]illing or R
wounding treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army” in interna-
tional armed conflict and “[k]illing or wounding treacherously a combatant adversary” in
non-international armed conflict. Id. art. 8(2)(e)(xi), (ix); see also id. art.
8(2)(e)(xvi)–(xxx) (defining war crimes to include, among other things, using poison,
poison weapons, poison gas, dumdum bullets, and weapons causing superfluous injury).
153. See MARK R. AMSTUTZ, INTERNATIONAL ETHICS: CONCEPTS, THEORIES, AND CASES IN
GLOBAL POLITICS 146 (2005).  Notable exceptions include the Reagan administration’s
attempt at killing Mumar Kaddafi and the Bush-Cheney administration’s attempt to kill
Saddam Hussein on the eve of the war in Iraq. See, e.g., Gregor Francis Intoccia, American
Bombing of Libya: An International Legal Analysis, 19 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 177, 179 (1987).
154. William C. Banks & Peter Raven Hansern, Targeted Killing and Assassination: The
U.S. Legal Framework, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 667, 688 (2003); see also THOMAS HUNTER,
TARGETED KILLING: SELF-DEFENSE, PREEMPTION, AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM 87 n.30 (2009)
(citing CAROL V. GLINES, ATTACK ON YAMAMOTO 1–2 (1998) (suggesting that Roosevelt
authorized the attack)).
155. Mary Ellen O’Connell, Targeted Killing with Combat Drones 4, n.20 (May 10,
2010) (on file with author) (citing Diane Marie Amann, John Paul Stevens, Human Rights
Judge, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1569, 1583 (2006) (quoting a telephone interview with Justice
John Paul Stevens on June 22, 2005)).
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ated” groups,156 thereby arguably permitting the United States to
kill suspected terrorists anywhere without attempting to capture
them.157 In oral argument of Rumsfeld v. Padilla,158 involving an
alleged “enemy combatant,” Justice Kennedy asked Solicitor Gen-
eral Clement “Could you shoot him when he got off the plane [in
the United States, rather than try to arrest him]?”159  The Solicitor
General doubted we could.160  The same prohibitory rule should
apply in all other countries not undergoing armed conflict within
their territory.161
D. United States Counterterrorism Operations and International Law
Those supporting the Bush-Cheney administration’s position
argued that al Qaeda’s level and frequency of violence against the
United States and our allies did satisfy the criteria both for “armed
attack” and for “armed conflict.”  In particular, the 1993 attack on
the World Trade Center, the 1998 attack on two of United States’
African embassies, the 2000 attack on the USS Cole, the 9/11 attack
in 2001, the 3/11 attack on Madrid in 2004, the 7/7 attack in
London in 2005, and the 2002 and 2005 Bali bombings, (not to
mention on-going attacks by al Qaeda and its affiliates in Iraq,
156. Military Order on the Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in
the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 sec. 1(a) (Nov. 13, 2001) (noting that there
exists “a state of armed conflict” between the United States and terrorists groups, including
al Qaeda).
157. A Canadian judge advocate supports this position but argues that some who
merely provide financial support for a terrorist organization should be immune from
attack: “Mere financial donors or those providing moral support would not be targeted
(although they may be arrested), but members of the organization employed in supplying
weapons and or carrying out intelligence activities could be attacked.”  Kenneth Watkins,
Canada/United States Military Interoperability and Humanitarian Law Issues: Land Mines, Terror-
ism, Military Objectives, and Targeted Killings, 15 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 281, 313 (2005); see
also Paust, Self-Defense Targetings, supra note 93, at 271–72. R
158. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
159. Transcript of Oral Argument at 17–18, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004)
(No. 03–10027).
160. Solicitor General Paul Clement stated, “No, I don’t think we could for good and
sufficient reasons.” Id.
161. A former international law advisor to the Army Judge Advocate General stated
that although we should not carry out such a targeted killing attack (presumably as a mat-
ter of a discretion), international humanitarian law allows such a targeted killing.  Geoff
Corn, Statement at the ICRC Conference on Customary International Humanitarian Law
(Oct. 1, 2005).  The actual question to which he responded was whether U.S. military
forces could kill Mohammed Khalid, the alleged mastermind behind 9/11, while he was in
a swimming pool in Islamabad, Pakistan. Id.; see also Michael J. Dennis, Application of
Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in Times of Armed Conflict and Military Occupation, 99
AM. J. INT’L L. 119 (2005) (arguing that the ICCPR, while not applying extraterritorially,
does apply domestically, and hence such a killing would be a violation if committed on
U.S. soil, but not if committed abroad).
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Afghanistan, Pakistan and Somalia) met the “armed attack”
requirement of the U.N. Charter self-defense provision for jus ad
bellum and fulfill the “protracted” element of armed conflict for jus
in bello.162  Even if one characterizes these attacks as “sporadic,”
their intensity, particularly that of 9/11, they argued, satisfies both
the U.N. Charter and the armed conflict requirement to invoke
international humanitarian law.163  Although on 9/11 al Qaeda
used U.S. air passenger jets as weapons of mass destruction, it has
reportedly been seeking other weapons of mass destruction,
including an atomic bomb.164  Some argue this development and
the transnational character of al Qaeda and its affiliates, said to
operate in about 100 countries, justified President Bush’s declara-
162. Jane G. Dalton, Professor, Naval War Coll., Presentation at the American Branch
of the International Law Association International Law Weekend (Oct. 21, 2005) [herein-
after Dalton, American Branch Presentation].  One might add to this list, among others,
the 2002 truck bombing of a Tunisian synagogue, apparently aimed at French and German
vacationers; an attack on a French oil tanker off Yemen that same year; the 2003 suicide
bombing of civilian targets in Morocco, targeting not only Moroccan nationals but possibly
Spanish nationals; the 2003 bombing of the Marriott hotel in Jakarta, see McDonnell, The
Death Penalty, supra note 127, at 414–15; and the bombing of Jordanian hotels. Sabrina R
Tavernise, Suicide Bombing Leaves 29 Dead in Baghdad Cafe´, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/11/international/worldspecial/11iraq.html?_r=1
(reporting that a group claiming to be al Qaeda took “credit” for bombing three Jordanian
hotels and killing over fifty-five people).
163. Dalton, American Branch Presentation, supra note 162; see also Marco Sassoli, Use R
and Abuse of the Laws of War in the “War on Terrorism”, 22 LAW & INEQ. 195, 201–02 (2004).
Sassoli notes that the Bush-Cheney administration has adopted a “very wide” concept of
armed conflict:
Its instructions to Military Commissions explain that it does not require ‘ongoing
mutual hostilities, or a confrontation involving a regular national armed force.  A
single hostile act or attempted act may provide sufficient basis . . . so long as its
magnitude or severity rises to the level of an ‘armed attack’ or an ‘act of war’, or
the number, power, stated intent or organization of the force with which the
actor is associated is such that the act or attempted act is tantamount to an attack
by an armed force.  Similarly, conduct undertaken or organized with knowledge
or intent that it initiate or contribute to such hostile act or hostilities would satisfy
the nexus requirement.’
Sassoli, supra, at 202 (quoting DEP’T OF DEFENSE, MILITARY COMMISSION INSTRUCTION NO. 2:
CRIMES AND ELEMENTS FOR TRIALS BY MILITARY COMMISSION § 5(C) (2003)).  “In other
words, if I attack a single Montreal police officer with the intent to initiate an armed con-
flict between French-speaking and English-speaking Canadians, there is, according to the
U.S. administration, an armed conflict (and the police may detain me as an enemy combat-
ant without any judicial guarantees).” Id.
164. Proponents would also argue that, with modern technology and advanced com-
munications, a transnational non-state terrorist group threatens democratic societies as
much, if not more than, hostile states because such a terrorist group may wreak great
damage and at the same time be undeterrable. See, e.g., Bradley Larschan, Legal Aspects to
the Control of Transnational Terrorism: An Overview, 13 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 117, 117–19 (1986)
(“With the development of small, highly portable and technologically sophisticated weap-
ons, a terrorist group consisting of a very few members can hold a city anywhere in the
world hostage—or destroy it.”).
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tion that the United States is in a global armed conflict, and thus
entitled to extend geographic limits on non-international armed
conflict and apply international humanitarian law worldwide.165  As
lex specialis,166 the Bush-Cheney administration argued that interna-
tional humanitarian law supplants international human rights law,
thereby permitting targeted killing globally.167
The Bush-Cheney approach was overbroad.  Although the 9/11
attacks constituted an “armed attack” within Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter, publicly available evidence fails to show that the Taliban
had effective control of al Qaeda within the meaning of Nicaragua
v. United States.168  Consequently, the United States had the right to
use proportionate force to stop al Qaeda members in Taliban
Afghanistan, but not the right to attack the Taliban and the entire
country and, on that basis alone,169 replace the Taliban regime.
Furthermore, given the protracted nature of the hostilities in
Afghanistan (and formerly in Iraq) international humanitarian law
has applied in those theatres, but not in the world as a whole.170
Additionally, the Geneva regime contains no black holes: if an indi-
vidual is considered an unprivileged combatant and ineligible for
prisoner of war status under the Third Geneva Convention of 1949,
then he or she defaults to civilian status, like saboteurs, who may be
proceeded against criminally or held for security reasons under the
Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949.171  Unless there is evidence
165. See Toni Pfanner, Scope of Application, Perpetrators of Terror, and International Human-
itarian Law, in INTERNATIONAL LEGAL DIMENSION OF TERRORISM 275, 286 (Pablo Antonio
Fernandez-Sanchez ed., 2009).
166. “[L]ex specialis” is short hand for “lex specialis derogat legi generali.”  Francoise
J. Hampson, The Relationship Between Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law from the Per-
spective of a Human Rights Treaty Body, INT’L REV. RED CROSS, Sept. 2008, at 549, 558, availa-
ble at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-871-hampson.pdf.  The translation
of the full phrase is “the more specific law has precedence over the more general law.” Id.
at 558 n.37.
167. See, e.g., The Nuclear Weapons Case, supra note 12, ¶ 25. R
168. See Lawrence Azubuike, Status of Taliban and Al Qaeda Soldiers: Another Viewpoint,
19 CONN. J. INT’L L. 127, 139–40 (2012); Michael N. Schmitt, Responding to Transnational
Terrorism Under the Jus ad Bellum: A Normative Framework, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED
CONFLICT: EXPLORING THE FAULTLINES 157, 186 (Michael Schmitt & Jelena Pejic eds.,
2007).
169. Under the totality of the circumstances, the United States invasion of Afghanistan
probably was justified, but not only based upon the actions of al Qaeda, but also on the
grounds of humanitarian intervention, particularly the brutal repression of women in
Taliban Afghanistan. See MCDONNELL, supra note 19, at 267–68; see also, e.g., Paust, Death of R
bin Laden, supra note 76, at 542–43. R
170. Sassoli, supra note 163, at 197–98; MELZER, supra note 120, at 396. R
171. MELZER, supra note 120, at 396.  Note the authoritative ICRC commentary to Arti- R
cle 5 of the Geneva Convention IV supports this position as follows:
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that a member of al Qaeda was involved in an imminent attack
against the United States or its allies, a law enforcement approach
under the human rights law model should be pursued in those
areas.172  Under human rights law, the government may not delib-
erately kill without trial “even the worst criminal [except] under
the most extreme circumstances.”173  An overly broad definition of
“armed conflict” can endanger the civilian population and poten-
tially be a threat to peace, should the United States act in a country
without its consent.174
It may, nevertheless, seem rather surprising that a humanitarian Convention
should tend to protect spies, saboteurs or irregular combatants. Those who take part
in the struggle while not belonging to the armed forces are acting deliberately
outside the laws of warfare. Surely they know the dangers to which they are expos-
ing themselves. It might therefore have been simpler to exclude them from the
benefits of the Convention, if such a course had been possible, but the terms
espionage, sabotage, terrorism, banditry and intelligence with the enemy, have so
often been used lightly, and applied to such trivial offences (2), that it was not
advisable to leave the accused at the mercy of those detaining them.
ICRC, COMMENTARY TO CONVENTION (IV) RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PER-
SONS IN TIME OF WAR 53 (1949) (emphasis added). But see Kretzmer, supra note 143, at 209 R
(noting that “[t]he assumption that terrorists are merely civilians taking a direct part in
hostilities might make sense if the hostilities of an international nature were also taking
place”). Such apparently is the case in Afghanistan where al Qaeda members are “taking a
direct part” with the Taliban fighters against the United States and the new regime there.
That analysis might also apply to Iraq, where al Qaeda members have apparently “tak[en] a
direct part” in the Iraqi insurgents’ efforts against the United States and against the new
government.  The Iraqi situation had been so chaotic and complex that it had been hard
to categorize neatly.  For a good description and analysis of the confusing legal nature of
the current conflict, see Geoffrey S. Corn, “Snipers in the Minaret—What Is the Rule?” The
Law of War and the Protection of Cultural Property: A Complex Equation, 2005 ARMY L. 28, 31
(2005).
172. Kretzmer, supra note 143, at 212–13. R
173. Sassoli, supra note 163, at 213. But see Luis E. Chiesa & Alexander K.A. Greena- R
walt, Beyond War: Justfying Targeted Killings in Law and Morality, WASH. & LEE L. REV. (forth-
coming 2012) (arguing, inter alia, that targeted killing may be morally and legally
justifiable against extraordinarily dangerous individuals, such as the drug cartel head Pablo
Escobar and al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, because of the virtual certainty of retalia-
tory murderous attacks on judges, prosecutors, witnesses, and other innocents should such
individuals be arrested).
174. This reasoning suggests that the 2002 Predator drone strike violated international
law because United States was not party to any armed conflict in Yemen and never argued
it was intervening on the Yemeni government’s behalf. See MELZER, supra note 120; see also R
supra note 20 and accompanying text.  Therefore, the strike would only have been justified R
if resort to deadly force was permitted under the law enforcement approach.  Since the
CIA has not revealed any details of the strike, it is difficult to determine if the law enforce-
ment approach would have permitted the use of deadly force there.
Apparently, this attack was carried out with the permission of the Yemeni government.
Had the United States lacked such permission, only a state that committed an act trigger-
ing self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter would authorize the United States
invoking its rights therein to act in individual or collective self-defense.  Compare the
majority and dissenting opinion in Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ ¶ 166–77, 195 (June 27)
(discussing when a state’s support of an armed group rises to the level of armed attack
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E. Advocates of the Robust Self-Defense Argument Justifying Use of
Drones Outside Areas of Armed Conflict.
Admittedly, states that serve as havens for transnational terrorist
organizations challenge international security.  In states that either
are unwilling or unable to stop al Qaeda, the Taliban or “associated
forces” outside of armed conflict zones and even if such forces had
not launched “armed attacks” from such states (such as Yemen and
Somalia), the Obama administration apparently considers that “the
inherent right of self defense”175 permits attacking individuals
belonging to such organizations.176  The Obama administration
has thus argued differently from the Bush-Cheney administration
to achieve the same results.  Unlike the Bush-Cheney administra-
tion’s characterization, the United States is not in a global war
against terrorism per se.  Rather, the Obama administration argues
that the United States is “in armed conflict with al Qaeda, the
Taliban and associated forces.”177  The United States has asserted
upon the state the group targets); see also KITTCHAISAREE, supra note 126, at 135–36. Assum- R
ing the target of the drone attack was not taking a “direct part” in the hostilities in Afghani-
stan or Iraq, some commentators have argued that the targeted killing may have violated
international law. But see Norman G. Printer, Jr., The Use of Force Against Non-State Actors
Under International Law: An Analysis of the U.S. Predator Strike in Yemen, 8 U.C.L.A. J. INT’L &
FOREIGN AFF. 331, 374–75 (2005) (arguing that as an “enemy combatant,” the al Qaeda
member killed in the attack had no greater rights than a privileged combatant and there-
fore was a proper military target under international humanitarian law).
175. Printer, supra note 174, at 381–82. The Obama administration has taken the posi- R
tion that it does not have to analyze whether the international law of self-defense applies,
irrespective of where the alleged suspected terrorist or terrorist organization is located, in
armed conflict or not, stating the following:
The United States does not view our authority to use military force against al-
Qa’ida as being restricted solely to ‘hot’ battlefields like Afghanistan.  Because we
are engaged in an armed conflict with al-Qa’ida, the United States takes the legal
position that —in accordance with international law—we have the authority to
take action against al-Qa’ida and its associated forces without doing a separate
self-defense analysis each time.
John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President of Homeland Security & Counterterrorism,
Strengthening Our Security by Adhering to Our Values and Laws (Sept. 16, 2011), available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/remarks-john-o-brennan-
strengthening-our-security-adhering-our-values-an; see also Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., Address
to Northwestern School of Law (Mar. 5, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/
opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.html.
176. Harold H. Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Keynote Address at the Annual
Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Mar. 25, 2010), available at http://
www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm.  President Obama’s counter-terrorism
adviser expanded on Koh’s discussion, noting that the United States has the right to take
unilateral action.  Brennan, supra note 175; see also Holder, supra note 175. R
177. Koh, supra note 176.  Legal Adviser Koh explained the administration’s view, R
namely, that the United States is in a non-international armed conflict with al Qaeda and
associated forces and that it may strike both in “hot battlefields” as well as in any other
country where al Qaeda terrorists are located if such a country is unable or unwilling to
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that it can carry out targeted killing operations anywhere members
of al Qaeda, the Taliban, and “associated forces” are, unless the
host state in question is willing and able to arrest, capture, or kill
them.178
Professors Paust and Anderson likewise support attacks outside
zones of armed conflict on the basis of self-defense.179  Professor
Paust analogizes to the famous 1837 Caroline case, arguing that
England, which then controlled Canada, had the right of self-
defense to attack Canadian insurgents who were engaged in armed
attacks against the British government and were using U.S. terri-
tory as a safe haven.180  The Caroline rule is contained in the
exchange of diplomatic notes between U.S. Secretary of State
Daniel Webster and British Minister Lord Ashburton, consisting
largely of Webster’s language justifying the exact measure of self-
defense (at least in this context) only when the “‘necessity of that
self-defence is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of
means, and no moment for deliberation.’”181  Paust asserts that the
only question at issue there was whether the manner of the attack
comported with the international law of self-defense.182  In the
event, Paust argues that the customary law of self-defense permit-
ted Britain to use armed force to counter armed attacks engaged in
by the insurgents,183 that this customary law predating the U.N.
capture the al Qaeda members. Id.; see also Holder, supra note 175.  Koh insists that the R
Obama administration’s formulation that the United States in an “armed conflict with the
Taliban, al Qaeda, and associated forces,” materially differs from the Bush-Cheney adminis-
tration’s “Global War on Terrorism” in that Obama’s focuses only on transnational ter-
rorists, presumably excluding “domestic” ones.  Koh, supra note 177.  But see MCDONNELL, R
supra note 19, at xvii–xviii. Koh’s argument about precluding solely local terrorists from R
attack apparently did contribute to the Obama administration’s ban on CIA attacks on
unidentified suspected terrorists. See Entous et al., supra note 33.  The ban on “signature R
strikes,” however, has apparenly been lifted.  Entous et al., U.S. Relaxes Drone Rules, supra
note 71. R
178. Koh, supra note 176. The Obama administration seems to suggest that there is no R
non-international armed conflict that extends to any state in the world that is either unwill-
ing or unable to capture transnational terrorists. See id.; see also Holder, supra note 175. R
Holder also asserts that targeted killing of suspected terrorists do not constitute “assassina-
tions” but lawful combat killings.  Holder, supra note 175; cf. supra note 73 and accompany- R
ing text (discussing whether and when targeted killings should be deemed assassinations).
179. Paust “disagree[s] with the Obama Administration that (a) we are at war with al
Qaeda, and (b) that one can attack a state as such that is unwilling or unable to control
terrorists from engaging in armed attacks emanating from their territory.”  E-mail from
Jordan Paust to author (Dec. 22, 2011) (on file with author).
180. Paust, Self-Defense Targeting, supra note 93, at 241–44. R
181. British-American Diplomacy: The Caroline Case, supra note 94. R
182. Paust, Self-Defense Targeting, supra note 93, at 241–42. R
183. Id.
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Charter continues to run with the Charter, and that state practice
reaffirms the continuing custom.184
Professor Anderson and Benjamin Wittes each argue that if ter-
rorists are in a state unable or unwilling to arrest or capture them,
then self-defense permits the U.S. to attack them, including using
Predator or Reaper Drones to carry out a targeted killing opera-
tion.185  Professor Anderson relies upon Abraham Sofaer, Legal
Adviser to the U.S. State Department in the second Reagan admin-
istration and the first Bush administration, who asserted “the right
of a state to strike terrorists within the territory of another State
where the terrorists are using that territory as a location from
which to launch terrorist attacks and where the State involved has
failed to respond effectively to demand that the attacks be
stopped.”186  Anderson recognizes that his position is
controversial.187
F. Alston’s Argument Opposing the Robust Defense Argument
As attractive as the self-defense argument sounds, it falls more
squarely within jus ad bellum (the law governing the right to use
armed force in the first place) rather than jus in bello (the law gov-
erning the manner in which armed force may be used during the
conflict).  Philip Alston, the Rapporteur for the U.N. Human
Rights Council, explains that “[w]hether the use of force is legal is
a question that usually arises at the start of an armed conflict [jus ad
bellum], while the law applicable to the conduct of that armed con-
184. Id. at 249, 252–53, 255.  Professor Paust does not actually use the term “custom”
but rather “general patterns of legal expectation,” which appears substantially equivalent
to the opinio juris element of customary international law. Id. at 241.
185. Anderson, supra note 18 (“Use of force is justified against terrorists anywhere they R
set up safe havens, including in states that cannot or will not prevent them . . . .”); Benja-
min Wittes, Senior Fellow and Research Director in Public Law, Brookings Inst., Presenta-
tion at the American Branch of the International Law Association International Law
Weekend: Is Targeted Killing Legal? (Oct. 23, 2010).  Professor Anderson asserts that there
is “a broader legal category [of self-defense] than ‘armed conflict’ (a subset of it), self-
defense might consist of tiny strikes using, for example, covert CIA actors against terrorists,
yet not rising to the full level of sustained fighting that crosses the legal threshold into
‘armed conflict.’  It might be invoked in places and ways outside of traditional theaters of
armed conflict such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, or Iraq.”  Anderson, supra note 18. R
186. Id.
187. See Kenneth Anderson, Targeted Killing and Drone Warfare: How We Came to Debate
Whether There Is a “Legal Geography of War” 8 (Am. Univ. Wash. College of Law, Res. Paper
No. 2011-16, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1824
783. But see Paust, Self-Defense Targetings, supra note 93, at 238–41 & n.3. R
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flict applies throughout it [jus in bello].”188  He notes that different
proportionality rules apply to jus ad bellum and jus in bello:
The limitations on each are distinct. Proportionality under self-
defence requires States to use force only defensively and to the
extent necessary to meet defensive objectives, whereas the test
for proportionality under IHL [International Humanitarian
Law][jus in bello] requires States to balance the incidental harm
or death of civilians caused by an operation to the military
advantage that would result.189
He also explains how the principle of necessity under self-defense
in jus ad bellum differs from its counterpart in jus in bello:
Necessity under self-defence requires a State to assess whether it
has means to defend itself other than through armed force,
while necessity in international humanitarian law requires it to
evaluate whether an operation will achieve the goals of the mili-
tary operation and is consistent with the other rules of interna-
tional humanitarian law [jus in bello].190
Lastly, Alston notes that state and individual responsibility differ
depending on whether there is a violation of the law of self-defense
(under jus ad bellum) or a violation of international humanitarian
law (under jus in bello): “Finally, the ‘robust’ self-defence approach
fails to take into account the existence of two levels of responsibil-
ity in the event that a targeted killing for which self[-]defence is
invoked is found to be unlawful.”191  If a state commits an act of
aggression in violation of the constraints on self-defense, making a
disproportionate response, for example, then the state has to make
reparation for the act of aggression, and the individual com-
mander who ordered the attack might be criminally responsible
for the crime of aggression.192  On the other hand, a state and
commander who carry out a targeted killing in violation of interna-
tional humanitarian law are subject to a different set of interna-
tional legal obligations.  For example, a commander who targets a
civilian who has never ordered or planned attacks or in any other
way participated in hostilities may be criminally responsible for a
war crime under Article 8 of the Rome Statute of the International
188. Report on Extrajudicial and Summary Killings, supra note 30, ¶ 43 (emphasis R
added) (citations omitted).
189. Id.; see also O’Connell, supra note 71, at 15 (citing D.R.C. v. Uganda, 2005 I.C.J. R
168); Reinhold, supra note 94, at 248. R
190. Report on Extrajudicial and Summary Killings, supra note 30, ¶ 43. R
191. Id.
192. The Review Conference of the International Criminal Court recently adopted a
definition of a crime of aggression, albeit a highly qualified one.  Kress & von
Holtzendorff, supra note 147. R
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Criminal Court.193  The state would be responsible under AP I,
Article 51 and its customary law analog, prohibiting attacks on civil-
ians as such.  The lesson here is that mixing and matching jus ad
bellum and jus in bello confuses the two separate international legal
regimes.194
Alston concluded: “The legality of a specific killing depends on
whether it meets the requirements of international humanitarian
law [jus in bello] and human rights law (in the context of armed
conflict) or human rights law alone (in all other contexts).”195
Drone-employed targeted killing falls within jus in bello rather than
within jus ad bellum, because it amounts to a tactic—a method and
means of carrying out warfare.
In the context of the tribal areas of Pakistan, it is hard to disa-
gree with Professor Paust, who noted:
[C]ontinuing al Qaeda and Taliban armed attacks planned, ini-
tiated, coordinated, or directed from inside Afghanistan and
Pakistan on U.S. military personnel in Afghanistan who are
engaged in an international armed conflict are necessarily part
of such an armed conflict and that the de facto theatre of war has
expanded into parts of Pakistan at least since 2004.
Nevertheless, as well reasoned as the Caroline rationale is, it says
nothing about the modality of conducting hostilities.  Further-
more, Caroline applies only in narrow circumstances,
[A]llow[ing] a target state to act unilaterally against a planned
terrorist act emanating from the territory of another state, if it
were clear that either of two conditions obtained: (1) the state
from whose territory the action was emanating could not, even
with the information supplied to it by the target, respond in
timely fashion to prevent the terrorist act because of shortage of time; or
(2) the state from whose territory the action was emanating,
193. See Rome Statute, supra note 115, art. 8(b)(i) (criminalizing those who R
‘[i]ntentionally direct[ ] attacks . . . against individual civilians not taking direct part in
hostilities”).  Afghanistan acceded to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
in 2003; the Yemen Parliament voted to ratify the Rome Statute, but later reversed itself.
Nasser Arrabyee, Yemen Parliament Recants Vote for ICC, GULF NEWS (Apr. 9, 2007), http://
gulfnews.com/news/gulf/yemen/yemen-parliament-recants-vote-for-icc-1.171658. Iraq,
Pakistan, and Somalia have not ratified.
194. See Report on Extrajudicial and Summary Killings, supra note 30, ¶ 43. Justice R
Higgins of the International Court of Justice, stated in the Nuclear Weapons case as fol-
lows: “It is not permitted in the choice of weapons to cause unnecessary suffering to enemy
combatants, nor to render their death inevitable, nor to aggravate their sufferings when dis-
abled.”  The Nuclear Weapons Case, 1996 I.C.J. at 585, ¶ 12 (Higgins, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
195. The Nuclear Weapons Case, 1996 I.C.J. ¶ 44.
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could not, even with adequate notice, act effectively to arrest the
terrorist action.196
This observation reflects the restrictive language of Caroline,
which presumptively discourages use of force against a state with
which the victim state is “at peace.”  As British Minister Ashburton
stated, only “a case of ‘strong overpowering necessity’ [would] sat-
isfy Webster’s ‘instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means
and no moment for deliberation’ test.”197  If there were reliable
evidence that alleged terrorists were planning an imminent attack,
then resort to deadly force might be permissible under either
anticipatory self-defense or the law enforcement approach.198  Oth-
erwise, arrest, preferably by a broad international coalition, would
be permissible.199
The robust self-defense view appears to ignore the human rights
revolution that has institutionalized far greater respect for individ-
ual rights than ever before.  Aside from human rights directly influ-
encing humanitarian law through the Martens clause,200 through
196. John E. Noyes, The Caroline: International Law Limits on Resort to Force, in INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW STORIES 263, 301 (John E. Noyes et al. eds., 2006) (quoting YORAM DINSTEIN,
WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 247, 249 (4th ed. 2005)) (emphasis added).
197. Noyes, supra note 196, at 290–91 (quoting Minister Ashburton’s letter arguing R
that Britain had complied with Webster’s Caroline test); see also supra note 94 and accompa- R
nying text.
198. If a state is unable to prevent non-state actors within its borders from threatening
the United States (or another state for that matter) and the threat fulfills the stringent
requirements of anticipatory self-defense, only then would United States have the right to
make a proportionate attack.  Absent such and where the haven state is essentially power-
less to control the threatening non-state actor, the United States, preferably with an inter-
national coalition, at most could engage in a law enforcement type action within the haven
state territory, once again limited by the principle of necessity, a fairly high threshold but
less than that for anticipatory self-defense.  Under human rights law, law enforcement may
use deadly force only in egregious circumstances where the lives of U.S. troops or civilians
are imminently threatened.
199. Cf. Antonio Cassese, Ex Iniuria ius Oritur: Are We Moving Towards International Legiti-
mation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L.
23, 29 (1999).  Admittedly, this is a particularly challenging problem.  Putting troops on
the ground in a state characterized as “failed” could rightly be interpreted as a major viola-
tion of that state’s sovereignty.  Even if the purpose is to arrest rather than kill, the per-
ceived violation of state sovereignty is significant.  On the other hand, carrying out a
targeted killing operation with a drone attack is an even greater violation. But see Berger &
Tiedemann, supra note 67, at 14 (noting that Pakistan objected more forcefully to U.S. R
raids in the Pakistani tribal areas than to U.S. drone strikes).  The issue resembles that of
humanitarian intervention and a similar fact-specific analysis is required to determine
whether gathering a broad coalition to carry out a law enforcement operation on a failed
state’s territory is justified under the core principles of international law, if not the precise
letter of the U.N. Charter. See infra notes 208–226 and accompanying text. R
200. Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 incorporates the Mar-
tens clause in its first substantive article: “In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other
international agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and
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Articles 1 and 72 of AP I,201 and through the preambular
paragraphs of AP II,202 human rights influences humanitarian law
indirectly:
[I]nternational human rights norms have an expressive quality
that affects the social conduct of groups and organizations inde-
pendent of measures of judicial enforcement. . . . The infringe-
ment of widely held norms often causes anger and protest, and
sometimes this anger and protest triggers a cycle of positive legal
consolidation of these norms.203
For example, most international law scholars regard the prohibi-
tion of extrajudicial killing as having crystallized into a peremptory
norm of international law.204  Under the International Convention
on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties, the
protection of life is non-derogable even in times of public emer-
gency.205  Furthermore, most nations have abolished the death
authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the
principles of humanity and from dictates of public conscience.”  A.P. I, supra note 3, art. 1(2) R
(emphasis added).
201. From the section dealing with persons under the power of a party to armed con-
flict, Article 72 provides, as follows:
The provisions of this Section are additional to the rules concerning humanita-
rian protection of civilians and civilian objects in the power of a Party to the
conflict contained in the Fourth Convention, particularly Parts I and III thereof,
as well as to other applicable rules of international law relating to the protection of
fundamental human rights during international armed conflict.
Id. art. 72 (emphasis added).
202. The preamble of A.P. II includes the Martens Clause and the following: “Recalling
furthermore that international instruments relating to human rights offer a basic protec-
tion to the human person.” A.P. II, supra note 11, pmbl. R
203. Volker Heins, Giorgio Agamben and the Current State of Affairs in Humanitarian Law
and Human Rights Policy, 6 GERMAN L.J. 845, 850 (2005).  The Tactical Directive may be a
response to such concerns. See supra notes 300–302 and accompanying text; see also supra R
note 149 and accompanying text (noting the work of the ECtHR in applying human rights R
norms to counter-terrorism cases, arguably in non-international armed conflict). But see
G.I.A.D. Draper, Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, ACTS JURIDICA 193 (1979), excerpted
in HENRY J. STEINER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 398 (3d ed. 2008)
(stating that “[t]he two regimes [humanitarian law and human rights law] are not only
distinct but diametrically opposed”).
204. See supra note 78. R
205. See Jean Marie Henckaerts, Concurrent Application of Human Rights Law: A Victim’s
Perspective, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 237, 257 (Robert
Arnold & Noelle Quenivet eds., 2008) (noting that non-derogable rights apply even during
armed conflict); see also, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 79, arts. 4(2), 6(1).  Admittedly, the doc- R
trine of lex specialis gives priority to certain humanitarian law rules during armed conflict
immunizing combatants who kill other combatants under humanitarian law and taking
such killings out of the category of “arbitrary” killings proscribed by Article 6.1 of the
ICCPR.  See supra note 167 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of lex specialis.  But R
see generally Conor McCarthy, Legal Conclusion or Interpretive Process? Lex Specialis and the
Applicability of International Human Rights Standards, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AND
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, supra, at 121 (arguing that lex specialis as a rule of construction should
undergo robust context specific interpretation rather than be applied mechanically).
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penalty even during war.206  The claim that a state may employ a
weaponized drone to kill everyone in a house outside an area of
armed conflict defies human rights norms over sixty years in the
making.207
G. Analogizing Humanitarian Intervention to the Unwilling/Unable
Host State Challenge
Yet even absent Security Council authorization, states attacked
by terrorist organizations may seek to use armed force in such host
states.  The argument to do so resembles the doctrine of humanita-
rian intervention.  There, proponents argue for foreign military
intervention in a state to stop gross human rights abuses from
being committed within the state.  Here, proponents argue for for-
eign military intervention in a host state to stop terrorist organiza-
tions from using the host state as a haven to launch attacks against
the victimized state.  In both situations, the foreign intervenors’
use of force generally violates the letter of U.N. Charter Articles
2(4), 42, and 51.  These articles prohibit the use of force absent
U.N. Security Council authorization under Chapter VII or absent
an armed attack by the host state.
Neither basis for intervention has risen to the level of customary
international law so as in effect to nullify, or redefine,208 the U.N.
Charter in these circumstances.  Antonio Cassese argued, however,
that there is emerging customary international law that would vali-
date humanitarian intervention under highly qualified condi-
tions.209  Under his formulation, which was generally codified in
the Responsibility to Protect (R2P),210 (1) the host state is either
206. Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries, AMNESTY INT’L, http://www.amnesty.org/en/
death-penalty/abolitionist-and-retentionist-countries (last visited June 13, 2012) (listing
141 countries as having abolished the death penalty “in law or practice” and 57 countries as
having retained the death penalty).
207. Kretzmer, supra note 143, at 201; MCDONNELL, supra note 19, at 104. But see Paust, R
Self-Defense Targetings, supra note 93, at 263–69. R
208. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 109, art. 31.3(b) R
(authorizing the resort to subsequent state practice in treaty interpretation).
209. Cassese, supra note 199, at 26–27. R
210. INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY (ICISS), THE RESPONSIBIL-
ITY TO PROTECT XI (2001), available at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.
pdf.  The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has been adopted by heads of state. See 2005
World Summit Outcome, ¶¶ 138–40, G.A. Res. 60/1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 16,
2005); see also U.N. S.C. Res. 1674, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006); S.C. Res. 1894,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1894 (Nov. 11, 2009); Cassese, supra note 199, at 27; Christine M. R
Chinkin, Kosovo: A “Good or Bad War”, 93 Am. J. Int’l L. 841, 844 (1999) (“Does not humani-
tarian intervention entail a responsibility to ensure that the methods used are appropriate
for the achievement of the objectives sought?”); Richard A. Falk, Kosovo, World Order, and
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unable or unwilling to stop the gross human rights violations; (2)
all peaceful measures to end the abuses have been exhausted; (3)
the Security Council is paralyzed by virtue of one or more of the
five permanent (P-5) members’ veto power; (4) the intervention is
being carried out by a broad coalition of states and “not [by] a
single hegemonic power” or “such a power with . . . [an] ally”;211
(5) the intervention is being conducted solely to end the gross
human rights abuses, not for an ulterior purpose; (6) the interven-
tion has been approved or largely unopposed in the U.N. General
Assembly; and (7) the intervenors’ use of armed force is narrowly
proportioned to end the human rights abuses, with concomitant
strict observation of international human rights and humanitarian
law.212
Even under Cassese’s sharply tailored criteria, humanitarian
intervention absent Security Council authorization has not yet crys-
tallized into customary international law, and there is debate
whether humanitarian intervention and R2P constitute even “evolv-
ing custom.”213  Nonetheless, Cassese’s formulation and R2P
reflect a more internationally democratic approach than the cur-
rent arbitrary system permitting a single P-5 member to veto, for
example, any international military rescue to stop another holo-
caust, and may satisfy basic morality in the face of a humanitarian
catastrophe.  A coalition of states complying with his formulation
almost certainly mitigates, if not absolutely cures, the international
law violation.  Consequently, the analysis of humanitarian interven-
tion provides some guidance in confronting states that are either
the Future of International Law, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 847, 856 (1999) (“[T]he humanitarian
rationale is also sustained or undermined by the extent to which tactics of warfare exhibit
sensitivity to civilian harm . . . .”).
211. Cassese, supra note 199, at 27; see also Paust, Use of Armed Force, supra note 74, at R
545–47 (regarding permissible regional action).
212. Cassese, supra note 199, at 27. The National Atlantic Treaty Organization’s R
(NATO) aerial bombardment of Milosevic’s Serbia is often pointed to an example of a
“proper” humanitarian intervention.  Professor Sarah H. Cleveland characterized how that
intervention was considered by international lawyers: “Illegal by some, illegal but legitimate
by many, and legal [by others].”  Panel Discussion at the American Branch of the Interna-
tional Law Association International Law Weekend: Libya and Lawfulness (Oct. 21, 2011)
[hereinafter Libya and Lawfulness].
213. Panel Discussion at the American Branch of the International Law Association
International Law Weekend: R2P Comes of Age? (Oct. 21, 2011) (panelist Prof. David P.
Stewart stated that the evidence of R2P evolving seemed to suggest movement both for and
against any such evolution; panelist Prof. John F. Murphy stated that the evidence indi-
cated movement away from R2P gaining customary law status); see also THE RESPONSIBILITY
TO PROTECT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 217–22 (Alex J. Bellamy et al. eds., 2011).
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unable or unwilling to stop a transnational terrorist organization
from operating on their soil.
For example, assume that a host state permits a terrorist organi-
zation to conduct training of thousands of terrorists on its territory
and that the terrorist organization has committed, or vows to com-
mit, crimes against humanity against the civilian population of
another state.  Such training does not amount to an armed attack
and probably does not rise to the level of imminency for anticipa-
tory self-defense either.  If the host state is unable or unwilling to
stop terrorist training on that scale, if all peaceful means have been
exhausted, and if a P-5 member veto (or almost certain veto)
blocks the Security Council from authorizing force, the victim state
or potential victim state should be able to use some degree of force
to thwart such a threat.
On the other hand just as Cassese recognized that his formula-
tion might open a Pandora’s Box and permit strong countries to
abuse their power, there is grave danger that a powerful victim
state will abuse its power in using force against terrorist organiza-
tions operating in such host states.  To cabin that power, but also to
recognize that sometimes the arbitrary exercise of the P-5 member
veto may prevent a state from answering a dire threat to its security,
requires the application of a set of requirements resembling that of
Cassese’s and R2P on humanitarian intervention.
Comparable to gross human rights violations, the magnitude of
the acts or threatened acts must come close to that of “an armed
attack” within the meaning of the U.N. Charter, if not yet reaching
that threshold.  All peaceful measures must have been exhausted,
namely, diligent law enforcement efforts have been made in good
faith and are generically unable to effectuate an arrest.  There
must be more than an alleged terrorist operating in a remote,
hard-to-reach area.  After all, if a dangerous criminal like Ted
Kaczynski, the Unabomber,214 were hiding out in a remote area of
the United States that was difficult for law enforcement to get into,
that would hardly justify law enforcement in shooting him from an
airplane or launching a Hellfire missile at him from a Predator
Drone.  As a “last resort . . . [m]ilitary [humanitarian] intervention
can only be justified when every non-military option for the preven-
tion or peaceful resolution of the crisis has been explored[.]”215
214. After Kaczynski Was Seized, Bomb Blew Up Near Cabin, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 1996),
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/07/20/us/after-kaczynski-was-seized-bomb-blew-up-near-
cabin.html?ref=theodorejkaczynski.
215. ICISS, supra note 210, at XII. R
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From an international law perspective, the decision to carry out
a targeted killing operation in a state that either is unable or
unwilling to stop a terrorist organization should not rest solely with
a hegemonic power or with the consent of a close ally.  It should be
that of a broad coalition.  It might be objected that a state has the
right, under the U.N. Charter, to act in individual self-defense and
that a state should have the absolute right to make a determination
of self-defense on its own.  On the other hand, a state does not
have the express right under the U.N. Charter to intervene in
another state that has neither carried out an armed attack directly
(nor indirectly through terrorist organizations), nor threatened to
do so.216  Furthermore, a broad, diverse coalition is the best insur-
ance against a powerful victim state going beyond a narrowly pro-
portioned use of force in these circumstances.217
Given the exceptional character of an attack on a state that has
neither attacked nor threatened to attack the United States, the
targeted killing operation must observe a higher standard than the
collateral damage (proportionality) rule and aim to prevent all
non-combatant casualties.218  This is analogous to the exceptional
proportionality requirement and the sole purpose requirement of
humanitarian intervention.  As a humanitarian intervention, the
state is obligated to go beyond the normal rules of armed conflict.
Given the exceptional situation of operating in a state that is either
unable or unwilling to arrest or capture terrorists on its soil, but
which has neither carried out an armed attack nor used terrorists
to do so, states like the United States should comply with excep-
tional standards here as well.  This would require operations more
closely resembling the Navy Seals’ operation against Osama bin
Laden than the routine use of weaponized drones with explosive
force of a Hellfire missile.219  Admittedly, this would put members
216. See Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. 14, 14 (June 27).  One might argue that the 9/11
attacks satisfy the U.N. Charter definition of “armed attack.”  Al Qaeda and its affiliates,
however, are so loosely organized that attributing those attacks to all who later take up the
banner (at least initially more as a matter of prestige than as a matter of policy or loyalty to
a top-down military organization) is far too attenuated.
217. Cf. Libya and Lawfulness, supra note 212 (consensus of the panel that a broad R
coalition of states carrying out a humanitarian intervention is the best way to insure that
the intervention is not a pretext.).  Note that the Obama administration claims authority to
act unilaterally in failed or unwilling states. See Brennan, supra note 175. R
218. See generally Chinkin, supra note 210; Falk, supra note 210; Kretzmer, supra note R
143 (arguing that because of the human rights revolution, a state may resort to a targeted R
killing, in non-international armed conflict, only if, among other things, non-combatant
civilians will be spared).
219. This is not to suggest that the United States or any other nation facing transna-
tional terrorism should heavily rely on special forces who often carry out targeted killing
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of the armed forces at risk, but it is submitted that a more limited
use of armed force will ultimately reduce the cycle of violence car-
ried out by systematic employment of drone attacks.
Like humanitarian intervention, such an intervention to stop a
transnational terrorist organization can hardly be said to have rip-
ened into a customary norm such as to nullify or modify the U.N.
Charter.  Some will surely argue that the post 9/11 international
law regime has created an emerging norm to permit the use force
against terrorist organizations in states that are either unwilling or
unable to stop such organizations from operating on their terri-
tory.220  But in the end, such attempts are unconvincing.221  On the
other hand, powerful states with high technology such as
weaponized drones will be sorely tempted to (and have given into
that temptation) to use them against perceived outstanding
threats, even if such threats do not fit the definition of armed
attack under Article 51 or armed conflict under the Geneva Con-
ventions and their Protocols.  Requiring such states to comply with
criteria that are analogous to Cassese’s and R2P’s humanitarian
intervention criteria will likely eliminate the worst abuses and will
limit the use of weaponized drones to the truly exceptional case.
Recognizing the inherent arbitrariness of the veto possessed by
each of the five permanent Security Council members, Cassese has
constructed criteria that create a more inclusive and ideologically
neutral process for dealing with an international human rights
catastrophe.  Likewise, a narrow exception for foreign intervention
in the face of dire threats that do not reach a level of imminence or
armed attack should be permitted only where it would fit within a
democratic and rights based regime not paralyzed by the veto of
one of the P-5 members of the Security Council.  The analysis
would essentially be whether a democratically founded and rights-
based Security Council222 would have been compelled to authorize
the use of force under its Chapter VII powers.
This unquestionably limits the United States in what steps it may
take in dealing with terrorist organizations using states as havens.
This rejects the unilateral action to carry out targeted killings
attacks.  On the contrary, the author thinks such attacks should be limited to the extreme
case.
220. See, e.g., Paust, Self-Defense Targeting, supra note 93; E-mail from Paust to author, R
supra note 179 (characterizing such organizations as “non-state armed attackers”). R
221. See, e.g., Report on Extrajudicial and Summary Killings, supra note 30, ¶¶ 43–44. R
222. Professor Cleveland, for example, suggests that the five permanent member veto
be replaced by a super-majority requirement in the Security Council.  Libya and Lawful-
ness, supra note 212. R
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attacks outside of armed conflict, requires a broad coalition of
states, a heightened collateral damage rule akin to that of the
European Court of Justice, and a higher requirement for exhaus-
tion of peaceful remedies.
In general, this approach rejects the notion that the United
States has apparently adopted that terrorists have an “elongated
imminency” test,223 which essentially makes them continuous
targets even outside of armed conflict.224  This rejects the notion
that geography does not matter, that terrorists can be targeted vir-
tually anywhere, especially if the host state is unwilling or unable to
arrest or capture them.  It does give the United States considerable
leeway to go after the most dangerous terrorists and to encourage
states around the world to engage in law enforcement and, some-
times, military action against them.  If states join a broad coalition
of states, and the other criteria are satisfied, this approach gives
countries like the United States the right to use a limited amount
of force in extreme cases.225  This approach requires international
cooperation and rejects the proposition that, outside of armed
223. Attorney General Holder asserts that “‘imminent threat’  incorporates the relevant
window of opportunity to act[,] the possible harm that missing the window would cause civil-
ians, and the likelihood of heading off future attacks against the United States.”  Holder,
supra note 175 (emphasis added).  The language “relevant window of opportunity” and R
heading off “future attacks” (presumably not immediate ones), tells us that the United
States claims it may kill a suspected terrorist outside armed conflict zones even when the
threat is far from imminent.  One might make an exception for the unquestioned leader of
a deadly terrorist organization like Osama bin Laden.  The difficulty is that there is no
limiting principle on the “elongated imminency” test.  It could be applied to anyone in the
terrorist organization or even to the so-called lone wolf who is merely inspired by a terrorist
leader.
224. Professor Paust argues that we should answer this question by hypothetically look-
ing at a moving picture rather than a snapshot of the alleged terrorist to determine if he or
she is posing an imminent threat. See Paust, Self-Defense Targeting, supra note 93, at 572 R
n.16; Paust, Civilian Casualties, supra note 123.  Such an approach appears to be taking the R
ICRC’s continuous combat function definition of “directly taking part in hostilities” and
applying it to areas outside of armed conflict.  As appealing as the motion picture meta-
phor is, that approach risks an overbroad authorization for the use of force.
225. For example, suppose a state was unable to stop hundreds of members from an
affiliate of al Qaeda from training on its soil.  Such training would not amount to an armed
attack, and not necessarily to an imminent armed attack, either.  Yet such training is cer-
tainly threatening.  The United States should first attempt to get the host state to stop the
training.  Failing that, the United States should attempt to get the U.N. Security Council to
authorize the use of force against the terrorist organization in the host state.  Failing that,
the United States should attempt to assemble a broad coalition of states to deal with the
terrorist threat.  A broad coalition of states could, after trying all peaceful means to stop
the training, launch a narrowly proportioned attack against the training operation.
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conflict, the United States can order such an attack on its own (and
especially not through its espionage agency, the CIA226).
III. EMPLOYING ATTACK DRONES TO CARRY OUT TARGETED
KILLING OF SUSPECTED ISLAMIC TERRORISTS—
AN ADVANCE IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER?
Under certain limited circumstances, using attack drones to tar-
get and kill a person complies with international law.227  From a
tactical perspective, both the Bush-Cheney and Obama administra-
tions have considered the drone program a huge success; dozens
of top al Qaeda and Taliban leaders have been killed, others
remain under the constant watch of the attack drones.228  The ter-
rorists’ havens in the tribal areas of Pakistan and in the remote,
mountainous regions of Afghanistan are no longer safe.  This came
about with no loss of U.S. troops.  Both the Bush-Cheney and
Obama administrations endorse the drone program.  Members of
Congress have blessed it as well.229
Closer examination of the employment of drones to kill an indi-
vidual previously identified by name calls for a different conclu-
sion.  In brief, this Section examines whether the United States’
current employment of drones for targeted killing operations
advances “world public order.”  Professors McDougal, Lasswell, and
Chen identified this principle, noting that “[o]ur overriding aim is
to clarify and to aid in the implementation of a universal interna-
tional order of human dignity.”230  In the context of armed con-
flict, they acknowledged that “[t]he constructive use of the military
instrument for collective security” is necessary “for the mainte-
nance of minimum public order,” but noted that “a general com-
munity aspiring toward human dignity values must seek to
226. For a brief discussion setting forth the reasons why the CIA should not be
entrusted with carrying out targeted killing drone attacks, see supra note 63. R
227. Targeted killings carried out against combatants or those carrying out a continu-
ous combatant function in zones of armed conflict like Afghanistan, assuming the require-
ments of proportionality and military necessity are met, comply with humanitarian law.
228. There are reports that al Qaeda is moving to urban areas, which are “immune to
drones,” according to one Western diplomat. See, e.g., Ali K. Chishti, Al Qaeda Shifting to
Pakistan’s Urban Areas, DAILY TIMES (Pakistan) (Aug. 25, 2010), http://www.dailytimes.
com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\08\25\story_25-8-2010_pg7_20.  Some have argued that five
years ago the drones pushed Osama bin Laden to Abbottobad, better enabling him to be
killed. See id.; Pam Benson, Bin Laden Documents: Fear of Drones, CNN SECURITY CLEARANCE
(May 3, 2012), http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/05/03/bin-laden-documents-fear-of-
drones.
229. See Bone & Bolkcom, supra note 36, at 3. R
230. MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 16 (1986); MYRES S.
MCDOUGAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 236 (1980).
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minimize the employment of such violence and coercion . . . , “231
[using them only as] “a last resort.”232
In this context, advancing world public order resembles legal
philosopher John Rawls’ most original contribution, “The Veil of
Ignorance.”233  Rawls assumes that all relevant actors do not know
their “place in society, . . . class position or social status, [their per-
sonal wealth], [their] intelligence and strength [,] . . . the circum-
stances of their own society, . . . its economic or political
situation[,] or the level of civilization or culture it has been able to
achieve.”234  The principle he espouses, therefore, requires the spe-
cial interests of all groups in society (or here in the international
community) be considered equitably in reaching a rule that
applies to all.235
Rawls suggests that, in determining whether a victim state may
use force within the territory of a failed or unwilling host state, one
needs to assume the status of all stakeholders and attempt to reach
a just solution.236  In the context of weaponized drones, we should
metaphorically stand in the shoes, not only of involved highly
industrialized states, such as the United States and the North Atlan-
231. MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 230, at 236. The approach of Yale University, where R
McDougal taught, has been criticized for the vagueness of its standard and, consequently,
for its potential abuse by partisan interpreters. See Richard Falk, Charybdis Responds: A Note
on Treaty Interpretation, 63 AM. J. INT’L L. 510, 512 (1969). Yet the purpose of such an
approach is hard to dismiss, particularly when applied to those who advocate a right to use
force on foreign territory in the absence of an armed attack by the foreign state itself. See
MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & FLORENTINE FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM PUBLIC WORLD ORDER
122 (1961).
232. MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 230, at 236 (emphasis added). R
233. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118 (revised ed. 1999).
234. Id.
235. Professor D’Amato criticizes Rawls’ philosophy as being too simplistic as applied
to international law rather than to a single community or nation. See generally Anthony
D’Amato, International Law and Rawls’ Theory of Justice, 5 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 525
(1975).  D’Amato’s mainly criticizes Rawls’ position on greater economic equality, as well
as his generalizations about the use of armed force. Id. at 532–33.  On the other hand, the
challenge here is to articulate principles that policy makers should consider in addition to
the minimum set of obligations that the law dictates.  Aside from the basic moral principle
to uphold life and to use military force only as a last resort, Rawls provides a more nuanced
texture, considering the rights, perspectives, and interests of all stakeholder by hypotheti-
cally removing the interests of all.  RAWLS, supra note 233, at 118; cf. RONALD DWORKIN, R
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 88 (1978).  Similarly, Amartya Sen criticizes Rawls for focusing
on a “given people.” AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 71 (2009).  Sen notes, however,
that “each country, or each society, may have parochial beliefs that call for more global
examination and scrutiny, because it can broaden class and type of questions, and because
factual presumptions that lie behind particular ethical and political judgements can be
questioned with the help of the experiences of other countries or societies.” Id. The
author’s approach attempts to embrace in part Sen’s critique.
236. RAWLS, supra note 233. R
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tic Treaty Organization nations, but also of (1) those developing
states upon whose soil military actions are ongoing or contem-
plated, such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen,
(2) ethnic groups and peoples in such states such as the Pastuns
and Tajiks, (3) the greater Islamic world, and (4) the international
community as a whole.  If we were nationals of Pakistan, Somalia,
or Yemen, would we necessarily conclude that because our govern-
ment is unwilling to root out transnational terrorists or is dysfunc-
tional or non-existent, at least in some parts of the state, every
other country that has been threatened by agents of terror could
kill suspected terrorists on our soil?  Using Rawls’ veil of ignorance,
we would expect some legal limits.237  Even the term “failed state”
may be only a rationalization for using military force in a country
without its or its people’s consent.238  Something more than merely
the fact that a state is unwilling or is failed, or partially failed,
should justify a foreign state’s use of deadly force.239
Granted, the drones have killed Taliban and al Qaeda leaders
and supporters, and polls suggest that some residents, particularly
those intimidated by the Taliban or al Qaeda, are not opposed to
the drone attacks.240  The drones, however, have also caused out-
237. This argument is supported by the Yale School of treaty interpretation, which
takes the position that where there is a gap in treaty law, the treaty should be interpreted so
as to advance public world order. See generally MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, HAROLD D. LASSWELL &
JAMES C. MILLER, THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1967).
A stated right of a foreign state to use armed force rather than law enforcement
approaches in a failed state is surely presumptively contrary to advancing world public
order.
238. AKPINARLI, supra note 34, at 230. R
239. See supra notes 94, 180–187, 196 and accompanying text for a discussion of the R
Caroline case and its applicability to extraterritorial use of armed force against suspected
terrorists.  The author is indebted to Professor Mary Ellen O’Connell of Notre Dame Law
School for suggesting the notion of last resort in the context of failed states.  Panel Presen-
tation on Targeted Killing, American Branch of the International Law Association Interna-
tional Law Weekend (Oct. 23, 2010) (the debate between Benjamin Wittes and Professor
O’Connell can be viewed at http://www.lawfareblog.com/2010/10/wittes-v-oconnell-on-
targeted-killing-and-drones); cf. Noyes, supra note 196, at 301 n.134 (quoting JAMES CRAW- R
FORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY 179–80
(2002)) (“Necessity can excuse the wrongfulness of an illegal stat act, such as an illegal
armed incursion into foreign territory [but] may be invoked only in narrow circumstances
. . .[:] ‘(a) it the only means for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave
and imminent peril; and (b) does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or
States towards which the obligation exists, or of the international community as a whole.’”)
(emphasis added).
240. A Pew Global Research Poll indicated that 32% of Pakistanis approved of drone
strikes. PEW RES. CTR., CONCERN ABOUT EXTREMISTS THREAT SLIPS IN PAKISTAN 12 (2010),
available at http://pewglobal.org/files/pdf/Pew-Global-Attitudes-2010-Pakistan-Report.
pdf.  On the other hand, a New America Foundation survey indicated that more than half
of respondents believed that the drone strikes killed mainly civilians and that two-thirds of
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rage.  Taliban leaders have called for two suicide attacks for every
drone attack.241  At least one study shows a direct correlation
between drone targeted killings and corresponding suicide bomb-
ing attacks.242  Rather than being confined to the remote tribal dis-
tricts, many such attacks have taken place in the heart of
Pakistan.243  The May 2010 attempted car bombing in Times
Square in New York was apparently retaliation for drone attacks in
the Pakistan Tribal areas.244
On August 5, 2009, a CIA drone killed Baitalluh Mehsud, a war-
lord commanding 20,000 militants.245  In express retaliation,
Jordanian physician Humam Khalil Al-Balawi, whom the CIA had
trusted as their agent, entered the U.S. base in Kost, Afghanistan
near the Pakistan border on December 30, 2009, greeted his CIA
handlers, and detonated a bomb, killing himself, seven CIA
those polled in the Pakistan tribal areas believed that using suicide bombers against U.S.
military targets was justified.  Bergman & Tiedemann, supra note 67, at 14. R
241. See, e.g., Taliban Vow to Avenge Drone Attacks, DAILY POST (Pakistan), Mar. 23, 2011,
available at 2011 WLNR 564911; Pakistan Taliban Chief Vows Revenge, AL JAZEERA, Oct. 5,
2009, available at 2009 WLNR 19601989 (reporting that Taliban leader said his group
would avenge the death of Baitullah Mehsud, his predecessor, whom the United States
killed in a drone attack); Amir Mir, Suicide Attack on Lahore Police Intelligence Unit Kills 15,
DAILY NEWS & ANALYSIS (Mar. 9, 2010), http://www.dnaindia.com/world/report_suicide-
attack-on-lahore-police-intelligence-unit-kills-15_1356935 (“Fifteen people were killed and
70 injured in a suicide attack on a police intelligence unit in Lahore on Monday.  The
Punjab chapter of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) said it carried out the attack to
avenge the February 24 killing of commander Qari Zafar, acting ameer of the al Qaeda-
linked Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) in a US drone attack in north Waziristan.”); Suicide Attacks
Increased During March 2011, CONFLICT MONITORING CTR. (Apr. 10, 2011), http://
cmcpk.wordpress.com/2011/04/27/suicide-attacks-increased-during-march-2011.
Some drone attacks have mistakenly targeted the innocent and have provoked calls for
revenge even by those who claim to be neither Taliban nor al Qaeda.  Rahmatullah Khan,
Grand Jirga Vows to Avenge Drone Killings, PAKISTAN OBSERVER, Mar. 19, 2011, available at 2011
WLNR 5823161 (Pakistan Grand Jirga calls for revenge against U.S. citizens for the killing
in a drone attack of forty-one people during a jirga concerning a border dispute).
242. New Pattern of Drone Attacks, CONFLICT MONITORING CTR. (May 3, 2012), http://
cmcpk.wordpress.com/2012/03/03/new-pattern-of-drone-attacks; see also Graham Usher,
Pakistan Spring, AL-AHRAM (Apr. 3, 2008)), http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2008/891/in2.
htm (noting that in a “ferocious reprisal” against Predator Drone attacks, the Taliban car-
ried out 17 suicide attacks in the last 10 weeks that killed 274 civilians, police and soldiers).
243. See supra note 242 and accompanying text. R
244. Sami Yousafzai & Ron Morea, Pakistan Taliban Source: Times Square Bombing Attempt
Was ‘Revenge Against America’, NEWSWEEK (May 6, 2010), http://www.newsweek.com/blogs/
declassified/2010/05/06/pakistan-taliban-source-times-square-bombing-attempt-was-
revenge-against-america.html.
245. Forty-seven percent of Pakistanis, however, approved the drone attack killing
Baitalluh Mehsud, allegedly behind the assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister,
Benazir Bhutto. See PEW RES. CTR., supra note 240, at 12.  Baitalluh Mehsud denied this R
allegation. Al Qaeda Militant Did Not Kill Bhutto: Spokesman, ABC NEWS (Australia) (Dec. 29,
2007), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2007-12-29/al-qaeda-militant-did-not-kill-bhutto-
spokesman/998732.
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officers, and one Jordanian secret service agent.246  In turn, the
CIA launched eleven weaponized drone attacks in the following
month, killing approximately ninety people, according to Pakistani
and U.S. authorities.247
The outrage is not completely confined to the extremists.  There
is substantial evidence that the Pakistani population opposes use of
drones in Pakistan.248  Of the more than one-third of Pakistanis
informed about drone attacks, 93% opposed weaponized drones,
according to a Pew Global poll conducted in 2010.249  The Pakis-
tani Parliament recently passed a resolution banning drone strikes
on Pakistani soil250 and the Pakistani government has ordered that
the United States cease operating drones out of the Shamsi base in
south Pakistan.251  Furthermore, most Afghans are also reportedly
246. Stephen Farrell, Video Links Taliban in Pakistan to C.I.A. Attack, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/10/world/middleeast/10balawi.html?page
wanted=all.
247. Jane Perlez & Pirzubair Shah, Drones Batter Al Qaeda and Its Allies Within Pakistan,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/05/world/asia/05drones.
html?_r=1&ref=sirajuddin_haqqani.
248. See Declan Walsh, Turbulent Pakistan Presents a Conundrum for Barack Obama,
GUARDIAN (U.K.) (Dec. 2, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/dec/02/barack-
obama-surge-pakistan-reaction; see also CIA Drones Damaging Pentagon Interest, SUNDAY TIMES
(Islamabad), May 15, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 9712096 (noting that “from 2004 to
2011 CIA carried out 234 drone strikes [in Pakistan].  Out of revealed strikes 118 were
during the last year and 21 launched just only in the last three months.  According to the
reports over 2,200 individuals have been killed which include innocent persons apart from
militants.”).
One commentator relates the effect of drone strikes on Taliban recruitment as follows:
A prominent Taliban commander of the Pakistan Taliban recently said that when
the Taliban try and do social welfare work in a village of 2,000 people, they may
succeed in getting 20 to 30 people join their ranks.  However, when the United
States attacks the village with a drone flight it brings the whole village to support
the Taliban.
Anwer Sher, How Pakistan Can Regain Its Self-Respect, AL ARABIYA NEWS (July 13, 2011),
http://english.alarabiya.net/views/2011/07/13/157425.html.
249. See PEW RES. CTR., supra note 240, at 12; see also Gordon Bowen, Has Outreach to the R
Muslim World by the Obama Administration Had an Impact on Muslim Attitudes Towards Terrorists
and Terrorism?, 15 MIDDLE E. REV. INT’L AFF. 65, 69 n.79 (2011) (“[M]ore than 60 percent
of Pakistani journalists surveyed in early 2011 were found to regard U.S. drone attacks in
Pakistan as ‘terrorism.’”) (quoting Lawrence Pintak & Syed Javed Nazir, Inside the Muslim
(Journalist’s) Mind, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/
02/12/opinion/20110213_pakistaniopart.html); STEVEN KULL, THE ROOTS OF MUSLIM
ANGER 67 (2011) (noting that a World Public Opinion.org poll in 2009 indicated that
eighty-two percent of Pakistanis polled believed drone attacks in the Pakistan Tribal areas
were unjustified).
250. Dina al-Shibeeb, Pakistani Legislators Denounce Stealth Operations, Worsening Bilateral
Relations, AL ARABIYA NEWS (May 14, 2011), http://english.alarabiya.net/save_pdf.php?
cont_id=149052.
251. Salmon Masood & Eric Schmidt, Tensions Flare Between U.S. and Pakistan After Strike,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/27/world/asia/pakistan-
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opposed to the drone attacks.252  That opposition is apparently
shared by much of the Muslim world.253
Determining whether a counterterrorism policy advances world
public order requires going beyond opinion polls, legislative acts,
and the cycle of violence.  Some empirical evidence, public policy,
the history of colonization of much of the Islamic world, and other
historical parallels also inform the debate.  Ironically, U.S. policy
toward civilians in Afghanistan is likewise compelling.
A. The Public Policy Case for Broadly Interpreting Use of Force Rules
and the Opposing Case for Narrowly Interpreting
Combat Law Immunities
Public policy supporting a broad interpretation of the use of
armed force rules is relatively simple.  Non-state actors like al
Qaeda are capable of recruiting, training, and equipping private
militia that can move from country to country and from armed
conflict zones to areas outside such zones.  Past and potential vic-
says-nato-helicopters-kill-dozens-of-soldiers.html; Pakistan Base Drones Are Sent Packing, MX
(Australia), June 30, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 12970467.
252. Jeffrey Sluka notes as follows:
Polls in Afghanistan and Pakistan show that a desire to strike back against the
United States increases after every drone attack, and when Faisal Shahzad, the
Pakistani-American who tried to plant a bomb in Times Square in May 2010 was
asked at his trial how he could justify planting bomb that could kill children he
answered: ‘When the drones hit, they don’t see children, they don’t see anybody.
They kill women, children, they kill everybody . . . I am part of the answer . . . I’m
avenging the attack.’
Jeffrey A. Sluka, Death from Above: UAVs and Losing Hearts and Minds, MIL. REV., May–June
2011, at 70, 75; see also Ibrahim Mothana, How Drones Help Al Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES, June 14,
2012, at A35, available at 2012 WLNR 12419394 (noting that drone strikes are causing more
Yeminis to hate America and join radical groups).
President Hamid Karzai banned drone attacks on homes in Afghanistan after a NATO
attack on two homes killed nine people, several of them children.  Nathaniel Sheppard, Is
War with Taliban at a Cross-Roads?, AL ARABIYA NEWS (June 2, 2011), http://english.
alarabiya.net/articles/2011/06/02/151500.html.
The Taliban are not unique in their reaction to targeted killing.  Reacting to Russia’s
“disappearing” Chechen and other Caucasus fighters and of targeted killing/assassinating
Chechen presidents, the so-called Black Widows, the wives of Caucasus fighters killed by
the Russians, exploded bombs on Moscow subways on March 31, 2010, killing forty people
and injuring scores of others.  Clifford Levy, Second Bomber in Moscow Attacks Is Identified,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/07/world/europe/07mos-
cow.html.  The Black Widows have been responsible for at least sixteen other bombings,
including the blowing up of two civilian airliners.  Clifford Levy, Russia Says Suicide Bomber
Was Militant’s Widow, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/03/
world/europe/03moscow.html; Michael Isikoff & Mark Hosenball, Terror Watch: Web of Vio-
lence Attacks by the Black Widows and Other Chechen Militants May Have Al Qaeda Links, NEWS-
WEEK WEB EXCLUSIVES, Sept. 1, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 3642367.
253. See, e.g., Rohan Gunaratna & Karunya Jayasena, Global Support for Al Qaeda and
Osama bin Laden: An Increase or Decrease?, UNISCI DISCUSSION PAPERS, Jan. 2011, at 199, 211.
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tim states must be able to employ military force to combat such
actors.  If such actors are in a state that is unable or unwilling to
arrest or capture them, then victim states are justified in attacking
those actors in the host state’s territory.254
The case for a narrow interpretation of humanitarian law immu-
nities is also relatively simple.  However dangerous non-state actors’
organizations may be, they pale in comparison with the danger
posed by using military force.  The military resources of the nation
state are far greater.  It is true that asymmetric warfare by terrorist
organizations can have extraordinary impact, such as the 9/11
attacks, but the greater threat to humankind remains with nation
state armies and militaries.  One only has to examine the history of
the last 100 years to prove this proposition.  Starting with World
War I, through the Spanish Civil War through World War II,
through the Korean Conflict, Vietnam, the 1991 Iraq-Iran War, the
2001 invasion of Afghanistan, the 2003 War in Iraq, and other con-
flicts, the number of casualties inflicted by states exceeds 170 mil-
lion.255  The number of terrorist killings carried out by private
terror organizations in that time period measures in the low
thousands.256
The strict interpretation of humanitarian law combat immunities
comports with the fundamental principle that must be recognized,
namely, the extraordinary nature of combat immunity and the
remarkable legal regime that permits it.  Immunizing individual
soldiers and commanders from criminal liability for what otherwise
254. See LINDSAY MOIR, REAPPRAISING THE RESORT TO FORCE 151 (2010) (“Both common
sense and realpolitic dictate that military action against non-state actors in a situation where
the host state is either unable or unwilling to take preventive action may well be necessary,
in that there is no reasonable or effective alternative to the use of force.”).
255. See Matthew White, 30 Worst Atrocities of the 20th Century, HISTORICAL ATLAS TWENTI-
ETH CENTURY, http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/atrox.htm (last updated Dec. 2004) (giv-
ing numbers only for the most lethal conflicts taking place during this time frame); Piero
Scaruffi, Wars and Genocides of the Twentieth Century, SCARUFFI, http://www.scaruffi.com/
politics/massacre.html (last vistied June 16, 2012) (citing numbers adding up to roughly
190 million); R.J. Rummel, 20th Century Democide, HAWAII.EDU, http://www.hawaii.edu/
powerkills/20TH.htm (citing numbers adding up to 262 million); see also List of Wars and
Anthropogenic Disasters by Death Toll, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_wars_
and_anthropogenic_disasters_by_death_toll (last updated June 16, 2012).
256. See Andrew Blum et al., Nonstate Actors, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction, 7
INT’L STUD. REV. 133, 153–154 (2005) (citing Robert Johnston, Incidents of Mass Casualty
Terrorism, JOHNSTON ARCHIVE, http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/terrorism/wrjp394.html
(last updated Apr. 30, 2012)); see also GLOBAL TERRORISM DATABASE, http://www.start.umd.
edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=casualties&search=casualties&count=100 (last visited
June 16, 2012) (defining terrorist acts as those committed by non-state actors).
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would be murder257 demonstrates that humanitarian law (the law
of war) is an exceptional legal regime.  Furthermore, immunity is not
limited to killing combatants; it covers killing civilians as long as
the civilians fit within the expansive category of “collateral damage”
under the proportionality rule.258  The penalty for murder is the
gravest in most countries’ criminal justice systems.  Because immu-
nity may undermine one of the international community’s funda-
mental values, combat immunities should be narrow, limited to
areas of armed conflict and only when troops have complied with
the law of armed conflict, including the principle of discrimina-
tion, the demonstration of military necessity, and the principle of
proportionality.259  So outside areas of armed conflict, law enforce-
ment as dictated by international human rights law should control,
permitting resort to deadly force only in an emergency.260  For “[i]f
the U.S. can claim it has the legal authority to carry out assassina-
tions/targeted killings worldwide, then other countries facing
‘transnational terrorists threats’ can do likewise.”261  Should Russia,
China, India, Pakistan, Iran, North Korea, or any other country be
allowed to assassinate or kill suspected terrorists outside an armed
conflict anywhere in the world (even in so-called unwilling or
failed states)?262
The United States’ temptation to use attack drones may derive,
in part, from love of technology263 and of the apparent ease of
eliminating a threat with attack drones, a method that does not put
257. Intentional murder is defined by the Model Penal Code as “purposely [or] know-
ingly . . . caus[ing] the death of another human being.” MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.2(2),
210.3.
258. See A.P. I, supra note 3, arts. 51, 57.  The ICRC interprets the proportionality rule
broadly: “The presence of a soldier on leave obviously cannot justify the destruction of a
village.”  Had there been two soldiers on leave, could the village then have been destroyed?
COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 133, at 684; see also Rome Statute, R
supra note 115, art. 8(b)(iv). R
259. See supra notes 131, 134–136 and accompanying text for a discussion of military R
necessity.
260. See McCann v. United Kingdom, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 97, 97 (1995) (hold-
ing the United Kingdom responsible for its Special Air Services (SAS) troops killing
unarmed suspected Irish Republican Army (IRA) terrorists, but absolving the SAS soldiers
from responsibility under a human rights-based law enforcement approach because the
soldiers were instructed that the IRA members had radio controlled detonators to a bomb
that they could instantly activate, even though such detonators were never found).  For a
more detailed discussion of McCann and the flexibility of human rights law in the context
of the terrorist threat, see MCDONNELL, supra note 19, at 159–60. R
261. MCDONNELL, supra note 19, at 160. R
262. Id. at 161.
263. See ALAN R. DRENGSON, THE PRACTICE OF TECHNOLOGY 80–81 (1995); P.W. SINGER,
WIRED FOR WAR 1 (2009) (“Why a book on robots and war? . . . Because robots are freakin’
cool.”).
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United States’ personnel at risk.  Our cultural expectation of quick
solutions to foreign wars and entanglements may, on a policy level,
make using attack drones more appealing.264  Emphasizing the
numbers of al Qaeda and Taliban killed in this manner suggests
progress in the war in Afghanistan and in the “war against ter-
ror.”265  The War in Vietnam, however, taught that body counts
may not correlate with progress towards victory266 and may give the
military (and the CIA) incentives to engage in illegal or immoral
behavior.267
B. Empirical Evidence Suggesting that Targeted Killing of the Leaders
of Islamic Terrorist Organizations is Counterproductive
Some empirical evidence supports the proposition that inten-
tionally killing the leaders of the Taliban, al Qaeda, and other
Islamic terror organizations may ultimately impair the U.S.
counterterrorism effort.  Jenna Jordan, a doctoral candidate at the
University of Chicago, exhaustively studied the “decapitation” of
298 terrorist organizations.268  She concluded that while targeted
killing of the organizations’ leaders is more effective against merely
ideological organizations (like the Baader Meinhof gang) as con-
trasted with religiously motivated terror groups, such targeting
generally helps such organizations endure longer than terrorist
organizations whose leadership is not targeted.269  Furthermore,
she found that targeted killing of terrorist leaders is particularly
ineffective against what she calls “separatist” terrorist organizations
(like the Irish Republican Army) and is least effective against relig-
264. The war in Afghanistan is becoming the longest fought war in the United States
history.  That may give policy makers even greater impetus to use what they perceive as the
tools to bring an end to it misguided that approach might ultimately be.
265. The Obama administration has termed it “the war against al Qaeda.” See supra
note 176 and accompanying text. R
266. See GREGORY A. ADDIS, NO SURE VICTORY: MEASURING U.S. ARMY PROGRESS AND
EFFECTIVENESS IN THE VIETNAM WAR 270–73 (2009).  Regarding potential abuse of the body
count, see KENNETH J. CAMPBELL, GENOCIDE AND THE GLOBAL VILLAGE 40 (2001) (citing
MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 97–101 (1992)).
267. Accord CAMPBELL, supra note 266. R
268. Jenna Jordan, When Heads Roll, 18 SECURITY STUD. 719, 746 (2009).  Jordan uses
the term “decapitation” to refer not only to the killing of terrorist leaders, but also to their
arrest. Id.
269. Id.
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ious terrorist organizations.270  Against the latter two groups,
targeting their leaders ends up strengthening the organization.271
The Taliban, al Qaeda, and their allied groups are in both cate-
gories.  These organizations are religious and “separatist.”  The
Taliban came from Islamic fundamentalist madrassas.272  They are
separatist because they seek control of land that they believe their
Pashtun tribal identity entitles them.273  One could say the same
about al Qaeda.  Inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood and Sayyid
al Qutb, the executed prophet of that organization, al Qaeda seeks
return to Muslim hands all of the territory that was once under
Muslim control.274  Thus, the Islamic terrorist organizations against
which the United States struggles are both religious and nationalis-
tic.275  Jordan also observes that the social networking literature
concludes that decentralized organizations are less likely to be seri-
ously affected by “decapitation” than hierarchical ones.276  Al
Qaeda, if not the Taliban, is noteworthy for its decentralized char-
acter.277  Al Qaeda has traditionally worked as a loose franchise sys-
tem rather than a top down military organization.278  All the more
reason that targeting al Qaeda leaders is likely to be ineffective.279
270. Id. at 723 (“The data show that independent of other measures, going after the
leaders of older, larger, and religious groups is not only ineffective, it is counterproductive.
Moreover, the decentralized nature of many current terrorist organizations has proven to
be highly resistant to decapitation and to other counterterrorism measures.”).
271. Id. at 748 (“Religious groups that have undergone decapitation are 16 percent less
likely to fall apart than those that did not. Finally, separatist groups that have had a leader
removed are 31 percent less likely to cease activity than separatist groups that have not.”).
272. ROBERT D. CREWS & AMIN TARZI, THE TALIBAN AND THE CRISIS OF AFGHANISTAN 9
(2008).
273. Id. at 20, 76–77 (noting that ethnic solidarity and the Taliban’s familiarity with
Pashtun society and culture helped the Taliban succeed).
274. After being imprisoned in Egypt, al Qutb went much further, asserting that the
entire world should be ruled by Islamic governments. See Andreas Krieg, From al Banna to
Qutb to Zawahiri – How the Ideology of al Banna Set the Foundations for Modern Islamic Fundamen-
talism, PICA, http://www.thepicaproject.org/?page_id=191 (last visited June 14, 2012).
275. The nationalism is defined more broadly than that tied to a particular nation-state
to embrace a pan-Islamic nation closely resembling that which existed under the Ottoman
Empire.
276. Jordan, supra note 268, at 755 (“The literature on social network analysis argues R
that decentralized organizations are less likely to suffer setbacks than hierarchically struc-
tured organizations.”).
277. See MCDONNELL, supra note 19, at 173, for a fuller discussion of this point. R
278. For example, the relationship between al Qaeda and “al Qaeda in Iraq” has been
described as a marriage of convenience, not a true partnership. See Brian Fishman, After
Zarqawi: The Dilemmas and Future of Al Qaeda in Iraq, WASH. Q., Fall 2006, at 19, 19.
279. Jordan, supra note 268, at 739.  She states as follows: R
Religious organizations should be most difficult to destabilize after the removal of a leader.
Studies in network analysis have found that religious organizations tend to be
more decentralized and are thus harder to weaken. Moreover, religion has a
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As to the Taliban, little evidence suggests that they have been sub-
stantially weakened militarily by the drone strikes.
Although Jordan’s may be the most detailed empirical study of
leadership “decapitation,” other researchers’ work supports her
findings.  After studying sixty instances in which terrorist organiza-
tions lost their leaders by arrest or killing, Professor Mannes with
some other researchers reached the same conclusion: “The result
that consistently stood out from this research was the propensity of
decapitation strikes to cause religious organizations to become sub-
stantially more deadly.”280  Professor Cronin observed that relig-
sacred element that inspires a level of dedication not seen in other movements,
resulting in greater resilience and longer lifespan. Religion is often integral to
individual identity, particularly to those involved in religiously motivated terrorist
organizations. According to Stohl and Stohl identity based organizations, which
can include both religious and separatist organizations, are hard to penetrate.
Religious and separatist movements also tend to have a strong base of community
support. Cronin argues that “broader popular support is usually the key to the
greater average longevity of ethnicnationalist/separatist groups in the modern
era.” Thus separatist organizations should also be highly resistant to leadership
decapitation.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
280. Aaron Manes, Testing the Snake Head Strategy: Does Killing or Capturing Its Leaders
Reduce a Terrorist Group’s Activity?, 9 J. INT’L POL. SOLUTIONS 41, 43 (2009); see also GARY
LAFREE ET AL., DETERRENCE AND DEFIANCE MODELS OF TERRORIST VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN
IRELAND, 1969–1992, at 2 (2006) (examining five major counter-terrorist operations and
their consequences and concluding that “imposing harsh criminal justice and military
interventions to reduce terrorism may well be counterproductive”); Robert White, From
Peaceful Protest to Guerilla War: Micromobilization of the Provisional Irish Republican Army, AM. J.
SOC. 94 (1989); Edward H. Kaplan et al., What Happened to Suicide Bombings in Israel? Insights
from a Terror Stock Model, 28 STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 225, 225, 227 (2005) (after exam-
ining 75 Israeli targeted killing operations, the authors conclude these operations
“spark[ed] estimated recruitment to the terror stock . . . rather than decreases the rate of
suicide bombing”); Tom Parker, Fighting an Antaean Enemy: How Democratic States Uninten-
tionally Sustain the Terrorist Movements They Oppose, 19 TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 155, 163,
173 (2007) (a comparative study of five democracies involved in counter-terrorism opera-
tions concluding that repressive measures such as targeted killing is a “major factor
explaining the development of political violence”) (quoting White, supra note 280, at R
1298). But see Mohammed M. Hafez & Joseph M. Hatfield, Do Targeted Assassinations Work?
A Multivariate Analysis of Israeli Counter-Terrorism Effectiveness during Al-Aqsa Uprising, 9 STUD.
CONFLICT & TERRORISM 359 (2006) (concluding that Israeli targeted killing operations
have no effect on the number of Palestinian attacks, neither increasing nor decreasing
them); Patrick B. Johnston, Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation in
Counterinsurgency Campaigns (Sept. 24, 2010) (unpublished post-doctoral research
paper, Harvard University), available at http://scholar.harvard.edu/johnston/files/decapi-
tation.pdf  (indicating that targeting killing of terrorist leaders can effectively destroy the
capacity of the terrorist group); Daniel Byman, Predator v. Taliban, FOREIGN AFF. (Mar. 18,
2009), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64901/daniel-byman/taliban-vs-predator
(arguing that despite risks, targeting killing of the Taliban is an effective counter-terrorism
practice); Abraham Kantor, Democratic Assassination: The Morality and Efficiency of
Targeted Killings as a Policy Tool (June 2007) (unpublished B.A. honors thesis, Ohio State
University), available at https://kb.osu.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/1811/28452/Copy_
of_06_07_07_FINALCOPY.pdf?sequence=1.
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iously motivated terrorists pose special dangers281 because, among
other things, they consider themselves engaged in
a Manichaean struggle of good against evil, implying an open-
ended set of human targets . . . Second, religious terrorists
engage in violent behavior directly or indirectly to please the
perceived commands of a deity . . . . Moreover, religious ter-
rorists may not be as constrained in their behavior by concerns
about the reactions of their human constituents. (Their audi-
ence lies elsewhere.) Third, religious terrorists consider them-
selves to be unconstrained by secular values or laws . . . .282
Given their spiritual bonds to their cause, the loss of a leader to a
remotely controlled drone may make such individuals view the lost
leader as a martyr to that cause, rather than discourage them from
further acts of violence.283  Despite the ever increasing deployment
of drones to carry out targeted killing operations and despite their
having killed so many Taliban and al Qaeda leaders, few claim that
the drones will eliminate the threat that the Taliban and al Qaeda,
its affiliates, and adherents pose.284  More importantly, this
research suggests that the tactical victories that have been achieved
through drone attacks may ultimately result in strategic defeat.
Professor Cronin also notes that the growth of Islamic funda-
mentalist terrorism is, in part, a response to globalization, epito-
mized by the United States’ superiority in technology and scientific
281. Audrey Kurth Cronin, Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism, 27
INT’L SECURITY 30 (2002–2003). But see G. Gvineria, How Does Terrorism End?, in SOCIAL
SCIENCE FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM 257, 271 (2009) (“Some authors suggest that killing polit-
ical leaders [of a terrorist organization] is more likely to backfire than killing operational
leaders as the latter are usually less known to the public and their deaths tend to get far less
attention.”).
282. Cronin, supra note 281, at 41–42. R
283. It is too early to evaluate whether the killing of Osama bin Laden by United States
Navy Seals will weaken or strengthen al Qaeda and its associated groups.  Despite the
euphoria on the part of many in the United States about the killing, Jordan’s research
suggests that it will strengthen these extremist religious terrorist groups.  One Pakistani
commentator has noted that “Che Guevara was far more valuable to Cuban militancy dead
than alive.”  Omar Ashour, Was Killing Him a Mistake, PAKISTAN OBSERVER, May 18, 2011,
available at 2011 WLNR 9924333.  As of June 2, 2011, the Taliban had conducted a series of
retaliatory suicide attacks resulting in the deaths of 150 people in Pakistan, most of them
soldiers.  Sheppard, supra note 252, at 248. R
284. There are probably other reasons for this phenomenon aside from the targeted
killing drone attacks.  On the other hand, one could hardly claim that the drone attacks
have effectively thwarted the Taliban. See also Berger & Tiedemann, supra note 67, at 14 R
(“Although the [drone] strikes have killed more than 1,000 militants, including 33 insur-
gent leaders, violence in Pakistan has gone up dramatically since the program began, from
only 150 terrorist incidents in 2004 to a peak of 1,916 in 2009 (according to the U.S.
National Counterterrorism Center) although the increase first ticked up in 2007, a year
before the frequency of the drone strikes began to pick up.”).
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development.285  The use of highly advanced weapon systems
exemplified by remotely operated attack drones may thus feed
even more deeply into outrage and retaliation by the Taliban and
al Qaeda, who generally have to rely on low-technology to fight
their battles.286  It is hard to imagine a more representative feature
of technology and scientific development than a robotically oper-
ated weapon of war from which, a controller, with the press of a
finger 7,000 miles away, can launch a precision guided missile
wreaking destruction on all those in its wake.287  Furthermore,
from the Islamists’ perspective, drones are a cowardly means of
warfare that violate elemental chivalry.
Some scholars have argued that taking out a charismatic leader
of a terrorist organization will result in the destruction of that
organization.  The arrests of the leaders of the Kurdish Workers
Party (PKK), and the Peruvian Sendero Luminoso may have been
successful decapitations,288 but government forces killed neither of
those leaders, and it is far from clear that the PKK has collapsed,
though the Sendero Luminoso’s activities have declined mark-
edly.289  In any event, neither of these organizations had religion as
their focus.  Unless the United States is willing to engage in repres-
sive counter-terrorism polices on the level of Nazi Germany, the
former Soviet Union or perhaps the current Russia, routinely
employing the explosive counter-terrorism device of weaponized
285. Cronin, supra note 281, at 46; see KAREN ARMSTRONG, ISLAM, A SHORT HISTORY R
157–58, 171–72 (2000) (noting that religious fundamentalism, be it Christian, Jewish, or
Islamic, is primarily a response to the modernism and secularism exemplified by
globalization).
286. Rick Smith, Dirty Secret of War on Terror? Low-tech Can Defeat High-tech, Author Warns,
WRALTECHWIRE, http://wraltechwire.com/business/tech_wire/opinion/blogpost/64207
71 (last updated Nov. 16, 2009).
287. Cronin’s assessment is shared by Armstrong, who concludes that Islamic funda-
mentalism has arisen as “a reaction against the scientific and secular culture that first
appeared in the West.”  KAREN ARMSTRONG, THE BATTLE FOR GOD xi (2000).  Armstrong
underlines the proposition that Islamic fundamentalism like Christian and Jewish funda-
mentalism is, to a great extent, a response to modernism, to the highly developed techno-
logical state and to the decline of traditional, conservative agrarian society: “It
[fundamentalism] is a reaction against the scientific and secular culture that first appeared
in the West, but which has since taken root in other parts of the world.” Id. (emphasis
added).
288. See Jordan, supra note 268, at 721. R
289. See, e.g., REGIONAL SURVEYS OF THE WORLD: SOUTH AMERICA, CENTRAL AMERICA AND
THE CARIBBEAN 652 (10th ed. 2002) (“The capture of Abimeal Guzman and subsequently
many others among its senior leaders inflicted serious damage on the movement for which
is seems unlikely to recover.”).
32358-jle_44-2 Sheet No. 73 Side B      10/29/2012   11:23:52
32358-jle_44-2 Sheet No. 73 Side B      10/29/2012   11:23:52
\\jciprod01\productn\J\JLE\44-2\JLE202.txt unknown Seq: 68 17-OCT-12 12:37
310 The Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. [Vol. 44
drones for targeted killing of listed individuals runs a substantial
risk of being counter-productive.290
C. The Scarring Colonization of Islamic Lands by Europe and Russia
Aside from empirical evidence, those fashioning counterterror-
ism policy should also consider history.  Nearly all Muslim coun-
tries were once Russian or Western European colonies.  Most
Muslim countries became independent after World War II.  Colo-
nization has cast a long, dark shadow of racism, economic exploita-
tion, and deliberate humiliation of the colonized peoples.  This
statement by Jules Harmand typifies colonizers’ attitudes:
It is necessary then to accept as a principle and point of depar-
ture the fact that there is a hierarchy of races and civilizations,
and that we belong to the superior race and civilization, while still
recognizing that white superiority confers rights, it imposes
strict obligations in return. The basic legitimization of conquest over
native peoples is the conviction of our superiority not merely our
mechanical, economic, and military superiority, but our moral
superiority. Our dignity rests on that quality and it underlies our
right to direct the rest of humanity.291
The British colonized Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.  In 1948,
the United Kingdom divided the South Asia subcontinent into
India and Pakistan, who remain bitter enemies to this day.292  Brit-
ain has had a long history with Afghanistan, waging war three
times, “invading in 1838 and 1878, and fighting a rebellion in
1919.”293  The British literally drew the borders of Iraq, cobbling it
together from three provinces of the Ottoman Empire.294
The United States never colonized an Islamic country.  However,
U.S. policy in the Middle East since the end of the Second World
War and the U.S. invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan have meant, at
least for Muslims, that the United States assumed the mantle of the
290. See Parker, supra note 280, at 127 (“The introduction of such ‘extremely repres- R
sive’ measures is simply not an option open to democratic states characterized as they are
by the rule of law, an independent judiciary, and a foundation of basic civil rights,” making
resort to “authoritarian half-measures” ultimately self-defeating, de-legitimizing the demo-
cratic state and handing a propaganda victory to the terrorist group) (citing DOUG
MCADAM, POLITICAL PROCESS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF BLACK INSURGENCY, 1930–1970
(1982)).
291. Ruth Gordon, Saving Failed States: Sometimes a Neocolonist Notion, 12 AM. J. INT’L L.
& POL’Y 903, 933 n.153 (emphasis added) (quoting Edward Said).
292. James Fallows, The Fifty-First State?, ATLANTIC (Nov. 2002), http://www.theatlantic.
com/magazine/archive/2002/11/the-fifty-first-state/2612.
293. MCDONNELL, supra note 19, at 1.  Part of this subsection is drawn from the first R
chapter of the author’s book. Id. at 1–35.
294. Fallows, supra note 292. R
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former European colonial powers.295  Since 1945, the United States
has “supported authoritarian regimes in the Arab world, including
the House of Saud in Saudi Arabia, Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, the
Shah of Iran, and, initially, Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and the auto-
cratic leaders of the tiny oil-rich gulf states.”296  The Arab spring is
a direct and welcome response to authoritarianism, but arose in
the face of U.S. policy coddling up to repressive governments.297
History should inform counterterrorism policy.  The United
States should be particularly sensitive to the experience of the
Pakistani, Afghan, Iraqi, Somali, Yemini, and other Islamic peoples
and to avoiding any practice that recalls colonial rule.  Thus, the
United States must ensure that it does not subject Afghans, Pakis-
tanis, Iraqis, Somalis, or Yeminis to invidious discrimination.
United States governmental officials and armed services must treat
such peoples as they would like U.S. citizens to be treated.  In the
words of former U.S. commander General McChrystal to troops in
Afghanistan, “Think of how you would expect a foreign army to
operate in your neighborhood, among your families and your chil-
dren, and act accordingly.”298  Furthermore, any assertion of mili-
tary power on Muslim land must be kept to the absolute minimum
necessary.
295. See MCDONNELL, supra note 19, at 1–35, for a more detailed discussion of this R
issue. For a Muslim perspective, see Mazhar Qayyum Khan, Give Political Solution a Chance,
NATION (Pakistan) (Apr. 2, 2008), http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-
daily-english-online/columns/02-Apr-2008/Give-political-solution-a-chance, stating as
follows:
The American and Western allies have to accept that force cannot subdue an
indomitable will.  They must vacate Muslim lands in letter and in spirit.  Not only
physical occupation ought to end but also the exploitation of their resources.
They cannot make up for the historical injustice Imperialist powers had caused,
but they can stop their neo-imperialist bent of mind.  The Muslims do not resent
the freedoms Americans enjoy.  They only demand democratic rights for them-
selves. The root causes of hatred of the West and militancy lie in past and present
discrimination they have suffered. It is time to grasp this truth to the end of
terrorism.
296. MCDONNELL, supra note 19, at 14.  For a discussion of Israel and United States R
policy, see id. at 14–16.
297. The Obama administration has commendably (however abruptly) attempted to
change the course of U.S. policy to support the Arab democratic movements and has sup-
ported the U.N. approved military intervention in Libya to protect civilians.  Yet the admin-
istration is countering a half-century of U.S. policy favoring repressive Arab regimes.  By
providing a democratic avenue to effect change and remedy legitimate grievances, the
Arab Spring threatens to take the air out of the extremists’ balloon.  Al Qaeda’s decision to
attack other Muslims rather than directing its fire solely on the West has also contributed
to al Qaeda’s decline in popularity in the Muslim world.
298. Dexter Filkins, Stanley McChrystal’s Long War, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2009), http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/10/18/magazine/18Afghanistan-t.html?pagewanted=13&_r=2.
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Reversing previous United States policy, General McChrystal rec-
ognized this issue:
Gentlemen, we need to understand the implications of what we
are doing.  Air power contains the seeds of our own destruction.
A guy with a long-barrel rifle runs into a compound, and we
drop a 500-pound bomb on it?  Civilian casualties are not just
some reality with the Washington press.  They are a reality for
the Afghan people.  If we use airpower irresponsibly, we can lose
this fight.299
These statements reflect the Tactical Directive General McChrystal
issued and his successor, General David Petraeus, reissued with
modifications, severely limiting air strikes and other attacks that
might result in civilian casualties or damage to civilian property.300
Thus, from a policy viewpoint, McChrystal and Petraeus (and Gen-
eral John R. Allen, the current International Security Assistance
Force (Commander) have endorsed close to zero tolerance for kill-
ing innocent civilians and destroying civilian homes and other
property.301  It was not enough, in their view, to comply with
299. Id.
300. Memorandum from Int’l Sec’y Assistance Force Headquarters regarding General
Stanley A. McChrystal’s Tactical Directive (July 6, 2009), available at http://www.nato.int/
isaf/docu/official_texts/Tactical_Directive_090706.pdf. In the Tactical Directive, General
McChrystal further explained: “We must avoid the trap of winning tactical victories—but
suffering strategic defeats—by causing civilian casualties or excessive damage and thus
alienating the people.” Id. Upon assuming command from General McChrystal, General
Petraeus issued a revised tactical directive, clarifying that U.S. and NATO troops may always
use force in self-defense when necessary, but reaffirming the overriding concern about
avoiding civilian casualties:
Hunt the enemy aggressively, but use only the firepower needed to win a fight.
We can’t win without fighting, but we also cannot kill or capture our way to vic-
tory.  Moreover, if we kill civilians or damage their property in the course of our opera-
tions, we will create more enemies than our operations eliminate.
Letter from David H. Petraeus, Commander, Int’l Sec’y Assistance Force, to the Troops
(Aug. 1, 2010) (emphasis added), available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/
pdf/world/2010/COMISAF-MEMO.pdf.  Some military officials have argued that as a
“’rule of engagement,” the Tactical Directive should not be considered state practice that
evidences evolving custom. See, e.g., George Cadwalader, Military Professor, U.S. Naval War
Coll., Panel Discussion at the American Branch of the International Law Association Inter-
national Law Weekend: Civilian Casualties in Modern Warfare: The Death of the Collateral
Damage Rule (Oct. 22, 2011).
301. This policy, the first tactical initiative, caused some controversy because it
appeared to limit the use of force by U.S. troops even in self-defense.  General Petraeus
issued the second tactical initiative, which, although it made clear troops could use deadly
force in self-defense, still emphasized the protection of civilian and civilian objects. See
supra note 300 and accompanying text.  Now that General Petraeus has been confirmed as R
CIA Director, it will be interesting to see if he applies the Tactical Directive to the drone
program.  Note that General Allen has continued the Tactical Directive: “I expect every
member of ISAF to be seized with the intent to eliminate civilian casualties caused by
ISAF.” Letter from John R. Allen, Commander, ISAF and USFOR-A, to the Troops 2 (July
18, 2011), available at http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/COMISAF-Guidance/
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humanitarian law, which, under the rubric of proportionality and
collateral damage, allows a sizable number of civilians to be killed
and civilian objects to be destroyed in most operations against a
military objective.302  Given Afghans’ long experience with domi-
nating colonial powers, military success there requires a far more
measured use of force so as to cool, rather than excite, Afghan
hostility to the United States’ effort.
Given the history of colonial exploitation and the United States’
current role, our country should use the utmost caution in employ-
ing weaponized drones against previously selected individuals in
this region of the world.  As discussed above, even when legal,
targeted killing occupies a less honored place in combat.  The
United States has not used drones against Caucasian peoples.
United States does not permit operating weaponized drones in
civilian airspace on its own territory—and has thus far only permit-
ted non-weaponized drones for surveillance along the U.S. bor-
der.303  In contrast, many people in some Muslim countries hear
the constant buzzing of U.S. weaponized drones flying overhead,
apparently ready to strike at any time.304
2011-07-18%20COMISAF%20Ltr%20to%20Troops%20Upon%20Taking%20Command.
pdf.
302. For an instructive exposition of the rationale behind the Tactical Directive, see
Richard Gross, Presentation in Panel at the American Society of International Law Annual
Meeting: New Battlefields/Old Laws: Shaping a Legal Environment for Counter-insur-
gency (Mar. 25, 2011) (noting that “sometimes tactical success can lead to strategic
defeats” and that “counterinsurgency is a fight for the will of the people”; and lastly that
when “you take out two Taliban you are not minus two in the fight; in many cases you’re
plus ten”).  For a much fuller discussion of the proportionality rule and the acceptance of
collateral damage under humanitarian law, see MCDONNELL, supra note 19, at 137–48. R
303. See General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, supra note 50. Drones are now engaged in R
patrolling the US-Mexican border.  Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Takes Steps to Tighten Mexican Border,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/16/us/us-takes-steps-to-
tighten-mexican-border.html?pagewanted=all; Randall C. Archibold, U.S. Adds Drones to
Fight Smuggling, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/08/us/08
drone.html?_r=1&ref=drugtrafficking.
304. See Clive Stafford Smith, For Our Allies, Death from Above, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/04/opinion/in-pakistan-drones-kill-our-innocent-
allies.html (“American drones would circle their homes all day before unleashing Hellfire
missiles, often in the dark hours between midnight and dawn.”); Jane Perlitz, Drones Batter
Al Qaeda and Their Allies in Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/04/05/world/asia/05drones.html (“The drones, operated by the C.I.A. fly overhead
sometimes four at a time, emitting a beelike hum virtually 24 hours a day, observing and track-
ing targets, then unleashing missiles on their quarry.”) (emphasis added).
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D. Applying International Humanitarian Law and International
Human Rights Law to Two United States Drone Strikes
This analysis suggests that the drone strike against Anwal al Awl-
aki, the U.S. al Qaeda member, was probably illegal and that the
strike against Baitalluh Mehsud was legal, but probably unwise.
Since the Awlaki killing took place outside an armed conflict to
which United States is a party, but in an area of Yemen in which it
was difficult to exercise law enforcement, the question becomes
whether under, international human rights law, killing Awlaki was
absolutely necessary to stop an imminent threat of death or serious
bodily harm.  Furthermore, Awlaki’s status as a civilian “active[ly]
. . . tak[ing] . . . part in hostilities”305 has been questioned; some
claim he was a mere propagandist, but the U.S. State Department
asserts that he played an operational role.306  As of this writing, the
evidence on these matters is unclear;307 consequently, at a very
minimum, both the executive branch and the U.S. Congress
should conduct open, independent investigations into the
operation.308
By launching from the Pakistani tribal areas large scale attacks
into Afghanistan, the Taliban, with the acquiescence of Pakistan,
have made such areas an extension of the Afghani armed con-
flict.309  As a leader of 20,000 Taliban militants, Mehsud’s status as
a combatant is beyond dispute.  The CIA drone attack in the tribal
areas killed not only Mehsud, but also his second wife and
destroyed his in-laws’ house, all consequences well within the pro-
305. Third Geneva Convention of 1949, supra note 114, art. 3(1). R
306. See Charlie Savage, Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case to Kill a Citizen, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 9, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/world/middleeast/secret-us-memo-
made-legal-case-to-kill-a-citizen.html?pagewanted=all.
307. Id. (citing unnamed sources that U.S. intelligence agencies concluded that Awlaki
“played a direct role in terrorist operations against the United States, that he was affiliated
with Al Qaeda’s terrorist network[,] and that he was beyond the reach of Yemen’s authori-
ties”).  Attorney General Holder stated that Farouk Abdulmutallab, the Christmas under-
wear bomber, admitted that “he made contact with” Awlaki.  Holder, supra note 175.  Note, R
however, that recent reports suggest that the use of drone strikes in Yemen has aided in
terrorist recruitment. See, e.g., Mothana, supra note 252; see also Complaint, Al-Aulaqi v. R
Panetta (D.D.C. filed July 18, 2012), available at http://www.ccrjustice.org/files/July-18-
2012-Nasser-Al-Aulaqi-Complaint.pdf (filed by the American Civil Liberties Union and
Center for Constitutional Rights, suing the Secretary of Defense for allegedly violating Al-
Aulaqi’s rights as an American citizen in targeting and killing him in the drone strike).
308. At a minimum, such investigations should be carried out by the CIA Inspector
General, the U.S. Department of Defense Inspector General, and Congress.
309. See, e.g., C.J. Chivers, Tensions Flare as G.I.’s Take Fire out of Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 17, 2011, at 1 (noting that “[g]round-to-ground rockets fired within Pakistan have
landed on or near American military outposts in one Afghan border province at least 55
times since May”); see also Paust, Self-Defense Targetings, supra note 93, at 250–51. R
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portionality-collateral damage rule.310  Yet the retaliatory suicide
double agent bomb attack against the CIA indicates the anger that
the drone attack inspired, despite having received broad approval
by Pakistanis.  Along with the historical evidence of Islamic coloni-
zation and empirical evidence regarding targeting religiously moti-
vated terrorists, this response raises, among others, the question
whether attacks on such a leader will dampen rather than inflame
violence.
CONCLUSION
The major industrial states are racing to produce robotic weap-
ons; at least fifty-six nations are developing them.311  Furthermore,
there now is “massive spending” to develop completely autono-
mous weapons that take “humans out of the loop.”312  The combi-
nation of advances in robotic weaponry and threats from terrorist
non-state actors is incendiary.  It enables government officials to
call the Geneva Conventions quaint and obsolete and even more
liberal governmental officials to offer far-reaching legal interpreta-
tions justifying targeted killing with remotely operated weapon
systems.
Drones raise the ante.  The ease of using drones and the lack of
danger to the attackers increase the likelihood of using attack
drones more than ever before and in areas far from armed conflict,
thereby eroding humanitarian law and human rights law.  For the
attacked people—generally technologically limited, but united by
an extreme fundamentalist religious ethos—targeted killing by
such means must be particularly infuriating.
At the very least, there is a reasonable doubt that using drones
for targeted killing operations of suspected Islamic terrorists will,
in the long run, seriously disable the terrorist organizations they
lead.  Despite the decapitation of numerous Taliban and al Qaeda
leaders and the Obama administration’s belief that the strikes have
effectively paralyzed al Qaeda in the Pakistan tribal areas, there is
some evidence to suggest that such operations might actually
strengthen such organizations both internally and externally.
310. Yet as an attack in a partially failed state (the tribal areas of Pakistan), it is submit-
ted that NATO and the United States should observe a higher standard, to strive to elimi-
nate civilian casualties. See supra note 218. R
311. John Markoff, War Machines: Recruiting Robots for Combat, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/28/science/28robot.html.
312. Noel Sharkey, Grounds for Discrimination: Autonomous Robot Weapons, RUSI DEFENCE
SYSTEMS, Oct. 2008, at 89; see also Ramage, supra note 55. R
316 The Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. [Vol. 44 Employed against these targets, the unchivalrous, seemingly cow-ardly, method of warfare might result in greater support for ter-rorists and more terrorist recruits in the Islamic world. Perhaps even more important, compiling hit lists and then using a machine remotely operated from a distant land, to take the life of listed suspected terrorists appears much more like murder than honorable combat and, thereby, undermines world public order. Furthermore despite their precision, drone missile attacks often endanger non-combatants.  The United States and its allies should restrict the targeted killing of suspected Islamic terrorists to the exceptional case where a militant poses an imminent threat to the United States, allied troops or civilians, and, as a matter of policy, if not crystallized, international law, ensure that innocent civilians be spared. The West and the United States should learn from their own experience in Afghanistan resulting in the Tactical Directive and from the history of air warfare in  Vietnam, and World War II that interpreting combat immunities strictly and human rights and humanitarian law protections broadly is our best hope for uphold-ing the United States’ moral authority and for lessening rather than inflaming conflict, especially with religiously motivated terrorist movements in repressed societies largely colonized by Western hands.  
